Indeed.
On 9 May 2015 at 12:11, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> wrote: > > > On Saturday, May 9, 2015, Russell Standish <[email protected]> wrote: > >> On Fri, May 08, 2015 at 12:43:32PM +1200, LizR wrote: >> > On 8 May 2015 at 05:14, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> wrote: >> > >> > > >> > > >> > > On Thursday, May 7, 2015, Russell Standish <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> > > >> > > All computational supervenience gets you is that two counterfactually >> > >> equivalent programs will generate the same conscious state. All bets >> > >> are off with counterfactually inequivalent programs that nevertheless >> > >> result in the same physical state. For that you additionally need >> > >> physical supervenience. >> > >> >> > >> The whole business of the recording is how can that physical >> apparatus >> > >> replaying the conscious moment actually be conscious, when it is not >> > >> aware of the environment. As far as computationalism is concerned, >> the >> > >> experienced moment has already been experienced, at some previous >> time >> > >> and place (there and then). Replaying the recording makes no >> > >> difference whatsoever. Yet the same sequence of physical states takes >> > >> place, so in some sense by physical supervenience a new conscious >> > >> moment is created. I don't think it can be, and I don't think this is >> > >> what physical supervenience can actually mean. >> > >> >> > > >> > > Why can't playing the equivalent of a recording made de novo (i.e. >> there >> > > was no original) instantiate the conscious moment for the first time? >> > > >> > >> > Assuming a recording *can* be conscious (i.e. that the MGA's conclusion >> > isn't absurd) then of course it can be. >> > >> >> But such a recording is so large (probably consuming all the matter >> with the visible universe), how can you assert that it's consciousness >> is absurd? That is what you need to do to make the MGA work... >> > > It's getting difficult to work out what everyone is claiming is and isn't > absurd. > > > -- > Stathis Papaioannou > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
