On 22 Mar 2015, at 19:37, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/22/2015 8:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 21 Mar 2015, at 10:35, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Sat, Mar 21, 2015 at 2:30 AM, LizR <[email protected]> wrote:
On 21 March 2015 at 08:51, John Clark <[email protected]> wrote:
Because I spotted a blunder in the "proof" about 3 years ago and
despite reams of blather in hundreds of posts you were unable to
fix it. Only a fool would keep reading a mathematical proof after
they've spotted an error, and I am not a fool.
However, as far as I know you've failed to communicate the blunder
to anyone else in a way that they agree with. To me your attempts
to explain it sounded like semantic quibbling rather than any deep
insight into something Bruno has got wrong (but maybe I just
haven't got my head around it yet).
I remember a long discussion where John ended up changing his
claim that step 3 was wrong to it just being trivial. But then he
still refused to keep reading. At this point I decided he was not
serious about the issue.
It is the least that we can say.
He insist that all what I say is wrong, but that he never read
anything after step 3, which means that he criticizes without
reading, with his own admission. That is the mark of the non-
scientific attidtude.
That shows also that he is not saying what he thinks, but repeat
something he heard. It is a parrot. Still, it would be polite to
say who influences his thinking about this, and it would be polite
to at least try give an explanation, not a dismissive shoulder
shrugging accompanied by lies, insinuation, or false attributions.
I don't think step 3 is at all essential to the argument. It's
nothing but setting up an analogy to Everett's MWI to show how
uncertainty and determinism are compatible - all of which JKC
already accepts.
I am not entirely sure why you say so, as the next steps of the
reasoning reduce physics to a measure problem on the (infinitely many)
computations going through my actual states in the universal
deployment, or the sigma_1 arithmetical reality. Step 4 to step 6
shows that the FPI remains invariant for the delays of reconstitution,
and from the nature, virtual/real, of the environment.
Then step seven illustrates the problem we have to solve, and to make
it simple, it assumes a concrete never stopping execution of a
universal dovetailer. In particular, the DU emulates all Boltzmann
brains, but not just Boltzmann brains (unless you generalize the
concept of Boltzmann brain, no problem I love Boltzmann (and it would
mean in Brussels my thesis has been refused (to be defended!) because
of that indeterminacy that we might attribute to Boltzmann (was that
the idea for which he suicides?)
.
Both in physics, and in arithmetic, that type of indeterminacy entails
the need of a justification of a mind-brain identity principles, to
account of the stability of the physical laws, which is an the
apparent miracle.
With computationalism, matter is a problem. An interesting problem.
Justifying an unique measure on the sigma_1 sentences justifying the
invariant of the observable, that is a stable first person plural
notions.
But if there is a unique measure, the measure is machine independent.
It does not depend on the choice of the phi_i base, and all universal
Löbian numbers should be able to find it.
Then we can, instead of finding that measure, see what universal
numbers can already correctly assert (and not assert) about they
ability to handle the FPI/measure, notably about the logic obeyed by
the important measure one, given that we have an idea of the empirical
logic (an algebra of linear projectors, a lattice of sub-Hilbert
space, a quantum logic (modular, orthomodular, well the comp one is
orthomodular, or quasi-orthomodular (not the time to enter into the
technical details (and meet the devil)).
Sean Carroll has seen this happens in some solution of cosmology
equation, and his natural move is the hope for solution à-la de Sitter
with finite universe, or uncreative emptyness. Ultrafinitist
physicalism(the antipod of our approach supposedly in this list, btw).
That would not solve the problem for a computationalist, as for him,
step 8 shows that the assumption of a finite universe is equivalent
with providing a magical role to one precise universal number, and not
try to search the evolution/FPI-solution of the "natural" universal
environment, which is a sum on all digital environments/universal
numbers.
It is arithmetic, seen through the modalities of the observable, and
indeed [2]p = []p & <>t, on p sigma_1 is shown to obeys a quantum
logic, and [2]<2>p, has all the property needed for defining an
(arithmetical) quantization. The arithmetical constraints enrich the
logic, and does not let much arbitrariness in the derivation of the
physical invariant, normally.
If cosmologists confirms we are in a finite physical universe, I would
bet we are in a "Bostrom" type of simulation (by our descendents), or
I doubt comp, and I am back to the mind-body problem.
Bruno
Brent
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