On 2/23/2015 7:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 23 Feb 2015, at 01:16, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/22/2015 2:52 PM, LizR wrote:
On 23 February 2015 at 10:17, meekerdb <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>>
Computationalism is an extraordinary claim.
The claim that what goes on inside brains is at some level Turing-emulable seems not
necessarily extraordinary - or do you think it is?
Yes. It's not crazy or outlandish, but I don't think it's ordinary either.
It seems like a fairly standard assumption by many scientists and philosophers, but I
can believe it's wrong - but some reason to do so would be nice rather, than just a
"statement from authority". as given here.Y
(If the conclusions Bruno has drawn from that assumption appear extraordinary those
aren't "claims", just deductions which can presumably be shown to be wrong through the
application of logic, assuming they are ub fact wrong. He's provided a detailed
description of his assumptions and deductions, so go to it.)
I doubt Bruno has made an error of deduction. But I find his interpretation that
identifies "provable" = "belief" dubious.
I do not identify "believable" with "provable by PA". I say only that if we assume
computationalism, then the result will apply to all rational believer in PA. They can be
quite different from PA, like ZF. the results apply as long as the machine is
consistent, and believes in the axioms of PA. It would not work on you, only in the case
your arithmetical beliefs are inconsistent with the theorems of PA. So, to make your
remark here relevant, you should give us a theorem of PA that you disbelief.
That every number has a unique successor.
And even the Plationist idea that arithmetic exists in the sense necessary to
instantiate the world we see is doubtful.
There is no world. But if you agree that 2+2=4 independently of time, mass, space (which
is the natural understanding of math proposition), and if you agree or assume
computationalism, then some numbers will behave like if they believe in worlds, and will
develop physics, etc.
What does it mean for a number to believe something? I earlier said you identified
"believe" with "provable" but you denied that - although it seems to me you use it that way.
You can say that they are zombies, assuming some magic matter, but it is more
interesting to look at the physics they develop, and compare with our inferred physics.
That some things may happen at random isn't.
Now that /is/ an extraordinary claim, in my opinion. What would be a suitable
underlying means by which the universe might operate, that it makes things happen at
random? I can imagine things that might appear random to us, but are actually the
result of deterministic forces operating on scales we can't probe - e.g. string
vibrations. But genuinely random - that seems to me to require extraordinary evidence.
So far we only have evidence for "apparently random" as far as I know.
Some backup for the above two extraordinary claims would be welcome.
(1) that brains aren't Turing emulable at any level
You seem to be saying that to assert a claim is extraordinary is equivalent to
asserting it's negation. So if I say claiming there's a teapot orbiting Jupiter is
extraordinary, you'll ask that I back up that extraordinary assertion? What happened
to agnosticism? I don't think I made any extraordinary claim; unless mere doubt of
Platonism has become extraordinary.
It is better to use "realism" instead of Platonism, which is related, but different.
Arithmetical realism is believed by all scientists, and almost all philosophers.
Platonism is a different matter, as it implies something like "no more than the numbers,
or that the world of ideas". Arithmetical realism is in the assumption (in Church thesis
notably). Platonism is among the counter-intuitive conclusions.
(2) that there is a mechanism by which the universe might generate truly, rather than
apparently random events.
I'm not sure it's possible to have a mechanism that generates truly random events. I
think that's like asking for an algorithm that produces truly random numbers. -
although it may turn on the meaning of "mechanism".
Well, if you enlarge mechanism by replacing computable function by function, then, by
Cantor, you get 2^aleph_zero genuine random functions, but there is no evidence that
this exists in nature
There's no evidence in nature that there are infinitely many natural numbers
either.
Brent
, other than what is retrievable by (self) duplication and our "multiple-preparation" in
arithmetic.
Bruno
Brent
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