meekerdb wrote:
On 6/29/2015 5:41 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On which view? That is true for []p, but false for []p & <>t.
Are you saying that it is true that all provable propositions are not
sufficiently coherent to instantiate a consciousness? But the set of
provable propositions with the added axioms of consistency are?
Are you not suffering of some Dunning-Kruger symptoms? If you have a
proof that finite continuations of local conscious calculations are
not sufficiently coherent, then you could refute comp. Do it, then.
I think Bruce is saying that you don't have a proof that they are
sufficiently coherent and so comp doesn't entail the reversal. His
argument is a defeater of a proof, not a proof of the contrary.
Exactly. As usual, Brent, you have a way of clarifying things with a few
well-chosen words.
I must admit that I have become frustrated by Bruno's habit of arguing
that because I do not have an alternative, fully worked out theory, his
theory must be correct ("the only game in town" argument!). My main
thrust all along has been to test the various logical weak points in
Bruno's argument, and to point out where his arguments are either mere
assertions, or nothing more than pseudo-arguments, that may be
motivational, but amount to far less than proof.
My conclusion is that, overall, his arguments do not entail the
conclusions he seeks to draw. So yes, I seek to defeat his 'proofs', not
necessarily to prove the contrary.
Bruce
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