On 21 Feb 2015, at 02:50, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/20/2015 8:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
QM + collapse is inconsistent (with a great variety of principle,
like computationalism, God does not play dice, no spooky actions,
etc.).
Principles of Platonist faith.
You don't need any faith to disbelieve in the opportunity to invoke
magical thing in the explanation.
It is up to those who make extraordinary claims to provide the
evidences.
It is a theorem of comp, also. The many worlds, in his relative
state formulation, is already a consequence of computationalism.
By church thesis, *all* computations are emulated in all possible
ways in elementary arithmetic, with a typical machine-independent
redundancy: it makes the notion of "world" formulable,
Does it? What's the definition of a world in comp?
It is a model of "my beliefs", assuming I am consistent (so that such
a model exist).
You can handle the world by notion like maximal consistent sets of
formula, which in this case can have oracle like answering W or M when
opening a door after a self-duplication. A world can satisfy a belief
like "I belief in PA and I am currently located at Washington".
Can you show that there are distinction denumerable worlds?
Word are internal psychological, epistemological or theological
notion, and the geometry on the worlds depend on the person's point of
view.
The "probability measure" is not dependent of our ability to
distinguish worlds, but on their ability to differentiate in
principle, a bit like decoherence in Everett-QM. Of course, we have
only the shadow of coherence, so we can't extract decoherence today: a
lot of problems must be solved before. The point is: we have the math
to do so, and so to test classical computationalism.
Bruno
Brent
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