On 09 May 2015, at 04:58, Russell Standish wrote:
On Fri, May 08, 2015 at 07:47:42AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
It is because it does not, indeed, and because of the insanity you
need to believe that a movie of a computation is a computation, that
Replaying the movie is a computation, so saying this idea is insane
doesn't help.
OK. Sorry. I hope I have helped. It is the kind of things which can be
made very transparant once we translate the reasoning in arithmetic.
The question at hand is whether replaying the movie is sufficient to
instantiate the consciousness moment. Given that the conscious moment
already existed at some time in the past,
I am not sure a conscious moment exist at nay moment. It exists and is
felt as a moment in all relevant number or combinators relations.
we have to define the
physicalist supervenience thesis as supervenience on the here and now,
as opposed to the original then and there, in order to drive a
possible difference between the computational supervenience thesis
(which doesn't say whether the recording is conscious or not)
The comp supervenience thesis does say consciousness does not
supervene on the movie, as it associate consciousness to computation,
and there is no computation done by the projection of the movie.
and the
phsyicalist one which says it is. I'm not convinced that this version
of the physicalist supervenience thesis makes a lot of sense, and I
would say that neither Bruce nor John Clark promote this when they say
that replaying the recording make not one iota of difference to the
actual experience.
Perhaps there is another way of skinning the cat. Suppose we have our
original computed experience, and the recording made of it. Now let us
prepare an ensemble of recordings that vary a little bit from the
original. Presumably, if we can arrange the encoding of the recording
in a non-fragile manner (fragility of an instruction set refers to
how often
random mutations of a program lead to non-valid programs - a
non-fragile instruction is one where random mutations usually lead to
working programs. The genetic code is not very fragile, due to vast
amounts of redundancy, but artificial computers are typically very
fragile).
The point here being that it might well be possible to create a
recording of a new conscious experience (albeit very similar to the
previously recorded experience), without needing an astronomical
amount of monkeys clicking away on keyboards. If this is at all
plausible, then we can do away with the troublesome "here and now"
aspect of the physicalist supervenience thesis.
This still leaves us with whether this new "recording" actually
instantiates the new conscious experience in our non-robust
universe. The Physicalist supervenience thesis quite unambiguously
says yes. Computationalism is simply mute on the affair, as the new
"recording" is definitely not the same program as the one that
instantiate the consciousness.
By modifying the movie in such a way that it still is a computaion,
you will instanciate that new computation (which exists already in
arithmetic), but by making it noun conterfactually correct, you get
only a desciption of that computation, and not the one needed for that
consciousness (which is already in Platonia) can continue his life
here, and so the movie and its playing does not add anything to the
measure, (unless you project the movie on the graph, and get the
correct conuterfactual.
This is not a so long way from Turing test. The recording is not
conscious because it fails all possible Turing test (noram: there is
no computation at all).
If we are to accept that instantiating the conscious experience by
replaying the "recording" is an absurd notion, then it is clear there
is a difference between this PPST and Comp. But I raise the question
of whether it really is absurd? The difference between the playback
of the "recording" and the actual computation is one of counterfactual
correctness. If it is absurd, it can only be absurd because
counterfactual correctness is an important feature.
It is important because it is part of the semantic of the program, and
its computations.
But too many
people have stated that it is irrelevant...
Well some people can go far to save their God. It is common, normal I
would say.
If this counterfactual aspect is important, then the only way to
rescue physical supervenience (as opposed to physicalist supervenience
aka primitive physical supervenience)
But this is open, at least in the mathematical part, and my intuition
oscillates on this.
This can vary according which of S4GRz1, Z1* and X1* (and their own
variants) is closer to the logic of qualia and which is closer to
"only quanta".
and comp is to require that the
counterfactuals must physically real as well.
OK. That is possible.
This in turn entails
some sort of many worlds must be true, and this is back in the robust
ontology territory.
No, with comp, we have the many world, or better, the "all
computations" at the start. It exists in the smallest arithmetic in
which you can represent the partial recursive function (like RA).
There is nothing more robust than the (sigma_1- arithmetical reality.
The problem of the materialist is to justify how its God "matter"
operate a selection, where the comp answers explains that "matter" is
provided by the winning universal numbers (winning in the measure of
your normal extensions support).
But to really draw that conclusion requires accepting the absurdity of
noncounterfactual program instantiating consciousness. I think more
work is actually needed here, as we're talking about very large
recordings, something like 1e14 bits per second of consciousness
(about 100 Terabytes per second). Replaying this movie in real time is
still many orders of magnitude out from current capability. Normal
HD movies is only about 500KB per second.
The biggness of the number will not change the fact that although the
described state comes from a computation, once in a movie, we get only
the micmick of a computation. But once we agrre with this, even the
real computare computation are no more associated to consciousness:
consciousness is associated to an infinity of comp state in
arithmetic, and manifest itself only where it can, which is why it
needs the counterfactual correctness. That correctness is part of the
relative self-referencial correctness.
I don't have a stake in the outcome either way - I accept the MWI as
the preferred interpretation of QM, where the MGA neither works,
comp is agnostic on physics, except that it has to be able to Turing
emulate universal systems.
To use the quantum and our entanglement with all particles in the
"physical universe" just makes the UD calculation *much* longer, but
the physics will still be the sum on all computation, and we need to
explain that quantum aspect from the normal selection on all
computation, or why the quantum universal numbers win.
nor
is needed, as ontology is robust. I'm just trying the critique the
argument on its own terms.
I hope I have clarified.
Best,
Bruno
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics [email protected]
University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au
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