On 13 Feb 2015, at 19:52, David Nyman wrote:
On 13 February 2015 at 15:04, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
The problem of terms like "epiphenomenalism" (and some other ...ism)
is that they are defined implicitly only in the Aristotelian
picture. They *can* acquire different meanings in the platonician
picture.
Yes, I agree. In a previous discussion with Brent, I remarked that a
difference between consciousness on 'Aristotelean' and
computationalist assumptions is that the former seems to lack the
explanatory resources to elucidate an explicit theory of the first-
person, other than brute association with the physical action of
some material substrate. His view, which seems rather common, is
that this is as far as we can or should expect explanation to go.
That seems to me to be a little obscurantist, or at least unhelpful.
There is an implicit use of "matter" as a gap. It is quite similar to
Bohmian, or Copenhageans adding something unintelligible to QM to
avoid its consequences. But with comp, they have to eliminate the
person eventually.
None of this means that comp is correct, of course, but it does at
least have the value of suggesting possible lines of thought in
which the role of the first-person may appear somewhat less
exceptional and paradoxical. 'Truth', in the sense of a first-
person, or immediate and incorrigible, actuality, is perhaps not
something that we would expect to find in the Aristotelian ('seek no
further') formulation of physics. But it's hard to escape the
intuition that truthfulness, at least as a first approximation, is
an intrinsic feature of consciousness. This of course was Descartes'
basic intuition and time hasn't eroded its essential point.
That's point is an eternal fixed point. It is the sense of humor of
the universal machine truth: the consistency of inconsistency.
G* proves <>[]f, it makes death and humor possible, at some very basic
level. Thomas Slezak made similar comparisons between Descartes'
cogito and the diagonal sentence of Gödel, and I show this valid for
G, and Z, and the classical definition of knowledge (S4).
The aristotelians put the mind-body problem under the rug since ... ,
well, I begin to think that Aristotle has some responsibility. I try
to grasp "Aristotle's refutation of Plato", on this matter, and it
appears already to look similar to a sort of mockery of the lack of
common sense of the Platonists----the sempiternal knocking on the table.
Bruno
David
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