On Mon, Jun 29, 2015 at 7:27 PM, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]>
wrote:
> meekerdb wrote:
>
>> On 6/29/2015 5:41 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> On which view? That is true for []p, but false for []p & <>t.
>>>
>>
>> Are you saying that it is true that all provable propositions are not
>> sufficiently coherent to instantiate a consciousness? But the set of
>> provable propositions with the added axioms of consistency are?
>>
>> Are you not suffering of some Dunning-Kruger symptoms? If you have a
>>> proof that finite continuations of local conscious calculations are not
>>> sufficiently coherent, then you could refute comp. Do it, then.
>>>
>>
>> I think Bruce is saying that you don't have a proof that they are
>> sufficiently coherent and so comp doesn't entail the reversal. His
>> argument is a defeater of a proof, not a proof of the contrary.
>>
>
> Exactly. As usual, Brent, you have a way of clarifying things with a few
> well-chosen words.
>
> I must admit that I have become frustrated by Bruno's habit of arguing
> that because I do not have an alternative, fully worked out theory, his
> theory must be correct ("the only game in town" argument!). My main thrust
> all along has been to test the various logical weak points in Bruno's
> argument, and to point out where his arguments are either mere assertions,
> or nothing more than pseudo-arguments, that may be motivational, but amount
> to far less than proof.
>
>
Under a more generous interpretation, maybe Bruno is challenging you to
make any kind of positive argument for a non-comp theory of mind, not
necessarily for you to pitch your tent on some theory, maybe just to test
that you can claim with intellectual honesty that you gave the arguments a
fair shake.
Terren
> My conclusion is that, overall, his arguments do not entail the
> conclusions he seeks to draw. So yes, I seek to defeat his 'proofs', not
> necessarily to prove the contrary.
>
> Bruce
>
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