On 27 March 2015 at 17:13, Platonist Guitar Cowboy <[email protected] > wrote:
> > On Fri, Mar 27, 2015 at 3:16 AM, LizR <[email protected]> wrote: > >> PGC - I think you may have skimmed over too much for me to grasp what >> you're saying. But maybe not. So .... does contradicition arise because you >> assume to start with that consciousness is created by computation, then >> show that it would also (assuming physical supervenience) arise from >> something that isn't computation? >> > > Bruno will kick my butt for vulgarizing his thesis in this improvisatory, > overly short, imprecise manner. I suspect you're still assuming physical > universe without being aware of it. > Not without being aware. That's why it says "assuming physical supervenience" :-) > > >> I'm still not sure where the dreams come in, however. (Or the zombies...) >> >> On the subject of counterfactual correctness, isn't that the point of >> Olimpia and Klara? My problem with counterfactual correctness is (probably >> the same as Maudlin's?) -- how does the system *know* it's >> counterfactually correct if it doesn't actually pass through any of the >> "what-if" states? >> > > "The system" is what here? "It" referring to what here? Would you tend to > interpret these as physical or comp objects? > All this is assuming materialism. I can't reject that until I understand how the MGA does a reductio on it. > > Remember that comp supervenience requires physics to become part of > machine psychology/theology; thus every explanatory potency of a physical > universe is left behind. The association is some sensation [of my joy in > space-time (x,t)] to [type] of relative computational state. > Yes, I get the general idea. I want the specific details of how to get there. As I said I don't quite get the MGA. > > >> To put it another way, when you have a recording of the conscious >> computational states being replayed, what difference could be made by the >> presence (or absence) of all the extra bits that *would* deal with >> counterfactual correctness if a different computation was being replayed, >> but happen in this case not to be used? I can't see how this could make any >> physical difference to the states being replayed (unless counterfactual >> correctness introduces some nonphysical magic into the system?) >> > > A machine from which we remove some redundant parts resulting in a finite > set of states or executions looses counterfactual correctness: > Yes I know, but why do (presumably, on a Friday...) materialists like Brent argue that you need CCness to have a computation - what physical difference is it supposed to make, in the physicalist ontology? > The movie is not conscious. The universal machine viewing it via types, > not tokens, of possible activities keeps CC intact, with consciousness > supervening on potential activities, and not some brittle, particular > branch of the same. > Fine but that only works once you've ditched materialism (see above) which is what I'd like to do to embrace my inner comp, but can't see how (yet). > > And yes, we can cite all manner of quantum weirdness and state that > consciousness supervenes on physical processes that are not actualized. > This is reasonable since measurements depending on potential observations > that are non-actualized depend on CC. But here, Bruno iirc pointed out that > this would be a case of tokens rather than types. In short "Bruno will > definitely kill me for simplifying and shortening as much as I have" sense, > consciousness relative to computational state of a universal machine > supervenes on set of possible accessible extensions of these states > distributed on the entirety of the UD. PGC > Quantum theory gives a new slant on CCness, but is still I think materialist? In a nutshell, what I want to know is .... how do I start from the assumption of materialism, and show it leads to a contradiction? Preferably in baby steps that even my pretty little head can grasp. > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
