On 12 Feb 2015, at 13:20, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 12 February 2015 at 18:14, Jason Resch <[email protected]>
wrote:
Which means that consciousness tests are in theory possible, and
non-conscious zombies that exhibit those certain behaviors are
prohibited.
No, as per my answer to Brent.
The logic above alone does not tell us what the tests are, but it
does mean
that consciousness cannot be removed without there being a change/
difference
in behaviors.
If consciousness is supervenient then you can't selectively remove it.
You can change the behaviour and that may change the consciousness,
but not the other way around.
Nevertheless, these two statements are compatible:
1. There is no way to determine if a being is conscious or not.
2. Given that a particular being is conscious, there could be no
zombie equivalent of that being.
My assertion is that neither of the above two statements is or
implies
epiphenominalism. Epiphenominalism is the stronger statement that
consciousness has no effects, and so that presence or absence of
consciousness is dispensable and therefore it would make no
difference
to
the future evolution of this universe if on next Thursday all
conscious
sensations disappeared entirely.
I think both statements are compatible with epiphenomenalism.
Could you provide me with your definition of what epiphenominalism
is and
what it is not? Which of these theories of mind you consider to
fall within
epiphenominalism?
I'm not stuck on the term "epiphenomenalism" if it causes confusion.
I'll quote Brent:
"...being an epiphenomenon means one can give a causal account of the
phenomenon without mentioning it. But the epiphenomenon necessarily
accompanies the phenomenon."
Descartes Dualism
Liebniz's Pre-established Harmony
Berkeley's Idealism
Smart's Mind-Brain Identity Theory
Searle's Biological Naturalism
Physicalism
Functionalism
Computationalism
Eliminative Materialism
I think functionalism and computationalism are compatible with
epiphenomenalism. Identity theory, physicalism and eliminative
materialism could be compatible, although they tend to devalue or
discount consciousness.
I can agree that epiphenomenalism can be considered compatible with
computationalism, but then both matter and mind are epiphenomena. In
fact all of computer science, and physics, becomes, in that case, an
epiphenomena of arithmetic. But I prefer to abandon epiphenomenalism,
because this stretches the word too much.
Identity theory, physicalism and all weak materialism, are
incompatible with computationalism, and weak Occam. That is part of
what I try to explain.
Functionalism, in the literature is due to Putnam, and is a special
case of computationalism (it is comp + an implicit high susbstitution
level). But I know you defined functionalism in a larger sense. You
might need to define "function" to make it precise.
Eliminative materialism contradicts personal data, easily available to
all persons. IMO, it is insane, but "natural" for an aristotelian who
wish abstract from all 1p reference. It is good methodology, but poor
metaphysics.
The problem of terms like "epiphenomenalism" (and some other ...ism)
is that they are defined implicitly only in the Aristotelian picture.
They *can* acquire different meanings in the platonician picture.
Bruno
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Stathis Papaioannou
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