2015-03-27 10:12 GMT+01:00 LizR <[email protected]>: > On 27 March 2015 at 19:28, Quentin Anciaux <[email protected]> wrote: > >> The ab asurdo is showing computationalism is incompatible with physical >> supervenience, not that it is true. > > > Yes sorry, "reject" was a poor choice of words. I meant argue from the > comp position rather than the materialist one, and know what I'm talking > about. > > >> In the end by being forced to accept consciousness must supervene on the >> movie + broken gate... If you believe it, then you've abandon >> computationalism as a theory of the mind as the movie+broken gates is not a >> computation... Or you can keep computationalism and abandon physical >> supervenience.... QED > > > Yes I realise that. The same applies to Maudlin. All I wanted to know at > the moment was how the contradiction arises in the MGA. > > It seems to me that's what I explained... it arises because under computationalism, it is assumed consciousness is supported by a computation.... under computationlism + physical supervenience, it assumed the computation is eventually supported by physcial activity and eventually this leads to attribute consciousness to the record, which is not a computation, contradicting the assumption of computationalism...
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