On Sun, Dec 7, 2014 at 12:30 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
> > On 06 Dec 2014, at 14:09, Telmo Menezes wrote: > > > > On Sat, Dec 6, 2014 at 9:14 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > >> >> On 05 Dec 2014, at 17:20, Telmo Menezes wrote: >> >> >> >> On Fri, Dec 5, 2014 at 8:06 AM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> On 12/4/2014 8:05 PM, LizR wrote: >>> >>>> I suspect that Bruno is differentiating physical existence from primary >>>> existence. >>>> >>> >>> What's the difference? Isn't physical existence the paradigmatic case? >>> the example we point to when asked to define "exits"? >>> >> >> Not wanting to bypass Bruno's more sophisticated explanations, I tend to >> equate "physical existence" with the idea of something existing >> independently of an observer. Or, to put it another way, taking 3p reality >> seriously. No? >> >> >> Unfortunately, if we assume computationalism, the physical is no more 3p, >> but is 1p-plural, which makes the FPI locally 3p, but still globally >> 1p-plural. But that 1p-plural here is not the human 1p, but the 3p >> definable "1p-plural" use the 1p of the Löbian machine, which is very >> general, and admits a 3p definition, like []p & <>t, which is definable by >> the machine unlike the modalities with " & p" added to it. >> >> I guess I will need to explain this a bit more perhaps. You forget the >> "reversal" physics/machine-theology/psychology. In case of panic, note that >> the moon would still exist physically even if the humans did not appear. >> But there would be no moon without Löbian machines, which is not a problem >> because the existence of Löbian machines is derivable in elementary >> arithmetic. It is a consequence of 2+2=4. >> >> cf: NUMBER => MACHINE'S DREAM => PHYSICAL REALITIES >> > > Thanks Bruno. I have no problem with this. > > I was referring to "physical existence" in the conventional materialistic > sense. > > > OK. 1p-plural is certainly locally 3p-physical, in the conventionall > sense. If computationalism is correct, it has to be like that. > Why? > In your model the physical reality has a much different ontological status > than in materialism, even though, as you say, the outcome is the same for > many purposes. > > > That remains to be seen, but the first very modest result confirms this, > at a place most thought it would not. > On the other side: the contagion of superposition to the observer states > gives an empirical confirmation of the "natural" appearance of 1p plural > person (with duplication or n-plication of *population* of interacting > observers). It is less obvious with computationalism, but far from totally > hopeless though. > > > > Maybe we lack terms. But, also to reply to Brent, this idea of 1p-plural > is perhaps why one can doubt 3p reality and still avoid the mad house. > > > We still have the 3p basic ontology of the chosenTOE also (like numbers or > combinators). I mean to avoid the asylum ... > Ok, but I don't think this is what conventional materialists have in mind. I think materialists are extremists in a sense. They absolutely buy into common sense and frame science as an effort to recover that common sense no matter what. This leads to extremes, like doubting one's own consciousness or maintaining positions of faith over the interpretation of quantum mechanics. You can notice the subtle change in the meaning of being a "skeptic". The original meaning is very close to "agnostic" but it has been slowly sliding into a strong preference for common sense, which is to say, the belief of the majority. Telmo. > > Bruno > > > > > Telmo. > > >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> Telmo. >> >> >>> >>> Brent >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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