Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 25 Jun 2015, at 14:27, Bruce Kellett wrote:
My contention is that the body (and the rest of the world) is
essential for a satisfactory account of personal identity.
I can understand, but that remains possibly true phenomenologically.
Unless you explain me why you use your theory to refuse a brain
transplant to a kids who will die without?
A brain transplant means replacing one physic brain with another
physical brain. I think you need to explain why we need a transplant --
why not just replace the brain with the appropriate universal number
tattooed on the forehead?
Personal identity is not just a matter of memories. Or else we cease to
be persons when we are in (non-dreaming) sleep, or under anaesthesia, or
in a coma. Are you going to tell the grieving parents of the young boy
who is in a coma after a traffic accident not to worry because he is no
longer a person -- he has no memories at the moment?
Bruce
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