We're speaking to the statement: do extraordinary claims demand extraordinary 
evidence, or do sufficient claims demand sufficient evidence? Pauling, I 
dismiss as too political. There were various reviews of the nuclear winter 
claim during the 80's and after, and since the fall of the sov empire many of 
the old kgb files were opened and it was that org which funded the so called 
antiwar movement. Notice that nobody ever protested soviet deployments of 
ss-20's an 18's? But it was always cruise missiles and pershings that drew 
crowds in Europe. The nature of nuclear devastation was enhanced by the nuke 
antiwar people who needed to exaggerated to sell the point, as they are with 
AGW. Sell the point, not the whole truth. Would killing off 1-2 billion people 
sort of mess things up for the species? I surmise, yes. Since the report by 
Everett and Hugh are still classified (?) we have no way to analyze the 
veracity. As for MWI, it appears inescapable and very strange.
 
 
-----Original Message-----
From: Jason Resch <[email protected]>
To: Everything List <[email protected]>
Sent: Sun, Feb 22, 2015 6:01 pm
Subject: Re: Philip Ball, MWI skeptic



Whether or not nuclear winter was a real phenomenon or not, Hugh Everett 
together with George Pugh proved that anything beyond a small-scale nuclear 
would (due to the radiation) kill most of the life on the planet. I think this 
finding helped convince everyone that nuclear was was unwinnable and likely 
saved the planet. The projections were that there would be 20 million uninjured 
survivors out of 800 million if even 10% of the nuclear stockpiles were used.


 Cf. Dr. Linus Pauling Nobel Peace Prize 1962 lecture (and reprinted in Peace 
by Frederick W. Haberman, Irwin Abrams, Tore Frängsmyr, Nobelstiftelsen, 
Nobelstiftelsen (Stockholm), published by World Scientific, 1997 ISBN 
981-02-3416-3), delivered on December 11, 1963, in which he mentioned the work 
by Pugh and Everett regarding the risks of nuclear profliferation and even 
quoted them from 1959. Pauling said: "This is a small nuclear attack made with 
use of about one percent of the existing weapons. A major nuclear war might 
well see a total of 30,000 megatons, one-tenth of the estimated stockpiles, 
delivered and exploded over the populated regions of the United States, the 
Soviet Union, and the other major European countries. The studies of Hugh 
Everett and George E. Pugh [21], of the Weapons Systems Evaluation Division, 
Institute of Defense Analysis, Washington, D.C., reported in the 1959 Hearings 
before the Special Subcommittee on Radiation, permit us to make an estimate of 
the casualties of such a war. This estimate is that sixty days after the day on 
which the war was waged, 720 million of the 800 million people in these 
countries would be dead, sixty million would be alive but severely injured, and 
there would be twenty million other survivors. The fate of the living is 
suggested by the following statement by Everett and Pugh: 'Finally, it must be 
pointed out that the total casualties at sixty days may not be indicative of 
the ultimate casualties. Such delayed effects as the disorganization of 
society, disruption of communications, extinction of livestock, genetic damage, 
and the slow development of radiation poisoning from the ingestion of 
radioactive materials may significantly increase the ultimate toll.' ..."



The report remains classified to this day: 
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/hugh-everett-biography/


In 1960 he helped write WSEG No. 50, a catalytic report that remains classified 
to this day. According to Everett’s friend and WSEG colleague George E. Pugh, 
as well as historians, WSEG No. 50 rationalized and promoted military 
strategies that were operative for decades, including the concept of Mutually 
Assured Destruction. WSEG provided nuclear warfare policymakers with enough 
scary information about the global effects of radioactive fallout that many 
became convinced of the merit of waging a perpetual standoff—as opposed to, as 
some powerful people were advocating, launching preemptive first strikes on the 
Soviet Union, China and other communist countries.





Jason





On Sun, Feb 22, 2015 at 4:02 PM, spudboy100 via Everything List 
<[email protected]> wrote:

Wasn't this a form of Carl Sagan's statement., "Extraordinary claims require 
extraordinary evidence?" Sagan was extremely bright and inspiring but he was 
not the best astronomer who ever drew breath. For instance, he sided with the 
soviet - sponsored propaganda on Nuclear Winter, which captured a few 
scientists, not by their intelligence, but because of their anti-nationalism. 
It was plausible nonsense and sagan and postel jumped aboard the Kremlin train 
based on their world view and not facts. Freeman Dyson, comparatively wondered 
by looking at the projections if it might not result in a nuclear autumn 
instead, climate-wise? Closer in time, do you not remember the BICEP-2 trouble? 
Here was "Extraordinary Evidence" that proved itself wrong." I am thinking, 
Brent, guessing really, that falsifying Computationalism will take a mountain 
of money (trillions?) to Falsify, ultimately, since we're speaking to the 
possible underpinnings of the universe. A far way to walk either way. 

Computationalism is an extraordinary claim.  That some things may    happen at 
random isn't.





-----Original Message-----
From: meekerdb <[email protected]>
To: everything-list <[email protected]>
Sent: Sun, Feb 22, 2015 4:17 pm
Subject: Re: Philip Ball, MWI skeptic


          
    
On 2/22/2015 9:19 AM, Bruno Marchal      wrote:
    
    

      
        
On 21 Feb 2015, at 02:50, meekerdb wrote:
        
        
                    
            
On 2/20/2015 8:54 AM, Bruno              Marchal wrote:
            
            
              

              
              
QM + collapse is inconsistent (with a great variety                of 
principle, like computationalism, God does not play                dice, no 
spooky actions, etc.).
            
            
            Principles of              Platonist faith.
            
        
        

        
        
You don't need any faith to disbelieve in the opportunity          to invoke 
magical thing in the explanation.
        

        
        
It is up to those who make extraordinary claims to provide          the 
evidences.
      
    
    
    Computationalism is an extraordinary claim.  That some things may    happen 
at random isn't.
    
    
      
        

        
        

        
        

        
        
          
            
It is a theorem of comp, also. The many              worlds, in his relative 
state formulation, is already a              consequence of computationalism.  
By church thesis, *all*              computations are emulated in all possible 
ways in              elementary arithmetic, with a typical machine-independent  
            redundancy: it makes the notion of "world" formulable,
            
            Does it?               What's the definition of a world in comp? 
          

          
          

          
          
It is a model of "my beliefs", assuming I am consistent            (so that 
such a model exist). 
          
        
      
    
    
    That would comport with quantum bayesianism.
    
    
      
        
          

          
          
You can handle the world by notion like maximal            consistent sets of 
formula, which in this case can have            oracle like answering W or M 
when opening a door after a            self-duplication. A world can satisfy a 
belief like "I            belief in PA and I am currently located at 
Washington".
        
      
    
    
    But those are just words.  Does Washington have to exist in a    world?  Or 
just propositions containing "Washington".  Without some    referents every two 
propositions not of the form "X and not-X" will    be consistent.  "I'm in 
Washington." and "I'm in Moscow." are    consistent unless we have a theory of 
existence in spacetime and    some referents for "Washington" and "Moscow".
    
    Brent
    
    
      
        
          

          
          

          
          
          
 Can you show that there are distinction              denumerable worlds?
          
        
        

        
        
Word are internal psychological, epistemological or          theological 
notion, and the geometry on the worlds depend on          the person's point of 
view. 
        

        
        
The "probability measure" is not dependent of our ability          to 
distinguish worlds, but on their ability to differentiate          in 
principle, a bit like decoherence in Everett-QM. Of course,          we have 
only the shadow of coherence, so we can't extract          decoherence today: a 
lot of problems must be solved before.          The point is: we have the math 
to do so, and so to test          classical computationalism.
        

        
        
Bruno
        
      
    
    
  

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