On Tuesday, September 1, 2015, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
> > On 31 Aug 2015, at 14:56, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > On Monday, August 31, 2015, Bruno Marchal <[email protected] > <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','[email protected]');>> wrote: > >> >> On 31 Aug 2015, at 00:42, Russell Standish wrote: >> >> On Sun, Aug 30, 2015 at 12:34:18PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> On 30 Aug 2015, at 03:08, Russell Standish wrote: >>>> >>>> Well as people probably know, I don't believe C. elegans can be >>>>> conscious in any sense of the word. Hell - I have strong doubts about >>>>> ants, and they're massively more complex creatures. >>>>> >>>> >>>> I think personally that C. Elegans, and Planaria (!), even amoeba, >>>> are conscious, although very plausibly not self-conscious. >>>> >>>> I tend to think since 2008 that even RA is already conscious, even >>>> maximally so, and that PA is already as much self-conscious than a >>>> human (when in some dissociative state). >>>> >>>> But I don't know if PA is more or less conscious than RA. That >>>> depends of the role of the higher part of the brain consists in >>>> filtering consciousness or enacting it. >>>> >>>> >>>>> But it probably won't be long before we simulate a mouse brain in toto >>>>> - about 2 decades is my guess, maybe even less given enough dollars - >>>>> then we're definitely in grey philosophical territory :). >>>>> >>>> >>>> I am slightly less optimistic than you. It will take one of two >>>> decades before we simulate the hippocampus of a rat, but probably >>>> more time will be needed for the rest of their brain. And the result >>>> can be a conscious creature, with a quite different consciousness >>>> that a rat, as I find plausible that pain are related to the glial >>>> cells and their metabolism, which are not taken into account by the >>>> current "copies". >>>> >>> >>> What is blocking us is not the computing power - already whole "rat >>> brain" simulations have been done is something like 1/10000 of real >>> time - so all we need is about a decade of performane improvement >>> through Moores law. >>> >>> What development is needed is ways of determining the neural >>> circuitry. There have been leaps and bounds in the process of slicing >>> frozen brains, and imaging the slices with electron microscopes, but >>> clearly it is still far too slow. >>> >>> As for the hypothesis that glial cells have something to do with it, >>> well that can be tested via the sort of whole rat brain simulation >>> I've been talking about. Run the simulation in a robotic rat, and >>> compare the behaviour with a real rat. Basically what the open worm >>> guys a doing, but scaled up to a rat. If the simulation is way >>> different from the real rat, then we know something else is required. >>> >> >> >> I can imagine that the rat will have a "normal behavior", but as he >> cannot talk to us, we might fail to appreciate some internal change or even >> some anosognosia. The rat would not be a zombie rat, but still be in a >> quite different conscious state (perhaps better, as it seems the glial cell >> might have some role in the chronic pain. >> > > In general, if there is a difference in consciousness then there should be > a difference in behaviour. If the difference in consciousness is impossible > to detect then arguably it is no difference. > > > > How would you detect that the rat has a slight headache? > It should be detectable under ideal circumstances, or it should be detectable statistically by sampling a large number of rats. > Some drugs change *only* the "volume" of consciousness (notably alcool on > high dose, but this one change also the behavior). It is quite unpleasant, > like listening to music with a the sound made too much high, but you can > behave in your normal way, and unless somebody ask, there is no noticeable > difference in behavior. > The point is, it is detectable. If a subjective difference makes no objective difference under any circumstances then arguably there is no subjective difference. > First order experiences are usually wider than anything we can communicate > in a third person way, so it is natural that difference in consciousness > does not necessarily entail a difference in behavior, especially for a > finite time. > > The problem of inverse-spectrum for the qualia of color illustrates also > that a difference of consciousness might not lead to a difference in > behavior. > If the colours I see change every five minutes but I don't notice, then I would say there is no subjective change. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
