On 23 Feb 2015, at 20:46, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/23/2015 7:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 23 Feb 2015, at 01:16, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/22/2015 2:52 PM, LizR wrote:
On 23 February 2015 at 10:17, meekerdb <[email protected]>
Computationalism is an extraordinary claim.
The claim that what goes on inside brains is at some level Turing-
emulable seems not necessarily extraordinary - or do you think it
is?
Yes. It's not crazy or outlandish, but I don't think it's
ordinary either.
It seems like a fairly standard assumption by many scientists and
philosophers, but I can believe it's wrong - but some reason to
do so would be nice rather, than just a "statement from
authority". as given here.Y
(If the conclusions Bruno has drawn from that assumption appear
extraordinary those aren't "claims", just deductions which can
presumably be shown to be wrong through the application of logic,
assuming they are ub fact wrong. He's provided a detailed
description of his assumptions and deductions, so go to it.)
I doubt Bruno has made an error of deduction. But I find his
interpretation that identifies "provable" = "belief" dubious.
I do not identify "believable" with "provable by PA". I say only
that if we assume computationalism, then the result will apply to
all rational believer in PA. They can be quite different from PA,
like ZF. the results apply as long as the machine is consistent,
and believes in the axioms of PA. It would not work on you, only in
the case your arithmetical beliefs are inconsistent with the
theorems of PA. So, to make your remark here relevant, you should
give us a theorem of PA that you disbelief.
That every number has a unique successor.
Then you disbelieve already in the axiom of RA, and I have no clue
what you mean by number. The problem is that in physics and computer
science we do postulate that every natural numbers have a successor.
And even the Plationist idea that arithmetic exists in the sense
necessary to instantiate the world we see is doubtful.
There is no world. But if you agree that 2+2=4 independently of
time, mass, space (which is the natural understanding of math
proposition), and if you agree or assume computationalism, then
some numbers will behave like if they believe in worlds, and will
develop physics, etc.
What does it mean for a number to believe something? I earlier said
you identified "believe" with "provable" but you denied that -
although it seems to me you use it that way.
I say that a machine believes p if the machine asserts p. Then, as I
want machine trying to understand themselves, I limit myself to
ideally correct (with respect to the arithmetical reality) machine
which believes already to PA axioms and to the validity of the usual
inference rules.
You can say that they are zombies, assuming some magic matter, but
it is more interesting to look at the physics they develop, and
compare with our inferred physics.
That some things may happen at random isn't.
Now that is an extraordinary claim, in my opinion. What would be
a suitable underlying means by which the universe might operate,
that it makes things happen at random? I can imagine things that
might appear random to us, but are actually the result of
deterministic forces operating on scales we can't probe - e.g.
string vibrations. But genuinely random - that seems to me to
require extraordinary evidence. So far we only have evidence for
"apparently random" as far as I know.
Some backup for the above two extraordinary claims would be
welcome.
(1) that brains aren't Turing emulable at any level
You seem to be saying that to assert a claim is extraordinary is
equivalent to asserting it's negation. So if I say claiming
there's a teapot orbiting Jupiter is extraordinary, you'll ask
that I back up that extraordinary assertion? What happened to
agnosticism? I don't think I made any extraordinary claim; unless
mere doubt of Platonism has become extraordinary.
It is better to use "realism" instead of Platonism, which is
related, but different. Arithmetical realism is believed by all
scientists, and almost all philosophers. Platonism is a different
matter, as it implies something like "no more than the numbers, or
that the world of ideas". Arithmetical realism is in the assumption
(in Church thesis notably). Platonism is among the counter-
intuitive conclusions.
(2) that there is a mechanism by which the universe might
generate truly, rather than apparently random events.
I'm not sure it's possible to have a mechanism that generates
truly random events. I think that's like asking for an algorithm
that produces truly random numbers. - although it may turn on the
meaning of "mechanism".
Well, if you enlarge mechanism by replacing computable function by
function, then, by Cantor, you get 2^aleph_zero genuine random
functions, but there is no evidence that this exists in nature
There's no evidence in nature that there are infinitely many natural
numbers either.
But I do not postulate that nature is the fundamental reality. I prove
the contrary, in the computationalist frame.
It looks like you want me to believe that ~comp is consistent. But I
do believe this at the start. In fact if comp is consistent,then that
consistency is not provable in the comp theory.
My goal is to explain (to myself, notably) where consciousness, or the
belief in a reality, comes from. I also show that postulating a
physical reality does not work for this, unless you add in the
primitive matter some non Turing emulable functions, or some non FPI
retrievable infinities, which both would contradict comp + occam.
Bruno
Brent
, other than what is retrievable by (self) duplication and our
"multiple-preparation" in arithmetic.
Bruno
Brent
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