On Sat, May 09, 2015 at 03:22:40PM +1200, LizR wrote: > On 9 May 2015 at 14:58, Russell Standish <[email protected]> wrote: > > > But to really draw that conclusion requires accepting the absurdity of > > noncounterfactual program instantiating consciousness. I think more > > work is actually needed here, as we're talking about very large > > recordings, something like 1e14 bits per second of consciousness > > (about 100 Terabytes per second). Replaying this movie in real time is > > still many orders of magnitude out from current capability. Normal > > HD movies is only about 500KB per second. > > > > However, there is no obvious need to replay the recording in real time. > But given those figures we'd certainly want to approach real time, because > at the given rate a second of consciousness would require something like 10 > years to play back. >
My point only was that naively extrapolating intuition through 8 orders of magnitude is bound to cause problems. > > > > I don't have a stake in the outcome either way - I accept the MWI as > > the preferred interpretation of QM, where the MGA neither works, nor > > is needed, as ontology is robust. I'm just trying the critique the > > argument on its own terms. > > > > What does your comment about the MWI mean here? At first sight it appears > to be assuming the result - if comp is true then the MWI has to be > recovered from the UD (I think). But I could easily be missing the point. > No it has nothing to do with that. Physical supervenience in my book is a required feature. Note this is distinctly different from Bruno's primitive physicalist supervenience thesis, and the similar name makes for confusion. Physical supervenience is just the good old garden variety where a change of qualia entails a change of brain state, and has a load of evidence in its favour. The MGA when it boils down to it _is_ an argument showing that computational supervenience and physical supervenience (not the PPST) do not play well together. If we do accept the results of the MGA (and I'm still far from that because of the intuition pump problems), then we also note that the MGA actually fails for a robust ontology, as all counterfactuals are realised in a robust ontology. So if the MGA is valid, the only way to have your cake and eat it (ie computational+physical supervenience) is to accept a robust ontology (which in practice means accepting soemthing like the MWI). Note Bruno has already shown the reversal and that comp and the PPST are incompatible for robust ontologies, which completes his argument. What I'm saying is a corrolory: that to keep physical supervenience (not the PPST) and comp, your ontology needs to be robust. Cheers > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics [email protected] University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
