On 29 Jun 2015, at 01:37, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 26 Jun 2015, at 04:19, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 25 Jun 2015, at 14:27, Bruce Kellett wrote:
My contention is that the body (and the rest of the world) is
essential for a satisfactory account of personal identity.
I can understand, but that remains possibly true
phenomenologically. Unless you explain me why you use your theory
to refuse a brain transplant to a kids who will die without?
A brain transplant means replacing one physic brain with another
physical brain. I think you need to explain why we need a
transplant -- why not just replace the brain with the appropriate
universal number tattooed on the forehead?
because in that case (admitting some sense in it) would not save
your relative manisfestation locally.
Personal identity is not just a matter of memories.
Right, and that is clear from the AUDA definition. But for UDA,
personal memory is enough to get the reversal.
You have not *derived* any reversal at any stage -- you have only
ever asserted or assumed it.
The reversal follows logically from COMP + ROBUST-UNIVERSE at step
seven. If not, ask me what you don't understand.
Then in step 8, the assumption "ROBUST-UNIVERSE" is replaced by the
usual weak form of Occam razor, as we can never prove something about
reality without invoking it.
Why don't you ask question instead of talking like you find a flaw? If
you find a flaw tell us precisely in which step please. Apparently you
still have a problem with step 7, before MGA, as there is a reversal
at step seven. Don't you see it? How do you predict the result of an
experience of physics in step 7?
Or else we cease to be persons when we are in (non-dreaming)
sleep, or under anaesthesia, or in a coma. Are you going to tell
the grieving parents of the young boy who is in a coma after a
traffic accident not to worry because he is no longer a person --
he has no memories at the moment?
We can argue that in deep sleep or in coma, we might loss
temporarily the status of person, at least in a way which makes us
able to manifest that personhood relatively to people.
I think the relatives by the bedside take it that the body lying
there in a come (though showing brain activity -- not brain dead) is
a person, and they demand that it be accorded all respect due to a
person. Personal identity necessarily involves much more than
conscious memories, It is basically through the body that personhood
is demonstrated to other people. I expect that strangers I pass in
the street will accord me the status of personhood, even though I
have not demonstrated to them that I can pass a Turing test.
No problem with this. But for UDA,or in the MWI, using the personal
memory (the connectness of the relevant part of the (reconstituted)
brain, actually) is enough. Then in AUDA the memory, and everything
else is implicit in the corresponding beweisbar predicate, where we 3p-
identify a person with its set of beliefs, but the first person is
defined by the Theaetetus' definition.
Bruno
Bruce
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