On 27 March 2015 at 23:24, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com> wrote:
> 2015-03-27 10:12 GMT+01:00 LizR <lizj...@gmail.com>: > >> On 27 March 2015 at 19:28, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >>> The ab asurdo is showing computationalism is incompatible with physical >>> supervenience, not that it is true. >> >> >> Yes sorry, "reject" was a poor choice of words. I meant argue from the >> comp position rather than the materialist one, and know what I'm talking >> about. >> >> >>> In the end by being forced to accept consciousness must supervene on the >>> movie + broken gate... If you believe it, then you've abandon >>> computationalism as a theory of the mind as the movie+broken gates is not a >>> computation... Or you can keep computationalism and abandon physical >>> supervenience.... QED >> >> >> Yes I realise that. The same applies to Maudlin. All I wanted to know at >> the moment was how the contradiction arises in the MGA. >> >> It seems to me that's what I explained... > I'm sure it does. As I said, I can't quite get my head around it, so it's unlikely a quick overview is going to help me do so. (After all I couldn't follow Bruno's explanation, which involved smoke and mirrors, or something similar.) Maybe I'm just the wrong type of geek to be able to grok this argument, but I keep trying. > it arises because under computationalism, it is assumed consciousness is > supported by a computation.... under computationlism + physical > supervenience, it assumed the computation is eventually supported by > physcial activity and eventually this leads to attribute consciousness to > the record, which is not a computation, contradicting the assumption of > computationalism... > > Yes, I can see that if you are led to attribute consciousness to a record then that will contradict the original assumption. But I haven't yet been able to see how the MGA leads to attributing consciousness to a record. I'm sure it does show that, but for me it doesn't quite click. Maybe I'm doomed to never get an intuitive grasp of the argument. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
