PGC - I think you may have skimmed over too much for me to grasp what you're saying. But maybe not. So .... does contradicition arise because you assume to start with that consciousness is created by computation, then show that it would also (assuming physical supervenience) arise from something that isn't computation?
I'm still not sure where the dreams come in, however. (Or the zombies...) On the subject of counterfactual correctness, isn't that the point of Olimpia and Klara? My problem with counterfactual correctness is (probably the same as Maudlin's?) -- how does the system *know* it's counterfactually correct if it doesn't actually pass through any of the "what-if" states? To put it another way, when you have a recording of the conscious computational states being replayed, what difference could be made by the presence (or absence) of all the extra bits that *would* deal with counterfactual correctness if a different computation was being replayed, but happen in this case not to be used? I can't see how this could make any physical difference to the states being replayed (unless counterfactual correctness introduces some nonphysical magic into the system?) On 27 March 2015 at 14:49, Platonist Guitar Cowboy <[email protected] > wrote: > > > On Fri, Mar 27, 2015 at 2:09 AM, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: >> >> >>> >>> On Fri, Mar 27, 2015 at 1:10 AM, Bruce Kellett < >>> [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>> >>> PGC wrote: >>> >>> Why or how is anybody arguing that problem is generated or >>> solved by "how somebody feels about it"? >>> >>> It's via contradiction/standard reductio: assume conclusion >>> false and negation to be true, and from this we derive >>> contradiction. If latter is the case, conclusion must be true. >>> >>> Only two things are required: law of excluded middle and if >>> statement implies something false, it must be false. PGC >>> >>> Where is the contradiction? >>> >>> Of what? MGA? I just described the mechanism, far from "just feelings". >>> >>> I assumed you had read at least a paper: incompatibility of physical >>> supervenience with comp. PGC >>> >> >> >> Yes, physical supervenience is incompatible with computationalism. > > > Yup. > > >> But it remains to be proved that physical supervenience is false and comp >> is true. > > > In what frame then, as it looks as if you're implying some sort of > mega-ontology? > > What you suggest goes beyond the scope of demonstrating that you can't > keep both comp and physical supervenience in the same ontological frame. > > You're quite the ultimate mystic, Bruce! ;-) > > And Liz: yes, what if the movie graph dreams? Of course this is logically > plausible. > > But you forget that consciousness cannot supervene on the film due to > computationalism being the only game in town at this point by definition. > If you have something besides physical universes or comp ones, please share > ;-) > > No computational activity, given this frame, can be associated to the > projection of film, given the terms we're working with. This or the > stroboscope version of the argument imply that if you're going to use comp > with noted precisions, then observer is no longer required (universal > numbers), no real time playing of film, which itself has no computational > role, like some accidental passive supervenience?, and can be discarded. > > The absurdity is that if you allow the film to dream counter to the kinds > of objections raised here... that you have to ride with *all possible > dreams* supervening on the activity of the stroboscope and *even no > dreams at all* because the stroboscope itself actualizes no primitive > computational activity and can therefore be discarded. > > But if you really want: you can keep all your zombies that are no zombies > and pretend this is not absurd...;-) > > And no, this is no "proof that comp is true". That's way too strong. Just > the incompatibility and absurdity if you want to keep both or have film > dreaming or whatever. PGC > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
