Brent: I am no 'skeptic' I just seek some basis WHY to believe? JM On Mon, Feb 23, 2015 at 2:46 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
> On 2/23/2015 7:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 23 Feb 2015, at 01:16, meekerdb wrote: > > On 2/22/2015 2:52 PM, LizR wrote: > > On 23 February 2015 at 10:17, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> > > Computationalism is an extraordinary claim. > > > The claim that what goes on inside brains is at some level > Turing-emulable seems not necessarily extraordinary - or do you think it > is? > > > Yes. It's not crazy or outlandish, but I don't think it's ordinary either. > > It seems like a fairly standard assumption by many scientists and > philosophers, but I can believe it's wrong - but some reason to do so would > be nice rather, than just a "statement from authority". as given here.Y > > (If the conclusions Bruno has drawn from that assumption appear > extraordinary those aren't "claims", just deductions which can presumably > be shown to be wrong through the application of logic, assuming they are ub > fact wrong. He's provided a detailed description of his assumptions and > deductions, so go to it.) > > > I doubt Bruno has made an error of deduction. But I find his > interpretation that identifies "provable" = "belief" dubious. > > > > I do not identify "believable" with "provable by PA". I say only that if > we assume computationalism, then the result will apply to all rational > believer in PA. They can be quite different from PA, like ZF. the results > apply as long as the machine is consistent, and believes in the axioms of > PA. It would not work on you, only in the case your arithmetical beliefs > are inconsistent with the theorems of PA. So, to make your remark here > relevant, you should give us a theorem of PA that you disbelief. > > > That every number has a unique successor. > > > > > > > > And even the Plationist idea that arithmetic exists in the sense > necessary to instantiate the world we see is doubtful. > > > There is no world. But if you agree that 2+2=4 independently of time, > mass, space (which is the natural understanding of math proposition), and > if you agree or assume computationalism, then some numbers will behave like > if they believe in worlds, and will develop physics, etc. > > > What does it mean for a number to believe something? I earlier said you > identified "believe" with "provable" but you denied that - although it > seems to me you use it that way. > > You can say that they are zombies, assuming some magic matter, but it is > more interesting to look at the physics they develop, and compare with our > inferred physics. > > > > > > >> That some things may happen at random isn't. >> > > Now that *is* an extraordinary claim, in my opinion. What would be a > suitable underlying means by which the universe might operate, that it > makes things happen at random? I can imagine things that might appear > random to us, but are actually the result of deterministic forces operating > on scales we can't probe - e.g. string vibrations. But genuinely random - > that seems to me to require extraordinary evidence. So far we only have > evidence for "apparently random" as far as I know. > > Some backup for the above two extraordinary claims would be welcome. > > > (1) that brains aren't Turing emulable at any level > > > > You seem to be saying that to assert a claim is extraordinary is > equivalent to asserting it's negation. So if I say claiming there's a > teapot orbiting Jupiter is extraordinary, you'll ask that I back up that > extraordinary assertion? What happened to agnosticism? I don't think I > made any extraordinary claim; unless mere doubt of Platonism has become > extraordinary. > > > It is better to use "realism" instead of Platonism, which is related, > but different. Arithmetical realism is believed by all scientists, and > almost all philosophers. Platonism is a different matter, as it implies > something like "no more than the numbers, or that the world of ideas". > Arithmetical realism is in the assumption (in Church thesis notably). > Platonism is among the counter-intuitive conclusions. > > > > > > (2) that there is a mechanism by which the universe might generate > truly, rather than apparently random events. > > > I'm not sure it's possible to have a mechanism that generates truly random > events. I think that's like asking for an algorithm that produces truly > random numbers. - although it may turn on the meaning of "mechanism". > > > Well, if you enlarge mechanism by replacing computable function by > function, then, by Cantor, you get 2^aleph_zero genuine random functions, > but there is no evidence that this exists in nature > > > There's no evidence in nature that there are infinitely many natural > numbers either. > > Brent > > , other than what is retrievable by (self) duplication and our > "multiple-preparation" in arithmetic. > > Bruno > > > > Brent > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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