On 08 Aug 2016, at 19:27, John Clark wrote:
On Sun, Aug 7, 2016 Telmo Menezes <[email protected]> wrote:
>> Is this really that difficult to comprehend? If
computationalism is true then the machine will be able to make
2 copies that are identical to each other in every way and will
remain identical until the outside environment or perhaps random
quantum variations changes one but not the other.
> I agree and never argued the opposite.
I'm glad to hear we agree on that, then we both disagree with
Bruno because Bruno said:
"Nothing can duplicate a first person view from its first person
point of view, with or without computationalism."
I think that is the key to Bruno's confusion; that and trying to
establish personal identity by looking from the present to the
future rather than by remembering the past from the present.
>> Bruno asks "before the duplication what is the
probability that "YOU" will be inside the house looking out?". That
is not a question that is gibberish because Bruno isn't asking
about what will happen to Telmo Menezes, in a world with
personal pronoun duplicating machines Bruno wants to know about
the one and only one thing that will happen to YOU. And that's
just silly.
> We discussed this before. The MWI introduces the same problem.
And as I've explained several times MWI does NOT have the same
problem. Before you perform the 2 slit experiment it would NOT be
gibberish to ask you "After the experiment what do you expect to
see?", because both before and after the experiment the meaning of
the personal pronoun "you" is crystal clear unique and unambiguous,
"you" is the only chunk of matter in the observable universe that
behaves in a Telmomenezesian way. And because things are stated so
clearly after it's all over we can check and see if the
prediction you made about you turned out to be correct or not; it
might have been right and it might have been wrong but it wasn't
gibberish.
It's entirely different with a duplicating machine, "What one and
only one city will you see after you are duplicated?" is just words
with a question mark at the end and is not a question because after
"you" is duplicated there would be 2 chunks of matter that behaves
in a Telmomenezesian way.
> If I am about to open Schrödinger's cat box, then one
branch of me will see a live cat and another one a dead one.
OK, and personal pronouns cause no confusion because with
Schrödinger's cat box there is only one "me" per multiverse
branch; a situation that is not true with duplication machines.
And I might add that if "me" is defined as the person having this
thought right now then "me" will have no future at all and has had
no past.
> By your reasoning, the probability of Telmo Menezes
seeing a dead cat is 1,
Correct. And by my reasoning the probability of Telmo
Menezes seeing a live cat is also 1, always assuming
that MWI is correct and we don't know for a fact that it is.
> but from the first person perspective of any of
the branches it is 1/2.
Yes but you almost make that sound like a contradiction. All the
above means is that if the experiment is performed many
times about half the time "you", that is to say the only chunk
of matter in the observable universe that behaves in a
Telmomenezesian way, will see a live cat and about half
the time the only chunk of matter in the observable universe that
behaves in a Telmomenezesian way will see a dead cat.
> Bruno's argument only move this to a scenario where both
copies can coexist in the same branch, which can lead to some
social awkwardness but does not fundamentally change the first
person / third person distinction
One thing does change when both copies coexist in the same
observable universe, "What will you see next?" changes from
a meaningful question into a meaningless sequence of words with a
question mark at the end.
> Duplicating a first person view is the same as doing nothing.
1=1.
No, something has changed. Before the duplication only one chunk
of matter in the observable universe behaves in a Telmmenezesian
way, but after the duplication there are two chunks of matter
in the observable universe that behave in a Telmmenezesian
way.
> If you are facing your clone, the content of your
respective experiences is already different. Do you disagree?
Yes I disagree. Your clone is also facing its clone so you both
change in exactly the same way, so both chunks of matter still
behave in the same identical way.
>> Until that divergence there is no Moscow man or Washington
man, there is still only the Helsinki man regardless of how many
bodies are around.
> True.
Then if the definition of the Helsinki man is the man who is
currently seeing Helsinki right now it would be rather silly to ask
the Helsinki man what one and only one city the Helsinki man expects
to see tomorrow. Do you agree?
> Again this stems from ignoring the 1p / 3p discussion.
Well then educate me and cure my ignorance. I duplicate you
in a symmetrical room and from my 3p perspective the two of you
look and behave identically, from your 1p perspective what is the
difference between the two of you? I have a switch that can
instantly exchange the position of you two in that symmetrical room,
and when I use that switch from my 3p perspective I notice
absolutely no difference even when I use the most sensitive
instruments available, explain how from your 1p perspective you can
tell that something has changed.
And if you can't tell, if nothing has changed for you, if you notice
no subjective difference and I notice no objective difference then
what has that switch actually done? How can a change be neither
objective nor subjective?
>> Then call my bluff and just stop using that goddamn personal
pronoun! That would be the easiest way to prove me wrong, if I
was wrong, which I'm not.
> I did that already, some time ago. Just search the
archives.
Can't find it, must have been a very very long time ago! If Telmo
Menezes has clearly described Bruno's thought experiment without
personal pronouns or "THE 1p" John Clark would very much like to see
it.
>>> There's really no need for you to say things like "John
Clark is going to eat a ham sandwich".
>> There most certainly is if eating a ham sandwich is involved
in a thought experiment with people duplicating machines in it!
> True, but when you are stating your opinion in the mailing
list, which exists in a world without duplicating machines, it
is not really necessary.
It is necessary if John Clark is on a mailing list that discusses
thought experiments with 1p duplicating machines in it.
> What I'm asking is: if John Clark follows Bruno's protocol
and enters a duplicating machine, and then both copies look out of
the window in different places, do you think that John Clark will
experience being two in two places at the same time?
It's not important what I think, this question can be answered
experimentally by simply asking each of the two experimental
subjects 3 questions:
1) Are you John Clark?
2) Did you look out the window at exactly 9am?
3) What city did you experience?
If the answers to question #1 are yes and yes, and the answers to #2
are yes and yes, and the answers to #3 are Moscow and Washington
then John Clark will experience seeing and doing and being in 2
places at exactly the same time. I have a hunch if the experiment
was actually performed those are the answers you would get from the
experimental subjects. Do you have a similar hunch?
> Notice that "experience" is a first person phenomena.
Yes, and in our everyday world or even in Everett's MWI it is
obvious who is experiencing that first person phenomena, but it
is not obvious if "you" duplicating machines are involved because
then the personal pronoun is ambiguous.
> Yes, it is true that two entities with legitimate claims
to being John Clark will, among them (third person) experience
being in the two places, and it is also true that each one will
experience being only in one place. Correct?
Correct. And before the duplication it would be meaningless to
ask "which one city of the two cities will you end up seeing ?".
Correct? And if the MWI is true and if "you" means any chunk of
matter that behaves in a Telmomenesesian way then it is NOT
meaningless to ask "which city will you see next?". Correct?
> Then it follows that, from the first person, a 1/2
probability of being in one of the places
There is a 100% probability of A first person being in one the
places, THE first person has no probability at all associated with
it because after the duplication no such thing exists.
> assuming computationalism and an infinite multiverse, this
is already happening. My current observer moment is realized
infinitely many times, but it still only amounts to a single
observer moment
And in Bruno's thought experiment the only time there was a single
observer moment occurred before the duplication and it consisted
of Helsinki, not Moscow, not Washington, just Helsinki.
You attribute things which I do not say. You misquote me. And I am
still waiting for an explanation about your two recent posts which
contradicted themselves.
In fact, your theory, using my definitions, is contradicted directly
by both copies. With your definition (which I can only guess as you
never have given them), it is out of the topic.
The first person remains singular for both copies. The "other copy"
seems to each reconstituted person like a 3p doppelganger, and they
both confirms that they did get one bit of information, from their
first person points of view.
It is very simple: both copies describes the experience like that:
One is:
I am in Helsinki. I push on a button. I find myself in a box, I open
the door, and I see Moscow. (and for Bruce: and yes, I am conscious of
Moscow and of my consciousness (life, experience, first person
stories) here in Moscow. I definitely get the bit "M".
The other is:
I am in Helsinki. I push on a button. I find myself in a box, I open
the door, and I see Washington. (and for Bruce: and I am conscious of
Washington and of my consciousness (life, experience, first person
stories) here in Washington. I definitely get the bit "W".
Keep in mind that computationalism is *assumed*.
Bruno
John K Clark
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