On 09 Aug 2016, at 19:24, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Aug 9, 2016 at 11:58 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
> I am still waiting for an explanation about your two recent
posts which contradicted themselves.
What are you talking about?
In a post you agreed with principle 1:
Principle 1: if the guy in Helsinki is assured that the event X will
be statified/realized at both W and M, then P(X) = 1.
and you have agreed with principle 2: P_t(X_q) ≠ 1 => P_t'(X_q) ≠
1, if t' < t, and q > t (P_t = probability evaluated at t, and X_q =
some event at time q.
From this I have derived the indeterminacy, and apparently you change
your mind on principle 1.
> The first person remains singular for both copies.
Yes, and BOTH copies are absolutely convinced that they are the
Helsinki man and BOTH are correct, I think you agree on that.
Yes.
So it makes sense to ask what one city the Moscow man sees and it
makes sense to ask what one city the Washington man sees but it
makes no sense to ask what one city the Helsinki man will see.
Why? He knows that he will push a button, and that he will survive one
and entire, and this in once of the two city, hetting a doppelganger
in the other corresponding cities.
If it does not make sense here, it does not make sense in a quantum
superposition either.
> One is: I am in Helsinki. I push on a button. I find
myself in a box, I open the door, and I see Moscow. (and for Bruce:
and yes, I am conscious of Moscow and of my consciousness (life,
experience, first person stories) here in Moscow. I definitely
get the bit "M".
Bruno continues to use a personal pronoun smokescreen to cover
logical contradictions. I have defined "I" as any chunk of matter
that behaves in a Johnkclarkian way, and before I pushed the button
I already said that I would see Moscow and turn into the Moscow man,
and that is exactly precisely what happened. So I did not
receive one single bit of new information after I pushed the
button.
> The other is: I am in Helsinki. I push on a button. I
find myself in a box, I open the door, and I see Washington. (and
for Bruce: and I am conscious of Washington and of my consciousness
(life, experience, first person stories) here in Washington. I
definitely get the bit "W".
I have defined "I" as any chunk of matter that behaves in a
Johnkclarkian way, and before I pushed the button I already said
that I would see Washington and turn into the Washington man, and
that is exactly precisely what happened. So I did not receive
one single bit of new information after I pushed the button.
No need for Bruno to post a reply, I already know Bruno's response,
I confuse the peepee with the poopoo (or maybe it's the poopoo with
the peepee). But I have already given a clear non contradictory
definition of the personal pronoun "I", what is Bruno Marchal's
meaning of that word?
The 3p-self is the code of the machine. It is simple by ostentation,
but technically, it needs the diagonal D'X' = 'X'X'' trick, as
explained previously, but that is not needed for the reversal.
The 1p self is the owner of the memory (in UDA), and the Theatetetus'
knower in AUDA, and I show there that it makes sense thanks to
incompleteness. No machine can give a description, but all löbian
machine can prove that no machine can give a description of it.
Bruno
John K Clark
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