On 23 Mar 2015, at 19:58, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/23/2015 9:46 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 22 Mar 2015, at 22:45, LizR wrote:
On 23 March 2015 at 07:37, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
I don't think step 3 is at all essential to the argument. It's
nothing but setting up an analogy to Everett's MWI to show how
uncertainty and determinism are compatible - all of which JKC
already accepts.
I have put this point to him, but he says something like "because
we can never see the consequences of the MWI split, but we could
see the result of a teleporter duplication, therefore it's
different" (that seems like the gist of the argument, at least).
Bruno's point of course is just that if we had the teleporter, it
would lead to indeterminacy, just as MWI splits do (indeed, if we
take Everett literally, ISTM the MWI is an instance of Bruno's
teleporter) - whether or not we can talk to our duplicate later is
irrelevant to the point of the argument.
ISTM that the flaws in comp, if they exist, are either (a) at the
start - the premises are flawed (e.g. assumptions about the
ontological status of Peano arithmetic), or (b) at the end - the
MGA / "reversal" stage. The intermediate steps follow fairly
straightforwardly from the premises (if they are assumed correct).
In the theoretical science, it does not make sense to ask if the
premise are correct or not.
We can never answer that question.
But we can, if the theory is precise enough, test it.
Someone might believe that the theory is inconsistent, but it is up
to him to show the contradiction.
The ontological status of PA is not relevant. You need to believe
only in what PA says. Actually, only in what RA says, although the
interview is on the PA machines emulated by RA.
Sure it's relevant. If the theory purports to explain the world
The theory is there (computationalism, a digital version of Descartes
Mechanism, that our bodies evolves through local simple causes). It is
assumes by many materialist, and my goal has consisted in showing it
does not work, and that the mind-body problem, with computationalism,
does not give us any choice: we must derive the laws of the observable
from the machine's introspection. We must derive the laws of physics
from the laws of mind.
Of course, with computationalism, we get on a plateau a wonderful
theory of mind: computer science.
Amazingly, we get on a second plateau a wonderful machine theology: by
the difference between computer science, and computer's computer
science.
And thank to the virtuose use of the second recursion theorem of
Kleene by Solovay, we get complete axiomatization for both the science
and the theology of the ideally self-referentially correct (and
classical, platoniste) machine.
then the ontology of the theory needs to exist.
The basic ontology is *defined* by what we are willing to agree
unambiguously the existence.
Then, amusingly enough perhaps, with computationalism, the RA theory
is enough, or the combinators theory, both without induction axioms.
It is enough for the realm, but, to make things simpler, I interview
platonist machine like RA, with reasonably strong induction axioms.
The theory of electrodynamics isn't just about abstract equations,
it also postulates that electrons and photons exist, i.e. that we
can interact with them operationally.
Yes.
And today, we know that if this postulate is lifted as a metaphysical
assumption of primary (non deducible) matter, this becomes
incompatible with computationalism.
There is no problem because physicists never really used that
postulate. It is just locally very practical. The physical science is
in a large part independent of the metaphysical ontology.
Of course, with QM, new complex question appears on the nature of
matter, and observation, like with mind and computationalism, we get
non trivial new information, for the machine reasoning on themselves,
like <>t -> <>[]f.
Computationalism + (Weak) Materialism =====> consciousness
elimination, conscience elimination and eventually, matter elimination.
But you can keep materialism, by using strong infinity axioms, and
making matter and mind relying on big actual infinities.
Computationalism allows a finitism. Not an ultra-finitism with a
biggest natural number, but with the usual potential idea of going a
bit further in an exploration if needed, like a universal machine does
(or complains and ask politely the use to buy more memory space.
But the FPI, from inside makes it non avoidable for the universal
machine first person to be confronted with the infinite union of the
infinitely many possible computational histories, and computationalism
will justify a phenomenology of some apparent infinities for
collections of machines.
Bruno
Brent
The only strong axioms are Church thesis, and "yes doctor". This is
were we suppose we survive some finite truncation.
The arithmetical realism used is the part on which all
mathematicians agrees, except the ultrafinitists (0,000001 % of
mathematcians, at most).
So we're still at the point where John claims to have spotted a
flaw, but he can't satisfactorily explain it to anyone else. When
asks to do so he resorts to insults, irrelevant comments about the
terminology, and mockery - the equivalent of a child putting its
fingers in its ears, closing its eyes and singing loudly.
I'm afraid so.
Bruno
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