On Saturday, February 14, 2015, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> > On 12 Feb 2015, at 13:20, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > On 12 February 2015 at 18:14, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >> Which means that consciousness tests are in theory possible, and >>>>> non-conscious zombies that exhibit those certain behaviors are >>>>> prohibited. >>>>> >>>> >>>> No, as per my answer to Brent. >>>> >>> >>> >>> The logic above alone does not tell us what the tests are, but it does >>> mean >>> that consciousness cannot be removed without there being a >>> change/difference >>> in behaviors. >>> >> >> If consciousness is supervenient then you can't selectively remove it. >> You can change the behaviour and that may change the consciousness, >> but not the other way around. >> >> Nevertheless, these two statements are compatible: >>>>>> >>>>>> 1. There is no way to determine if a being is conscious or not. >>>>>> 2. Given that a particular being is conscious, there could be no >>>>>> zombie equivalent of that being. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> My assertion is that neither of the above two statements is or implies >>>>> epiphenominalism. Epiphenominalism is the stronger statement that >>>>> consciousness has no effects, and so that presence or absence of >>>>> consciousness is dispensable and therefore it would make no difference >>>>> to >>>>> the future evolution of this universe if on next Thursday all conscious >>>>> sensations disappeared entirely. >>>>> >>>> >>>> I think both statements are compatible with epiphenomenalism. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> Could you provide me with your definition of what epiphenominalism is and >>> what it is not? Which of these theories of mind you consider to fall >>> within >>> epiphenominalism? >>> >> >> I'm not stuck on the term "epiphenomenalism" if it causes confusion. >> I'll quote Brent: >> >> "...being an epiphenomenon means one can give a causal account of the >> phenomenon without mentioning it. But the epiphenomenon necessarily >> accompanies the phenomenon." >> >> Descartes Dualism >>> Liebniz's Pre-established Harmony >>> Berkeley's Idealism >>> Smart's Mind-Brain Identity Theory >>> Searle's Biological Naturalism >>> Physicalism >>> Functionalism >>> Computationalism >>> Eliminative Materialism >>> >> >> I think functionalism and computationalism are compatible with >> epiphenomenalism. Identity theory, physicalism and eliminative >> materialism could be compatible, although they tend to devalue or >> discount consciousness. >> > > I can agree that epiphenomenalism can be considered compatible with > computationalism, but then both matter and mind are epiphenomena. In fact > all of computer science, and physics, becomes, in that case, an > epiphenomena of arithmetic. But I prefer to abandon epiphenomenalism, > because this stretches the word too much. I use it in this way: if (1) consciousness is a necessary side-effect of certain types of behaviour, and (2) all behaviour is computable, then (3) comp is established, and so (4) following Bruno's argument consciousness is primary and there is no separate physical universe. (1) and (4) may at first seem contradictory, but I think they are not. (1) is a step in an argument - a bit like Wittgenstein's Ladder. > Identity theory, physicalism and all weak materialism, are incompatible > with computationalism, and weak Occam. That is part of what I try to > explain. > > Functionalism, in the literature is due to Putnam, and is a special case > of computationalism (it is comp + an implicit high susbstitution level). > But I know you defined functionalism in a larger sense. You might need to > define "function" to make it precise. In my (possibly idiosyncratic) use of these terms in computationalism you can replace the brain with an appropriate computer and the mind is preserved, while in functionalism you can replace the brain with any appropriate device and the mind is preserved. Computationalism is thus a subset of functionalism. Where this is relevant is if the brain uses non-computable physics: it would not then be possible to substitute the brain with a digital computer, but it may be possible to substitute with another device, an analogue computer, for example (although perhaps it could be argued that in the limiting case a Turing machine could still do the job). > Eliminative materialism contradicts personal data, easily available to all > persons. IMO, it is insane, but "natural" for an aristotelian who wish > abstract from all 1p reference. It is good methodology, but poor > metaphysics. > > The problem of terms like "epiphenomenalism" (and some other ...ism) is > that they are defined implicitly only in the Aristotelian picture. They > *can* acquire different meanings in the platonician picture. > > Bruno > > > > > > > > >> >> -- >> Stathis Papaioannou >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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