On 8 May 2015 at 05:14, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> wrote:
> > > On Thursday, May 7, 2015, Russell Standish <[email protected]> wrote: > > All computational supervenience gets you is that two counterfactually >> equivalent programs will generate the same conscious state. All bets >> are off with counterfactually inequivalent programs that nevertheless >> result in the same physical state. For that you additionally need >> physical supervenience. >> >> The whole business of the recording is how can that physical apparatus >> replaying the conscious moment actually be conscious, when it is not >> aware of the environment. As far as computationalism is concerned, the >> experienced moment has already been experienced, at some previous time >> and place (there and then). Replaying the recording makes no >> difference whatsoever. Yet the same sequence of physical states takes >> place, so in some sense by physical supervenience a new conscious >> moment is created. I don't think it can be, and I don't think this is >> what physical supervenience can actually mean. >> > > Why can't playing the equivalent of a recording made de novo (i.e. there > was no original) instantiate the conscious moment for the first time? > Assuming a recording *can* be conscious (i.e. that the MGA's conclusion isn't absurd) then of course it can be. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
