On 09 May 2015, at 01:59, Russell Standish wrote:
On Fri, May 08, 2015 at 12:43:32PM +1200, LizR wrote:
On 8 May 2015 at 05:14, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]>
wrote:
On Thursday, May 7, 2015, Russell Standish <[email protected]>
wrote:
All computational supervenience gets you is that two
counterfactually
equivalent programs will generate the same conscious state. All
bets
are off with counterfactually inequivalent programs that
nevertheless
result in the same physical state. For that you additionally need
physical supervenience.
The whole business of the recording is how can that physical
apparatus
replaying the conscious moment actually be conscious, when it is
not
aware of the environment. As far as computationalism is
concerned, the
experienced moment has already been experienced, at some previous
time
and place (there and then). Replaying the recording makes no
difference whatsoever. Yet the same sequence of physical states
takes
place, so in some sense by physical supervenience a new conscious
moment is created. I don't think it can be, and I don't think
this is
what physical supervenience can actually mean.
Why can't playing the equivalent of a recording made de novo (i.e.
there
was no original) instantiate the conscious moment for the first
time?
Assuming a recording *can* be conscious (i.e. that the MGA's
conclusion
isn't absurd) then of course it can be.
But such a recording is so large (probably consuming all the matter
with the visible universe), how can you assert that it's consciousness
is absurd? That is what you need to do to make the MGA work...
For the recording, its largeness is irrelevant. It is just not a
computing device.
Bruno
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Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics [email protected]
University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au
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