On Fri, May 08, 2015 at 12:43:32PM +1200, LizR wrote: > On 8 May 2015 at 05:14, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > > > > On Thursday, May 7, 2015, Russell Standish <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > All computational supervenience gets you is that two counterfactually > >> equivalent programs will generate the same conscious state. All bets > >> are off with counterfactually inequivalent programs that nevertheless > >> result in the same physical state. For that you additionally need > >> physical supervenience. > >> > >> The whole business of the recording is how can that physical apparatus > >> replaying the conscious moment actually be conscious, when it is not > >> aware of the environment. As far as computationalism is concerned, the > >> experienced moment has already been experienced, at some previous time > >> and place (there and then). Replaying the recording makes no > >> difference whatsoever. Yet the same sequence of physical states takes > >> place, so in some sense by physical supervenience a new conscious > >> moment is created. I don't think it can be, and I don't think this is > >> what physical supervenience can actually mean. > >> > > > > Why can't playing the equivalent of a recording made de novo (i.e. there > > was no original) instantiate the conscious moment for the first time? > > > > Assuming a recording *can* be conscious (i.e. that the MGA's conclusion > isn't absurd) then of course it can be. >
But such a recording is so large (probably consuming all the matter with the visible universe), how can you assert that it's consciousness is absurd? That is what you need to do to make the MGA work... -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics [email protected] University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
