On 19 Oct 2014, at 21:14, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:
Very well, and now we go to the primal. I am presuming, but who
wrote the programs for computationalism,
I guess you mean "who wrote the programs for the
computations" (Computationalism is just a religious belief, or a
philosophical axiom).
If you are ready to accept that 2+2 = 4 independently of us (the
living being), then we don't need to write the programs of the
computations, or the program of the UD (which generates and executes
all computations), because their existence is of the same type as the
truth of 2+2=4. That is, elementary arithmetic implements all
computations already.
who thought the great thought, who made Plato's ideals?
It is part of elementary arithmetic. You need only to believe in the
axioms of arithmetic, like:
0 ≠ s(x)
s(x) = s(y) -> x = y
x = 0 v Ey(x = s(y))
x+0 = x
x+s(y) = s(x+y)
x*0=0
x*s(y)=(x*y)+x
We see cause and effect in nature on our planet.
Platonist don't believe that what they see is necessarily real. If it
is persistent enough, they will take that as an evidence that there is
something real, but not that what they see is the real thing.
What causes lightning and thunder, or droughts, or earthquakes, and
so forth, however, these are local events, or apparently local, in
the sense of this region of the universe. But laws, or programs are
more subtle. Yet more profound. We have no indication, as of today,
that life is prevalent in the universe.
It is not well know, but there are strong evidences that life is
prevalent in arithmetic. In fact, it is provable once you accept
computationalism.
Not many scientists see panspermia as the dominating force, and what
is life but a chain of programs governing chemical action?
That is how we see them, but life is in the immaterial relations
leading to the experiences.
If a law or program is said to emerge, then what from, Planck Cells?
Just from elementary arithmetic, as you have learned in high school.
There is no other assumption beside computationalism.
How do planck cells produce programs. Is there a look up table, or
akashic database to be read? How did this relational database evolve?
"evolves" is how it seems to us, but time, space, energy comes from
the First Person Indeterminacy on all computations seen from the first
person points of view (if computationalism is correct). That is
computable, so it makes computationalism a testable hypothesis.
Bruno
-----Original Message-----
From: Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
To: everything-list <[email protected]>
Sent: Sun, Oct 19, 2014 12:19 pm
Subject: Re: Are We Really Conscious? (NYT Article today)
On 18 Oct 2014, at 17:00, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:
Moreover, can consciousness be copied? Can we be duplicated
mentally and how well can we. If, consciousness is a substance, as
Tegmark asserts, then the pattern can be copied, right?
If consciousness is a quantum substance, integrally, then it cannot
be cloned.
But then also, computationalism is false. Computationalism is that
consciousness can be duplicated in the 3-1 view, like in the WM-
duplication experiment. Consciousness cannot be duplicated in the 1-
view, though, that is why there is a first person indeterminacy to
begin with. But it is only relative (like in QM, actually).
But then, assuming comp, we have also that the physical substance,
the apparent primitive matter cannot be cloned, as it is a sum of
infinities. This must be weakened by the renormalization needed to
hunt the white rabbit away, and which is already consistent with the
observable-logic extracted from classical comp (comp + Theaetetus).
Keep in mind that once we assume computationalism, we cannot refer
to the current physics in the argument, for logical reason. that
elimiantes consciousness with or without saying. With
computationalism, it is also equivalent with using God in a
scientific explanation in theology. We can't do that, independently
of the existence of god or not, or here of the physical universe or
not.
Bruno
-----Original Message-----
From: Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]>
To: everything-list <[email protected]>
Sent: Sat, Oct 18, 2014 9:23 am
Subject: Re: Are We Really Conscious? (NYT Article today)
On 17 October 2014 09:40, David Nyman <[email protected]> wrote:
> On 16 October 2014 19:54, Stathis Papaioannou
<[email protected]> wrote:
>
>> A necessary side-effect roughly equates to the idea of weak
emergence.
>
>
> Weak emergence of what, precisely? And in what way could this
emergent
> something be distinguishable from the physical processes
constituting it?
Weak emergence of consciousness. The emergent phenomenon is
distinguishable from the physical processes constituting it in the
way
any system is distinguishable from its parts, while still being
fundamentally nothing more than its parts.
--
Stathis Papaioannou
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