Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 25 Jun 2015, at 14:27, Bruce Kellett wrote:

My contention is that the body (and the rest of the world) is essential for a satisfactory account of personal identity.

I can understand, but that remains possibly true phenomenologically. Unless you explain me why you use your theory to refuse a brain transplant to a kids who will die without?

A brain transplant means replacing one physic brain with another physical brain. I think you need to explain why we need a transplant -- why not just replace the brain with the appropriate universal number tattooed on the forehead?

Personal identity is not just a matter of memories. Or else we cease to be persons when we are in (non-dreaming) sleep, or under anaesthesia, or in a coma. Are you going to tell the grieving parents of the young boy who is in a coma after a traffic accident not to worry because he is no longer a person -- he has no memories at the moment?

Bruce

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