On Fri, Mar 27, 2015 at 3:16 AM, LizR <[email protected]> wrote: > PGC - I think you may have skimmed over too much for me to grasp what > you're saying. But maybe not. So .... does contradicition arise because you > assume to start with that consciousness is created by computation, then > show that it would also (assuming physical supervenience) arise from > something that isn't computation? >
Bruno will kick my butt for vulgarizing his thesis in this improvisatory, overly short, imprecise manner. I suspect you're still assuming physical universe without being aware of it. > > I'm still not sure where the dreams come in, however. (Or the zombies...) > > On the subject of counterfactual correctness, isn't that the point of > Olimpia and Klara? My problem with counterfactual correctness is (probably > the same as Maudlin's?) -- how does the system *know* it's > counterfactually correct if it doesn't actually pass through any of the > "what-if" states? > "The system" is what here? "It" referring to what here? Would you tend to interpret these as physical or comp objects? Remember that comp supervenience requires physics to become part of machine psychology/theology; thus every explanatory potency of a physical universe is left behind. The association is some sensation [of my joy in space-time (x,t)] to [type] of relative computational state. > To put it another way, when you have a recording of the conscious > computational states being replayed, what difference could be made by the > presence (or absence) of all the extra bits that *would* deal with > counterfactual correctness if a different computation was being replayed, > but happen in this case not to be used? I can't see how this could make any > physical difference to the states being replayed (unless counterfactual > correctness introduces some nonphysical magic into the system?) > A machine from which we remove some redundant parts resulting in a finite set of states or executions looses counterfactual correctness: The movie is not conscious. The universal machine viewing it via types, not tokens, of possible activities keeps CC intact, with consciousness supervening on potential activities, and not some brittle, particular branch of the same. And yes, we can cite all manner of quantum weirdness and state that consciousness supervenes on physical processes that are not actualized. This is reasonable since measurements depending on potential observations that are non-actualized depend on CC. But here, Bruno iirc pointed out that this would be a case of tokens rather than types. In short "Bruno will definitely kill me for simplifying and shortening as much as I have" sense, consciousness relative to computational state of a universal machine supervenes on set of possible accessible extensions of these states distributed on the entirety of the UD. PGC -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
