On 13 May 2015, at 01:26, Bruce Kellett wrote:
meekerdb wrote:
On 5/11/2015 11:14 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
[BM] Why? Have you proven that consciousness supervenes on a
record?
Have you proven that it does not?
No, but I have a lot of evidence it supervenes on brain /
*processes*/. Reducing that to /*states*/ is a further assumption.
That is the pedant's reply. :-)
A process reduces to a sequence of states -- you simply lower the
substitution level (step rate) to whatever value is necessary to
reproduce the process FAPP.
The assumption of the argument was that consciousness supervenes
on the brain state.
That's not the same as saying yes to the doctor. It's your added
interpretation that consciousness supervenes on a brain state as
opposed to a brain process that constitutes a computation. Bruno,
who made the argument, I think is relying on the latter.
Yes, that seems to be the case. The original claim of absurdity for
the idea that consciousness could supervene on a recording has been
replaced by the claim that the recording is not a computation of the
required kind. This also begs the question of course -- where is it
proved that that particular type of computation is both necessary
and sufficient for consciousness?
However, I think one can approach this in a different way. The
overwhelming evidence from neuroscience, and all related
experimentation, is that consciousness supervenes on the physical
brain -- the goo in our skulls. Damage the goo, stimulate the goo,
do anything to the goo, and our qualia or consciousness are altered.
Alter our consciousness/thinking/processing and there are associated
changes in the brain activity/states. (Pet scans and the like.)
The MGA argues that the natural sequence of brain states and a
recording of that sequence are not equivalent in that one is
conscious and the other is not.
You still miss the point. MGA just shows that physical supervenience
makes them equivalent, and as they are not equivalent (from the
computer science point of view which is relevant with comp), physical
supervenience has to be abandoned if we keep comp.
It is concluded from this that consciousness does not supervene on
the brain states/processes,
A relief, because this is what block the progress toward a solution of
the mind-body problem since 1500 years.
which conclusion is contradicted by the overwhelming bulk of
experimental evidence.
Proof?
The fact that coffee can change my mind, and that my mind can change
my brain is part of evidence for comp, not for the primitive physical
supervenience thesis, whose main weakness at the start is that it
assumes physicalism, primary matter, which are metaphysical concept,
and no real scientific evidences have ever been given to them. It is a
strong assumption in theology. There are no evidence that there is a
*primitive* physical universe, or that some laws of physics has to be
assumed.
This is science. When your theory is contradicted by overwhelming
experimental evidence,
One evidence is enough.
But there are none. You can try one, but from above, you will beg the
question as it seems you take the existence of *primitive* physical
universe for granted.
it is conventionally taken as evidence that your theory has been
falsified. The MGA puts Bruno's theory in this category: it has been
falsified by the experimental results.
Do you mean that comp has been falsified? My work shows that to
falsify a classical version of comp, you need to find a difference of
prediction between QL, and the logics S4Grz1, X1*, Z1* or variants.
Or do you mean that there is a flaw in MGA?
Bruno
Bruce
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