On Saturday, May 9, 2015, Russell Standish <[email protected]> wrote:
> On Fri, May 08, 2015 at 12:43:32PM +1200, LizR wrote: > > On 8 May 2015 at 05:14, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected] > <javascript:;>> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > On Thursday, May 7, 2015, Russell Standish <[email protected] > <javascript:;>> wrote: > > > > > > All computational supervenience gets you is that two counterfactually > > >> equivalent programs will generate the same conscious state. All bets > > >> are off with counterfactually inequivalent programs that nevertheless > > >> result in the same physical state. For that you additionally need > > >> physical supervenience. > > >> > > >> The whole business of the recording is how can that physical apparatus > > >> replaying the conscious moment actually be conscious, when it is not > > >> aware of the environment. As far as computationalism is concerned, the > > >> experienced moment has already been experienced, at some previous time > > >> and place (there and then). Replaying the recording makes no > > >> difference whatsoever. Yet the same sequence of physical states takes > > >> place, so in some sense by physical supervenience a new conscious > > >> moment is created. I don't think it can be, and I don't think this is > > >> what physical supervenience can actually mean. > > >> > > > > > > Why can't playing the equivalent of a recording made de novo (i.e. > there > > > was no original) instantiate the conscious moment for the first time? > > > > > > > Assuming a recording *can* be conscious (i.e. that the MGA's conclusion > > isn't absurd) then of course it can be. > > > > But such a recording is so large (probably consuming all the matter > with the visible universe), how can you assert that it's consciousness > is absurd? That is what you need to do to make the MGA work... > It's getting difficult to work out what everyone is claiming is and isn't absurd. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
