Le 27 mars 2015 05:58, "LizR" <[email protected]> a écrit : > > On 27 March 2015 at 17:13, Platonist Guitar Cowboy < [email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> On Fri, Mar 27, 2015 at 3:16 AM, LizR <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> PGC - I think you may have skimmed over too much for me to grasp what you're saying. But maybe not. So .... does contradicition arise because you assume to start with that consciousness is created by computation, then show that it would also (assuming physical supervenience) arise from something that isn't computation? >> >> >> Bruno will kick my butt for vulgarizing his thesis in this improvisatory, overly short, imprecise manner. I suspect you're still assuming physical universe without being aware of it. > > > Not without being aware. That's why it says "assuming physical supervenience" :-) >> >> >>> >>> I'm still not sure where the dreams come in, however. (Or the zombies...) >>> >>> On the subject of counterfactual correctness, isn't that the point of Olimpia and Klara? My problem with counterfactual correctness is (probably the same as Maudlin's?) -- how does the system know it's counterfactually correct if it doesn't actually pass through any of the "what-if" states? >> >> >> "The system" is what here? "It" referring to what here? Would you tend to interpret these as physical or comp objects? > > > All this is assuming materialism. I can't reject that until I understand how the MGA does a reductio on it.
The ab asurdo is showing computationalism is incompatible with physical supervenience, not that it is true. In the end by being forced to accept consciousness must supervene on the movie + broken gate... If you believe it, then you've abandon computationalism as a theory of the mind as the movie+broken gates is not a computation... Or you can keep computationalism and abandon physical supervenience.... QED >> >> >> Remember that comp supervenience requires physics to become part of machine psychology/theology; thus every explanatory potency of a physical universe is left behind. The association is some sensation [of my joy in space-time (x,t)] to [type] of relative computational state. > > > Yes, I get the general idea. I want the specific details of how to get there. As I said I don't quite get the MGA. >> >> >>> >>> To put it another way, when you have a recording of the conscious computational states being replayed, what difference could be made by the presence (or absence) of all the extra bits that would deal with counterfactual correctness if a different computation was being replayed, but happen in this case not to be used? I can't see how this could make any physical difference to the states being replayed (unless counterfactual correctness introduces some nonphysical magic into the system?) >> >> >> A machine from which we remove some redundant parts resulting in a finite set of states or executions looses counterfactual correctness: > > > Yes I know, but why do (presumably, on a Friday...) materialists like Brent argue that you need CCness to have a computation - what physical difference is it supposed to make, in the physicalist ontology? > >> >> The movie is not conscious. The universal machine viewing it via types, not tokens, of possible activities keeps CC intact, with consciousness supervening on potential activities, and not some brittle, particular branch of the same. > > > Fine but that only works once you've ditched materialism (see above) which is what I'd like to do to embrace my inner comp, but can't see how (yet). >> >> >> And yes, we can cite all manner of quantum weirdness and state that consciousness supervenes on physical processes that are not actualized. This is reasonable since measurements depending on potential observations that are non-actualized depend on CC. But here, Bruno iirc pointed out that this would be a case of tokens rather than types. In short "Bruno will definitely kill me for simplifying and shortening as much as I have" sense, consciousness relative to computational state of a universal machine supervenes on set of possible accessible extensions of these states distributed on the entirety of the UD. PGC > > > Quantum theory gives a new slant on CCness, but is still I think materialist? > > In a nutshell, what I want to know is .... how do I start from the assumption of materialism, and show it leads to a contradiction? Preferably in baby steps that even my pretty little head can grasp. >> >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
