On 23 Feb 2015, at 01:16, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/22/2015 2:52 PM, LizR wrote:
On 23 February 2015 at 10:17, meekerdb <[email protected]>
Computationalism is an extraordinary claim.
The claim that what goes on inside brains is at some level Turing-
emulable seems not necessarily extraordinary - or do you think it is?
Yes. It's not crazy or outlandish, but I don't think it's ordinary
either.
It seems like a fairly standard assumption by many scientists and
philosophers, but I can believe it's wrong - but some reason to do
so would be nice rather, than just a "statement from authority". as
given here.Y
(If the conclusions Bruno has drawn from that assumption appear
extraordinary those aren't "claims", just deductions which can
presumably be shown to be wrong through the application of logic,
assuming they are ub fact wrong. He's provided a detailed
description of his assumptions and deductions, so go to it.)
I doubt Bruno has made an error of deduction. But I find his
interpretation that identifies "provable" = "belief" dubious.
I do not identify "believable" with "provable by PA". I say only that
if we assume computationalism, then the result will apply to all
rational believer in PA. They can be quite different from PA, like ZF.
the results apply as long as the machine is consistent, and believes
in the axioms of PA. It would not work on you, only in the case your
arithmetical beliefs are inconsistent with the theorems of PA. So, to
make your remark here relevant, you should give us a theorem of PA
that you disbelief.
And even the Plationist idea that arithmetic exists in the sense
necessary to instantiate the world we see is doubtful.
There is no world. But if you agree that 2+2=4 independently of time,
mass, space (which is the natural understanding of math proposition),
and if you agree or assume computationalism, then some numbers will
behave like if they believe in worlds, and will develop physics, etc.
You can say that they are zombies, assuming some magic matter, but it
is more interesting to look at the physics they develop, and compare
with our inferred physics.
That some things may happen at random isn't.
Now that is an extraordinary claim, in my opinion. What would be a
suitable underlying means by which the universe might operate, that
it makes things happen at random? I can imagine things that might
appear random to us, but are actually the result of deterministic
forces operating on scales we can't probe - e.g. string vibrations.
But genuinely random - that seems to me to require extraordinary
evidence. So far we only have evidence for "apparently random" as
far as I know.
Some backup for the above two extraordinary claims would be welcome.
(1) that brains aren't Turing emulable at any level
You seem to be saying that to assert a claim is extraordinary is
equivalent to asserting it's negation. So if I say claiming
there's a teapot orbiting Jupiter is extraordinary, you'll ask
that I back up that extraordinary assertion? What happened to
agnosticism? I don't think I made any extraordinary claim; unless
mere doubt of Platonism has become extraordinary.
It is better to use "realism" instead of Platonism, which is related,
but different. Arithmetical realism is believed by all scientists, and
almost all philosophers. Platonism is a different matter, as it
implies something like "no more than the numbers, or that the world of
ideas". Arithmetical realism is in the assumption (in Church thesis
notably). Platonism is among the counter-intuitive conclusions.
(2) that there is a mechanism by which the universe might generate
truly, rather than apparently random events.
I'm not sure it's possible to have a mechanism that generates truly
random events. I think that's like asking for an algorithm that
produces truly random numbers. - although it may turn on the
meaning of "mechanism".
Well, if you enlarge mechanism by replacing computable function by
function, then, by Cantor, you get 2^aleph_zero genuine random
functions, but there is no evidence that this exists in nature, other
than what is retrievable by (self) duplication and our "multiple-
preparation" in arithmetic.
Bruno
Brent
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