On 27 March 2015 at 23:24, Quentin Anciaux <[email protected]> wrote:
> 2015-03-27 10:12 GMT+01:00 LizR <[email protected]>: > >> On 27 March 2015 at 19:28, Quentin Anciaux <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> The ab asurdo is showing computationalism is incompatible with physical >>> supervenience, not that it is true. >> >> >> Yes sorry, "reject" was a poor choice of words. I meant argue from the >> comp position rather than the materialist one, and know what I'm talking >> about. >> >> >>> In the end by being forced to accept consciousness must supervene on the >>> movie + broken gate... If you believe it, then you've abandon >>> computationalism as a theory of the mind as the movie+broken gates is not a >>> computation... Or you can keep computationalism and abandon physical >>> supervenience.... QED >> >> >> Yes I realise that. The same applies to Maudlin. All I wanted to know at >> the moment was how the contradiction arises in the MGA. >> >> It seems to me that's what I explained... > I'm sure it does. As I said, I can't quite get my head around it, so it's unlikely a quick overview is going to help me do so. (After all I couldn't follow Bruno's explanation, which involved smoke and mirrors, or something similar.) Maybe I'm just the wrong type of geek to be able to grok this argument, but I keep trying. > it arises because under computationalism, it is assumed consciousness is > supported by a computation.... under computationlism + physical > supervenience, it assumed the computation is eventually supported by > physcial activity and eventually this leads to attribute consciousness to > the record, which is not a computation, contradicting the assumption of > computationalism... > > Yes, I can see that if you are led to attribute consciousness to a record then that will contradict the original assumption. But I haven't yet been able to see how the MGA leads to attributing consciousness to a record. I'm sure it does show that, but for me it doesn't quite click. Maybe I'm doomed to never get an intuitive grasp of the argument. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
