On 09 May 2015, at 00:37, Russell Standish wrote:
On Fri, May 08, 2015 at 08:33:43PM +1200, LizR wrote:
On 8 May 2015 at 18:37, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
On 07 May 2015, at 14:45, Bruce Kellett wrote:
We can use an original biological brain, or an equivalent digital
replacement -- it does not make any significant difference to
the argument.
The first point is that in some conscious experience, be it a
dream or
anything else, there might be a portion of the 'brain' (in
quotes because
it can be biological or digital) that is not activated, so this
can be
removed without affecting the conscious experience.
This idea of removing unused parts of brain so only "active"
elements
remain, seems problematic to me and not just because of
counterfactual
correctness. The ability to do this is implicit in the assumption
that the
physics of the brain is classical.
But comp is based on the assumption that consciousness is the
result of
classical computation. If that assumption's wrong then comp fails, of
course, from step 0 - no need to worry about the MGA.
But Brent's qualms are just that removing the inactive parts (thus
making the computation noncounterfactual, and potentially destroying
the comp supervenience) also actually change the physical quantum
state, so may also be destroying the physical supervenience.
Hence invalidating the distinction between computational and physical
supervenience.
ISTM, the MGA works in a purely classical physical reality (such as
the non-robust case), but not a quantum one (which is a robust
case). This is not a problem for Bruno's argument, but it must be
clear that the MGA is _only_ relevant for the non-robust case.
That is why it has been made. To show the move to a robust universe is
equivalent as using primitive matter, or just physicalism, as a God-of-
the-gap.
Bruno
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Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics [email protected]
University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au
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