LizR wrote:
On the subject of counterfactual correctness, isn't that the point of Olimpia and Klara? My problem with counterfactual correctness is (probably the same as Maudlin's?) -- how does the system /know/ it's counterfactually correct if it doesn't actually pass through any of the "what-if" states? To put it another way, when you have a recording of the conscious computational states being replayed, what difference could be made by the presence (or absence) of all the extra bits that /would/ deal with counterfactual correctness if a different computation was being replayed, but happen in this case not to be used? I can't see how this could make any physical difference to the states being replayed (unless counterfactual correctness introduces some nonphysical magic into the system?)
That is an excellent point. I find it deeply ironic that Bruna relies on counterfactual correctness in his account of computationalism but cheerfully abandons counterfactual definiteness when it comes to the MWI explanation of the EPR correlations.
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