On 23 Mar 2015, at 00:19, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/22/2015 2:45 PM, LizR wrote:
On 23 March 2015 at 07:37, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
I don't think step 3 is at all essential to the argument. It's
nothing but setting up an analogy to Everett's MWI to show how
uncertainty and determinism are compatible - all of which JKC
already accepts.
I have put this point to him, but he says something like "because
we can never see the consequences of the MWI split, but we
could see the result of a teleporter duplication, therefore it's
different" (that seems like the gist of the argument, at least).
Bruno's point of course is just that if we had the teleporter, it
would lead to indeterminacy, just as MWI splits do (indeed, if we
take Everett literally, ISTM the MWI is an instance of Bruno's
teleporter) - whether or not we can talk to our duplicate later is
irrelevant to the point of the argument.
ISTM that the flaws in comp, if they exist, are either (a) at the
start - the premises are flawed (e.g. assumptions about the
ontological status of Peano arithmetic), or (b) at the end - the
MGA / "reversal" stage. The intermediate steps follow fairly
straightforwardly from the premises (if they are assumed correct).
Those are my reservations too: Not only the ontological status of
arithmetic (or other computational systems) but also of the UDA.
I use much less than what you need for the classical understanding
that the derivative of x^n is n*x^(n-1).
Come on.
I guess you think to the UD (UDA is an argument, published: it exists
as much as the moon or the Milky Way).
Or perhaps you meant UD*, which is the infinite execution trace of the
UD. But even PA can define it, and reason by induction on it.
Some of the inferences, like Godel incompleteness, depend on
infinities, which I think is just a convenience.
? It is basic math, like we learn in school. Gödel's proof is
constructive, as are line, except that the realm is not constructive
itself. That's life, machine can expolore non algorithmic realities
and are confronted with them, just by their own existence.
Some of the modal inferences appear to depend on ex falso quodlibet,
which again is just a convenient simplification of valid inference.
On the other, MGA end, I suspect that it's necessary to emulate a
whole "world", in which case the conclusion is close to trivial.
Which, in that case, was the point.
I also wonder about some of modal axioms; aren't there equally
intuitive alternatives?
We might hope, but reality kicks back.
Note that an army of philsophers were glad that G does not obey S4,
and use that to explain that we are not machine, as S4 would be the
conscious alternative of self-reference. But here we see that if we
define to the machine the notion of knowledge using Theaetetus
eminently classical method, the machine can explain why she has a
soul different from all possible machines, and she is correct. The
machine proposes the alternative itself. So you are right, but in the
reasoning, we start from the correct 3p description.
I assume classical logic, which is simpler, and the least we need when
doing theology.
So we're still at the point where John claims to have spotted a
flaw, but he can't satisfactorily explain it to anyone else.
I think I understand the "flaw". When the thought experiment is
posed with the pronoun you: "You are in Helsinki. You are
duplicated so your duplicates appear in Moscow and Washington. Then
you will be uncertain as to which city you will find yourself in."
then it appears unanswerable and ill posed because "you" is ill
defined in the presence of duplicating machines. There is no theory
of personal identity in the premises, it just tries to rely on the
intuitions built into language, which assume persons aren't
duplicated. If the thought experiment started with, "Suppose *you*
are a unique, unreproducible immaterial soul..." then it might have
an answer.
On the other hand if pronouns are avoided, so that referents are
clear: "John is in Helsinki. John is duplicated so duplicate Johns
appear in Moscow and Washington. Then John will be uncertain as to
which city John will find himself in." then the ambiguity is clear
in that the second occurrence of 'John' could refer to Moscow-John
or Washington-John and if you make it explicit it's no longer true,
e.g. "Then Helsinki-John will be uncertain as to which city Moscow-
John will find himself in."
But Bruno is only explicating how there can be an objectively
determinsitic process that *necessarily* produces a subjectively
uncertain outcome. No amount of additional information will remove
the subjective uncertainty of Helsinki-John about his future. JKC
says this is trivial since subjective uncertainty about the future
is commonplace. But it's not trivial, anymore than Everett's MWI is
trivial, because without the duplication of subjects, subjective
uncertainty about a deterministic process could always be eliminated
by gaining more information.
JKC is just picking on the fact that Moscow-John could meet
Washington-John to say that this is different that Everett's MWI.
But when an argument uses a thought experiment it is always the case
that the thought experiment is different from reality in some
respect. In this case that difference is irrelevant to the
inference from the thought experiment, so there's no reason to
object to it. That's why it is a mistake to reject and argument as
soon as you find a "flaw" in one step. It is necessary to see that
the "flaw" is used in later steps before you can reject the argument.
OK. Very good analysis.
Bruno
Brent
When asks to do so he resorts to insults, irrelevant comments about
the terminology, and mockery - the equivalent of a child putting
its fingers in its ears, closing its eyes and singing loudly.
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