On 29 June 2015 at 09:37, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote:
> Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 26 Jun 2015, at 04:19, Bruce Kellett wrote: >> >> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>>> On 25 Jun 2015, at 14:27, Bruce Kellett wrote: >>>> >>>>> My contention is that the body (and the rest of the world) is >>>>> essential for a satisfactory account of personal identity. >>>>> >>>> I can understand, but that remains possibly true phenomenologically. >>>> Unless you explain me why you use your theory to refuse a brain transplant >>>> to a kids who will die without? >>>> >>> >>> A brain transplant means replacing one physic brain with another >>> physical brain. I think you need to explain why we need a transplant -- why >>> not just replace the brain with the appropriate universal number tattooed >>> on the forehead? >>> >> >> because in that case (admitting some sense in it) would not save your >> relative manisfestation locally. >> >>> >>> Personal identity is not just a matter of memories. >>> >> >> Right, and that is clear from the AUDA definition. But for UDA, personal >> memory is enough to get the reversal. >> > > You have not *derived* any reversal at any stage -- you have only ever > asserted or assumed it. > > Or else we cease to be persons when we are in (non-dreaming) sleep, or >>> under anaesthesia, or in a coma. Are you going to tell the grieving parents >>> of the young boy who is in a coma after a traffic accident not to worry >>> because he is no longer a person -- he has no memories at the moment? >>> >> >> We can argue that in deep sleep or in coma, we might loss temporarily the >> status of person, at least in a way which makes us able to manifest that >> personhood relatively to people. >> > > I think the relatives by the bedside take it that the body lying there in > a come (though showing brain activity -- not brain dead) is a person, and > they demand that it be accorded all respect due to a person. Personal > identity necessarily involves much more than conscious memories, It is > basically through the body that personhood is demonstrated to other people. > I expect that strangers I pass in the street will accord me the status of > personhood, even though I have not demonstrated to them that I can pass a > Turing test. The person in a coma is worth preserving because he might wake up. If there is no chance of waking up he is effectively dead. Dead bodies have sentimental value to families, but that is not the same as being a living and conscious person. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
