On 13 May 2015 at 12:19, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: The fact that coffee can change my mind, and that my mind can change my > brain is part of evidence for comp, not for the primitive physical > supervenience thesis, whose main weakness at the start is that it assumes > physicalism, primary matter, which are metaphysical concept, and no real > scientific evidences have ever been given to them. It is a strong > assumption in theology. There are no evidence that there is a *primitive* > physical universe, or that some laws of physics has to be assumed. >
So IIUC, in your terminology, 'primitive physicalism' just stands for the assumption that some definite 'laws of physics' are assumed to be more basic than anything else. If so, on that assumption, such laws would of necessity be the ultimate basis of any effective computation (i.e. in some physical approximation). The MGA then points out that in principle we can always devise ways to preserve the purely physical dispositions of any given approximate realisation (by fortuitous or deliberate one-time interventions) even in circumstances where any or all of its original computational characteristics have been grossly disrupted. MGA then argues that, if conscious experience fundamentally depends on preservation of such physical dispositions, we should thereby conclude that it should be unaffected in such scenarios. But the problem is that the interventions cannot be guaranteed to preserve the original 'computational' architecture (in particular, its counter-factual capabilities). Hence it would seem that, on the one hand, that if consciousness supervenes on particular physical dispositions of the brain it should be preserved, but on the other, if it depends on the particular *computational* characteristics of such dispositions, it could not be (since these can always be disrupted or simplified). It is the incompatibility of these two views that forces a choice between the principles of physical and computational supervenience. It is argued in opposition to the rejection of physical supervenience that it appears everywhere to be supported by observation. However, if two observed phenomena (e.g. brain function and conscious experience) are found to be in constant conjunction, an alternative to one or the other having a 'primary' role would be that they both emanate from some common underlying progenitor. Under computationalism, that role is subsumed by the entire spectrum of computations below the substitution level of either (i.e. the 'computational everything'). Is that more or less your view? David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
