On 26 Jun 2015, at 04:19, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 25 Jun 2015, at 14:27, Bruce Kellett wrote:
My contention is that the body (and the rest of the world) is
essential for a satisfactory account of personal identity.
I can understand, but that remains possibly true
phenomenologically. Unless you explain me why you use your theory
to refuse a brain transplant to a kids who will die without?
A brain transplant means replacing one physic brain with another
physical brain. I think you need to explain why we need a transplant
-- why not just replace the brain with the appropriate universal
number tattooed on the forehead?
because in that case (admitting some sense in it) would not save your
relative manisfestation locally.
Personal identity is not just a matter of memories.
Right, and that is clear from the AUDA definition. But for UDA,
personal memory is enough to get the reversal.
Or else we cease to be persons when we are in (non-dreaming) sleep,
or under anaesthesia, or in a coma. Are you going to tell the
grieving parents of the young boy who is in a coma after a traffic
accident not to worry because he is no longer a person -- he has no
memories at the moment?
We can argue that in deep sleep or in coma, we might loss temporarily
the status of person, at least in a way which makes us able to
manifest that personhood relatively to people.
Bruno
Bruce
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