On 31 Aug 2015, at 21:54, Jason Resch wrote:
On Mon, Aug 31, 2015 at 12:39 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 31 Aug 2015, at 12:14, Russell Standish wrote:
On Mon, Aug 31, 2015 at 11:19:00AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 31 Aug 2015, at 00:42, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sun, Aug 30, 2015 at 12:34:18PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I guess that you remember that I am not yet convinced by your
argument that ants are not conscious, as it relies on anthropic use
of the Absolute Self-Sampling Assumption (ASSA) which I prefer to
avoid because the domain of its statistic is not clear to me. (I am
not impressed by the doomsday argument for the same reason).
Yes, I've heard that a lot. "I'm not impressed" = "It sounds like a
crock of shit, but I can't put my finger on why".
Probably the best way forward is to put forward a toy model showing
the anthropic argument failing, and then the mechanism is clear.
It does not fail. It can explain some of the geography by bayesian
reasoning, but it can't explain the difference between physical
laws, and local physical/geographical fact. For the lwas, we have to
find something which does not depend on anything particular above
being Turing universal or Löbian.
I'm in agreement with your comments here, however I fail to see the
connection with the doomsday argument, or my anthropic ants argument,
as these are fundamentally about geography (in one case about how long
humans might be here on Earth, and the other about the consciousness
of certain Earthling creatures).
The problem for me is in the use of a "probability to be a human",
or "probability to be an ant" without some relative conditional.
Is it necessarily even an exclusive?
In the frame of Russell's argument that Ant are not conscious, using
bayesianenly the fact that we are human and that Ant are more
numerous. (Like in Leslie Carter Doomsday argument). The use of Bays
is correct, but the result assumes an absolute self-sampling
assumption on which I am agnostic.
It feels like it is, but that might just be an illusion.
But reality is a sum on all the illusions. From inside we can already
prove that if the sum converge, then we can't prove that the sum
converge (that's why "God" or "Reality" requires faith or some
optimisme of some sort).
You might say, in the WM-duplication, that the guy is both the W-guy
and the M-guy, but the probability needed to get the physical still
requires the fact that, illusion or not, the first person experience
are exclusive, even if only *relatively* exclusive.
Can we not be both an ant and a human,
Assuming that ants are conscious, which was the point Russell's
argument try to refute.
I have no first person objection to your point, identify myself with
any animals and plants.
Then computer science protect this from trivialization by associating
a non trivial notion of person to any self-referentially platonist
correct universal machine. Platonist means that the machine believes,
for all arithmetical sentences A, the proposition A v ~A.
So the universal machine defines a universal person.
That universal person can make sense being the same person looking
through the Ant eyes and the Human eyes, but can the ant and the human
do that experience without remembering being the universal person?
That some creature can do that is quite plausibly in its own G* - G
proper theology, a protagorean virtue which can taught by exemplar
behavior but go only without saying.
but be relatively unaware of it
That's the terrestrial condition, but by "demolishing" your brain so
that for a moment it is close to the brain of an ant" might help to
conceive this or make some sense.
What is the probability to have a continuation (when dying, or not) in
which you do awake from both the Ant "dream" and the "Human "dream".
I have awaken from "parallel dreams" about 5 times, and Louis Jouvet
(the french onirophysiologists) describes similar occurences, and
explains them by an inhibition (or a lowering of activity) in the
corpus callosum. So I think it can make sense on recognizing yourself
in different creature experiences, and integrating them as "personal
souvenir". Technologically, in some future(s) such merging can be
"artificially" sustained in the relative stable "terrestrial "way.
such that we can't comment on the knowledge of being an ant from the
human organism's point of view, nor can the ant react to its human
sensations from the ant organism's view.
And the question is, could an ant experience merges with a human
experience in the infinite universal person mind. The UD, and thus
elementary arithmetic emulates such experiences, but the non trivial
problem is what is the probability of global merging of all experiences?
With CT + "yes doctor", such questions can be translated into
(complex) arithmetical (terrestrial) and analytical (divine)
statements. The universal person associated to a (Gödel-Löbian)
machine, is defiend by its constellation of points of views
corresponding to the Theaetetus intensional variant for a
"believability" predicate. (p, []p, []p & p, ...), with [] the
arithmetical definition of the machine's beliefs.
In "real life" the []p is variable. If the variation preserves self-
referential correctness the logic of belief (G), or knowledge (S4Grz),
etc. remains invariant too.
Bruno
PS I have to go. Heavy "re-entry" (we say in french. How do you call
that period in english?)
Jason
I have no frame or universe or reference for the ASSA. We can get
geographical 3p conclusion from 3p data, but when sampling on
oneself I have difficulties to make sense of the absolute
probabilities. (I think that was part of the old RSSA versus ASSA
debate).
Best,
Bruno
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Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics [email protected]
University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au
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