On 08 Dec 2014, at 11:36, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Sun, Dec 7, 2014 at 12:30 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 06 Dec 2014, at 14:09, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Sat, Dec 6, 2014 at 9:14 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 05 Dec 2014, at 17:20, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Fri, Dec 5, 2014 at 8:06 AM, meekerdb <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 12/4/2014 8:05 PM, LizR wrote:
I suspect that Bruno is differentiating physical existence from
primary existence.
What's the difference? Isn't physical existence the paradigmatic
case? the example we point to when asked to define "exits"?
Not wanting to bypass Bruno's more sophisticated explanations, I
tend to equate "physical existence" with the idea of something
existing independently of an observer. Or, to put it another way,
taking 3p reality seriously. No?
Unfortunately, if we assume computationalism, the physical is no
more 3p, but is 1p-plural, which makes the FPI locally 3p, but
still globally 1p-plural. But that 1p-plural here is not the human
1p, but the 3p definable "1p-plural" use the 1p of the Löbian
machine, which is very general, and admits a 3p definition, like
[]p & <>t, which is definable by the machine unlike the modalities
with " & p" added to it.
I guess I will need to explain this a bit more perhaps. You forget
the "reversal" physics/machine-theology/psychology. In case of
panic, note that the moon would still exist physically even if the
humans did not appear. But there would be no moon without Löbian
machines, which is not a problem because the existence of Löbian
machines is derivable in elementary arithmetic. It is a consequence
of 2+2=4.
cf: NUMBER => MACHINE'S DREAM => PHYSICAL REALITIES
Thanks Bruno. I have no problem with this.
I was referring to "physical existence" in the conventional
materialistic sense.
OK. 1p-plural is certainly locally 3p-physical, in the conventionall
sense. If computationalism is correct, it has to be like that.
Why?
Take the iterated WM-duplication. The 1p of the observer is given by
the record of its personal experience. A typical observer has some
random history, like WMMMMWMWWMMWWWM ... OK?
For the external 3p observer there is no random events which would
have occurred. Its own diary, after his interview of all resulting
copies, contains just all sequences, and is equivalent with a counting
of the natural numbers (in base 2, say), which is hardly seen as a
random phenomenon!
From this we might thing that the first person indeterminacy is not
testable, and that it is not like in quantum mechanics where two
observers can agree on some statistical test. It looks like the QM
indeterminacy has this 3p feature lacking in the 1p indeterminacy.
Of course this is wrong. two observers can share the 1p indeterminacy:
it is enough they both enter the duplication machine. If you duplicate
population of machines, they will share the statistical result. If the
guy above, who got the WMMMMWMWWMMWWWM... story, was duplicated
together with a guy wanting to make the statistical test, they would
both share the same random history, and in case they both agree on the
test, will both agree if the test succeeded or not.
That first person experience, which is sharable in each resulting
population (of a duplication experience) is what I call the first
person plural experience. It is still first person (= content of
diaries by people doing self-duplication, or self-superposition for
that matter), but it is sharable, among each of such population. From
their point of view, it is exactly like a 3p-"event".
COMP + non-solipsisme must imply that we share the FPI, we get
entangled, so to speak, by the contagion of the duplication of the
"other" observer with which we talk.
In that sense, we see that Everett saves Comp from solipsisme. We are,
by QM linearity, multiplied together.
I should have said "If COMP is correct, and non-solipisme is correct,
the physical has to be 1p plural, and we should share the computations
just above our substitution level. Now QM confirms this, unless the
put back some magic like the collapse (a collective hallucination,
according to Feynman, and comp shows this too and extends it to the
wave itself).
Once share such 1p stories, it is hard for us to see that they are 1p,
and we take them at first for 3p things. We better should, in case we
prefer to eat instead of being eaten. The prey has to be eaten to
realize that the predator was an illusion, or life would not have
developed, somehow.
Hope this clarifies a bit.
In your model the physical reality has a much different ontological
status than in materialism, even though, as you say, the outcome is
the same for many purposes.
That remains to be seen, but the first very modest result confirms
this, at a place most thought it would not.
On the other side: the contagion of superposition to the observer
states gives an empirical confirmation of the "natural" appearance
of 1p plural person (with duplication or n-plication of *population*
of interacting observers). It is less obvious with computationalism,
but far from totally hopeless though.
Maybe we lack terms. But, also to reply to Brent, this idea of 1p-
plural is perhaps why one can doubt 3p reality and still avoid the
mad house.
We still have the 3p basic ontology of the chosenTOE also (like
numbers or combinators). I mean to avoid the asylum ...
Ok, but I don't think this is what conventional materialists have in
mind.
Certainly not. They believe in primitive particles, localized in a
primitive 3d volume, with masses, charge, and other attributes. Of
course with QM, even in Everett, this can only be a sort of
approximation.
I think materialists are extremists in a sense. They absolutely buy
into common sense and frame science as an effort to recover that
common sense no matter what.
Hmm... Common sense is not bad. They just don't push it enough to see
the contradictions or difficulties.
Primitive matter is not that much "common sense", than Aristotelian
brainwashing. With the help of evolution to confuse matter and the
metaphysical or theological concept of primitive or primary matter.
This leads to extremes, like doubting one's own consciousness
OK. But that's is not common sense. It is non sense.
or maintaining positions of faith over the interpretation of quantum
mechanics.
In all case, we need faith to believe in a reality (a model, in the
painter or logician sense, which we can compare with our theory/
painting). No consistent machine can prove the existence of that
model, because that would be equivalent (by Gödel's completeness
theorem) to proving its own consistency, which is impossible (by
Gödel's incompleteness theorem).
That's why all machines which believe in a reality (enough rich to
belong to that reality) needs faith.
You can notice the subtle change in the meaning of being a
"skeptic". The original meaning is very close to "agnostic" but it
has been slowly sliding into a strong preference for common sense,
which is to say, the belief of the majority.
Of course. *some* people say that they are skeptic just to say that
they don't believe in immaterial angels. They ignore that we can be
skeptic for primitively material things, as opposed to immaterial math.
The problem is that people ignore that a platonist is strongly
atheist, with respect to *all* Aristotelian 'gods: that is both the
creator *and* the creation. But they are still "believer", if only in
some truth they have faith in, so that they can search for it.
Then if we take computationalism seriously enough, using the weak
usual Occam, we see that we can't avoid a coming back to Plato, where
matter is an emerging *point of view*, starting from a theory of mind/
perception/observable, itself starting from addition and
multiplication of natural numbers (or anything Turing equivalent).
Add the classical theory of knowledge, and its variants imposed by
incompleteness, and things get refutable experimentally, making comp a
"scientific", in Popper sense (already informally in Plato, imo) theory.
That illustrates also that exact science has an non empty intersection
with philosophy/metaphysics/theology, and ... well that is enough for
being hated by exact-scientists and philosophers alike in obscurantist
time...
In science we still kill the diplomat when the domain are judged too
much separated. Yet, historically, we know that the separation here
was artificial, and driven by political goals, not arguments. People
will swallow soon or later. Like cannabis, we can't hide the true fact
for long. If the humans can't, the spider will, or the machines. I
think comp might predict that lies have finite run time, unlike the
truth (but I am not sure, not for all type of lies ...).
Bruno
Telmo.
Bruno
Telmo.
Bruno
Telmo.
Brent
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