On 30 Jun 2015, at 01:27, Bruce Kellett wrote:
meekerdb wrote:
On 6/29/2015 5:41 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On which view? That is true for []p, but false for []p & <>t.
Are you saying that it is true that all provable propositions are
not sufficiently coherent to instantiate a consciousness? But the
set of provable propositions with the added axioms of consistency
are?
Are you not suffering of some Dunning-Kruger symptoms? If you have
a proof that finite continuations of local conscious calculations
are not sufficiently coherent, then you could refute comp. Do it,
then.
I think Bruce is saying that you don't have a proof that they are
sufficiently coherent and so comp doesn't entail the reversal. His
argument is a defeater of a proof, not a proof of the contrary.
Exactly. As usual, Brent, you have a way of clarifying things with a
few well-chosen words.
I must admit that I have become frustrated by Bruno's habit of
arguing that because I do not have an alternative, fully worked out
theory, his theory must be correct
I have never said that comp is correct. never. Nor that it is my theory.
And I submit a problem. + the ideally correct machine's solution of
that problem, using the classical definition of classical philosophy.
I am a scientist. If my brain is Turing emulable, the physical reality
is the border of the Turing universal machine mind. Study the results
and you will see that the "quantum" confirms this piciture, which
leads to a different rationalist conception of reality (more in the
spirit of Plotinus than the naturalist).
It is a monumental work. But I have just been lucky that people like
Gödel, Löb, Solovay and many others made the harder part.
("the only game in town" argument!).
My main thrust all along has been to test the various logical weak
points in Bruno's argument,
Thanks for the rethorical tricks to remind us that you have fail to
find any flaw.
and to point out where his arguments are either mere assertions, or
nothing more than pseudo-arguments, that may be motivational, but
amount to far less than proof.
Take Sane2014, and just give me the first sentence that you don't
understand. ...or of any of my other papers or post.
My conclusion is that, overall, his arguments do not entail the
conclusions he seeks to draw.
1) Which among the steps of UDA have you a problem with.
2) Well, you have shown not knowing enough to get AUDA, but I can also
explain every bits.
So yes, I seek to defeat his 'proofs', not necessarily to prove the
contrary.
Ok, but I honestly think that you failed. At least you seem to go
beyond step 3, which Jean-Paul Delahaye said just that step deserves a
Nobel Prize. It makes clear we don't need the quantum, nor magic, to
get a strong form of indeterminacy in a purely deterministic context.
I found that a long time ago just trying to put muself in the mind of
a paramecium, which gave me the time to understand the consequences of
this. To my knowledge St-Augustin thought on the idea, and Plotinus too.
With computationalism, the FPI gives no choice, you must extend
Everett's embedding of the subject into the object from the universal
wave to the numbers. The good news is that incompleteness provides to
the (Löbian) machine the means to do that, and to get the quanta, and
the qualia.
So, frankly, why not compare, as they are already comparable, and
compared on the most fundamental thing: the existence of some
quantization (and thus of a proximity space, and orthogonality).
Bruno
Bruce
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
