On Thu, Feb 12, 2015 at 9:54 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
> On 2/12/2015 9:15 AM, Jason Resch wrote: > > > > On Thu, Feb 12, 2015 at 6:20 AM, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> On 12 February 2015 at 18:14, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> > Which means that consciousness tests are in theory possible, and >> >> > non-conscious zombies that exhibit those certain behaviors are >> >> > prohibited. >> >> >> >> No, as per my answer to Brent. >> > >> > >> > The logic above alone does not tell us what the tests are, but it does >> mean >> > that consciousness cannot be removed without there being a >> change/difference >> > in behaviors. >> >> If consciousness is supervenient then you can't selectively remove it. >> You can change the behaviour and that may change the consciousness, >> but not the other way around. >> > > But then that is just a theory of supervienience/emergence, it is not > epiphneominalism. In interactionist dualism, if you remove the > consciousness you cause behavioral/physical changes since the immaterial > mind can no longer control the body. With epiphenominalism, you could > eliminate the immaterial mind without having any changes in the physical > world. > > > You use "could" in the sense of logically conceivable. But I use it > nomologically, and nomologically it is impossible to remove consciousness > if it an epiphenomenon of intelligent behavior. > > Emergence/Supervienence would not be epiphenominal theories, since > under them it is not logically possible to remove or change consciousness > without there being physically detectible differences in the system. > > > No it is *logically* possible. You can't prove false from "There is no > physical difference, but the being is not conscious." But it is > *nomologically* impossible - or at least that's what I think epiphenomenal > means. But I don't care about the semantics, if that's what "emergent" > means to you - fined call is emergent instead of epiphenomenal. > > In epiphenominalism, what consciousness exists or doesn't exist, and > how it may appear to the experiencer is all up to the rules that govern the > immaterial universe in which the mind inhabits under epiphenominalism. > > > If there's an immaterial universe in which minds exist with rules > independent of the material universe, then that's dualism. > Epiphenominalism is a form of dualism. See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dualism_%28philosophy_of_mind%29#Dualist_views_of_mental_causation > > The way to view epiphenominalism is that our minds are immaterial souls > on some ethereal plane, and we receive information from a physical universe > (in the same way a movie might be projected to be viewed but not effected) > into our conscious minds. Yet regardless of what our minds decide to do > with that information, we're only watching a movie we can't change. > > > Depends on who you're calling "we". Does "we" include our brains? > Under epiphenominalism, mental events are caused by the brain, but the mental events play no further causal role. It's up to you then whether you identify with your cause or the effect. > > If you really believe your thoughts and mental events have no effects > on the physical universe then that is epiphenominalism. Not just that you > can ignore the higher supervenient layers, but that you're better off not > mentioning them at all under Occam's razor, it's easier to just deny their > existence altogether since they have no effects. > > > Like it's easier to do thermodynamics by referring only to the velocity > and location of molecules. > Except for that pesky first-person view, everything would be so much simpler if not for it. Jason > > Brent > > The only thing preventing you from cutting off your own mind via > occam's razor is your own consciousness which you have direct evidence of, > but then you can only ever help to justify solipsism if you cling to > epiphenominalism. It's as dead-end of a theory as Berkeley's idealism is as > far as trying to figure out the properties and requirements of conscious > minds. > > > >> >> >> >> Nevertheless, these two statements are compatible: >> >> >> >> >> >> 1. There is no way to determine if a being is conscious or not. >> >> >> 2. Given that a particular being is conscious, there could be no >> >> >> zombie equivalent of that being. >> >> >> >> >> > >> >> > My assertion is that neither of the above two statements is or >> implies >> >> > epiphenominalism. Epiphenominalism is the stronger statement that >> >> > consciousness has no effects, and so that presence or absence of >> >> > consciousness is dispensable and therefore it would make no >> difference >> >> > to >> >> > the future evolution of this universe if on next Thursday all >> conscious >> >> > sensations disappeared entirely. >> >> >> >> I think both statements are compatible with epiphenomenalism. >> >> >> >> >> > >> > Could you provide me with your definition of what epiphenominalism is >> and >> > what it is not? Which of these theories of mind you consider to fall >> within >> > epiphenominalism? >> >> I'm not stuck on the term "epiphenomenalism" if it causes confusion. >> I'll quote Brent: >> >> "...being an epiphenomenon means one can give a causal account of the >> phenomenon without mentioning it. But the epiphenomenon necessarily >> accompanies the phenomenon." >> >> > The "necessary" part is not part of the standard definition of > epiphenominalism. > > >> > Descartes Dualism >> > Liebniz's Pre-established Harmony >> > Berkeley's Idealism >> > Smart's Mind-Brain Identity Theory >> > Searle's Biological Naturalism >> > Physicalism >> > Functionalism >> > Computationalism >> > Eliminative Materialism >> >> I think functionalism and computationalism are compatible with >> epiphenomenalism. Identity theory, physicalism and eliminative >> materialism could be compatible, although they tend to devalue or >> discount consciousness. >> >> > But none of those theories are forms of dualism. Wouldn't you agree that > the conventional account of epiphenominalism is a form of dualism? > > Jason > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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