On 25 Jun 2016, at 10:05, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 25/06/2016 1:36 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 24 Jun 2016, at 08:42, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 24/06/2016 3:32 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 23 Jun 2016, at 03:01, Bruce Kellett wrote:
..... if physics can be seen as possible a simulation run by
some alien civilization, then physics is certainly Turing
emulable.
Which is not the case. The alien can fail us only for a finite
time.
Prove that without assuming computationalism. What in our physical
world is not Turing emulable?
Consciousness, and the appearance of primary matter (probably the
phenomenological "collapse").
Comnsciousness is not Turing emulable? You had better say "No" to
the doctor, then.
No, because if you bet on a substitution level, where you will be
'reconstituted" will inherite your normality. The local brain we see
does not emulate consciousness, it makes only possible for a
consciousness to manifest itself in the relative way.
There is an equivalent in computer science: a program cannot run its
own semantic, nor its whole trace and stop. Consciousness concerns
really the first person, and the math shows it unnameable.
Primary matter might be a problem only if you assume
computationalism. But if you don't assume computationalism, you have
no problems.
Going on the planet Mars might be a problem only if you assume Mars,
Then, having a problem is interesting. We progress by solving problem.
Not hiding them by using assumptions like if they were dogma.
What could not be simulated by an alien running a simulation on a
physical computer? Prove that we are not brains-in-a-vat.
If Nature satisfies qZ1*, then we can take that as an evidence we
are at the physical bottom, which means we are in infinitely many
"brain in a vat" in arithmetic.
Rubbish. I thought it was part of your argument that we can't know
what substrate our computations are running on
Meaning that you heve not yet really study the papers. On the
contrary, I insist that for the FPI, you have no first external clues,
so that by just the subjective experience you can't see any
difference. But as I explain all along, we can see if we are in a
simulation or not (assuming comp and keeping it all along). A bit like
you van get lucid in a dream. So we can test comp V emulation.
-- there is no difference between the physical brain and the
computer simulation (at the correct level). In that case, we can
never know that we are not a BIV, or that we are not part of a
simulation run by some alien civilization.
Computationalism predicts that when looking below your substitution
level, you get some precise physics. If you don't get it, it means you
are emulate in a fake reality by people wanting to fail you (but you
got them), or computationalism is false, and we have to serach for
another theory of mind and matter.
If Nature violate qZ1*, then: either computationalism is wrong, of
we are in a brain in vat made by people closer to the bottom.
Computationalism could well be wrong,and we could still be BIVs.
That does not seem to make sense, unless you mean by BIV some
analogical continuous brain machine, non emulable by any Turing machine.
Or maybe computationalism is the same as brains-in-a-vat --
consciousness and the physical world are both merely illusions.
Consciousness is certainly not an illusion, as it is a form of
knowledge, linked to truth by definition. And that mirrors the fact
that we cannot doubt being conscious, given than a genuine doubt
require consciousness. Consciousness can be defined by []p & p,
with p = t, at least for a first approximation, and this makes it
non definable in arithmetic, yet unavoidable for all universal
numbers, and this knowingly so for the Löbian numbers. The physical
is an illusion, if you want, but a lawful persistent one, and we
can compare its structure with what we actually observe.
So you grant priority to what we observe? Just as well, because that
is what is basic. As Brent says, consciousness in isolation is
nothing -- we have to be conscious of something, and the only thing
we can be conscious of is the physical world.
The only thing we can be conscious of is one experience. That there is
a world there is a first bet, that there is a physical world is a
stringer bet. We don't know that.
No dpubt that there is a local physical reality, and no doubt that it
plays a key role in the theological structure, but to say that it is
fundamental and has to be assumed is going far to quick, especially in
absence of a theory of mind. And with the comp assumption, it just
cannot work.
The external world is, therefore, essential for the existence of
consciousness, and it is logically prior.
Some transcendent reality is needed, but to say that it is the
physical world cannot work once you say "yes" to the *digitalist*
doctor.
One is necessarily as sure of the external world as one is of being
conscious,
We can be sure of the ONE, but to tell that it is the first universal
number we infer from nature is too quick for me. Computationalism
necessitate to explain how it won the competition with all universal
numbers, which operate below your substitution level, by the FPI.
the external defines the conscious state: 1p does not exist without
the corresponding 3p.
I agree, but how does your God Matter select the computation in
arithmetic, and how does you God making the machine feeling she is
more real? What is your magical potion? I bet that you need actual
infinities, to derail computationalism. But then do it. develop your
theory, publish, etc. But stop invoking your god to detract people
from a simpler and more atheist (with that type of Gods at least)
solution.
Bruno
Bruce
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