On Mon, Aug 1, 2016 at 8:49 PM, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote: > On Mon, Aug 1, 2016 at 9:50 AM, Telmo Menezes <te...@telmomenezes.com> > wrote: > > >> > >> I am asking if you think that, for computationalism to be true, the >> diaries of the duplicates must be equal even after the duplication >> event. > > > Only if the environments the 2 are in are also identical after the > duplication event.
Exactly. >> > >> If computationalism is true, then the ability to have a first person >> experience of the world is duplicated, > > > Yes, otherwise it wouldn't be a people duplicating machine. > >> >> > >> but the contents of this >> experience (after the time of the duplication) is not. > > > Is this really that difficult to comprehend? If computationalism is true > then the machine will be able to make 2 copies that are identical to each > other in every way and will remain identical until the outside environment > or perhaps random quantum variations changes one but not the other. I agree and never argued the opposite. > >> >> > >> It is so >> thorough that you will not even notice that anything happened, since >> both you and your copy will always have the same diary and be >> perfectly synchronous. > > > Yes, until something changes one but not the other; until then while they > are still synchronised there may be 2 bodies but there is only one person > and only one consciousness. Yes. >>> >>> > >>> > >>> you don't even feel like that fellow over there who looks just like you; >>> he's the original Telmo Menezes but you don't feel like him >>> because right now you're having a different experience from him. >> >> >> Agreed, so why the stuff about duplicating the entire diary, including >> the future? > > > You tell me, I don't know what you're talking about. Weird. > > >>> > >>> > >>> You are >>> having the experience of being inside the house looking out, but the >>> original is having the experience of being outside the house looking in. >>> So >>> you don't feel like him because you're not him, although both you and the >>> original are >>> T >>> elmo Menezes >>> . >> >> >> Yes! So you agree and there is no reason to not proceed with Bruno's >> argument. > > > Yes there is because Bruno asks "before the duplication what is the > probability that "YOU" will be inside the house looking out?". That is not a > question that is gibberish because Bruno isn't asking about what will happen > to Telmo Menezes, in a world with personal pronoun duplicating machines > Bruno wants to know about the one and only one thing that will happen to > YOU. And that's just silly. We discussed this before. The MWI introduces the same problem. If there are infinite version of me sharing my diary up to some time t, then all estimations of probabilities that I can make of something happening to me suffer from your pronoun ambiguity. If I am about to open Schrödinger's cat box, then one branch of me will see a live cat and another one a dead one. By your reasoning, the probability of Telmo Menezes seeing a dead cat is 1, but from the first person perspective of any of the branches it is 1/2. Bruno's argument only move this to a scenario where both copies can coexist in the same branch, which can lead to some social awkwardness but does not fundamentally change the first person / third person distinction and respective implications to the observed probabilities. > >>> > Of course the diary belongs to both! As I made clear it would belong to >>> > one >>> of us but not the other ONLY if Bruno is right, only if no physical >>> machine can duplicate "a first person view from its first person point of >>> view". But Bruno isn't right. >> >> >> > >> This is not what Bruno is saying at all. There is even no need to >> argue this point, he wrote a paper about it. You can check it and you >> will see that no such thing is said. > > > Just a few days ago on July 29 Bruno said: > > "Nothing can duplicate a first person view from its first person point of > view, with or without computationalism. It just does not make any sense. It > duplicates only the 1-view in the 3-1 view picture." > > We all say silly things from time to time so if Bruno retracts that remark > I'll say no more about it, but until then I'm holding him to it, Duplicating a first person view is the same as doing nothing. 1=1. It does not make sense, as Bruno says. The duplication only becomes meaningful once the content of the experience changes. If you are facing your clone, the content of your respective experiences is already different. Do you disagree? > >>> > >>> > >>> So Bruno is talking nonsense. >> >> >> > >> What's the point of saying things like that? Be specific, > > > See the quote above. > > > >> > >> I'm not sure what "duplicating subjective experience" would even mean. > > > There is > an > experiment that can resolve this issue: You are a copy of Telmo Menezes > (or maybe the original, nobody knows) > made as precisely as Heisenberg's law allows and you are now facing the > other Telmo Menezes > in a symmetrical room, thus the two of you are receiving identical sensory > input and thus act identically. I now use a Star Trek brand transporter to > instantly exchange your position with the > original > (or maybe the copy) > , or if you prefer I leave your bodies alone and just exchange the two > brains. There is no way subjectively > for > you or > for the other > Telmo Menezes > to > notice that anything had happened, and objective outside observers would not > notice anything had happened either. There would not even be a way to tell > if the machine was actually working, I could even be lying about having a > transporter > and making a switch > . Who knows who cares? > > Of course if there were a unsymmetrical change in the environment or there > was a random quantum fluctuation that made the people different then things > would evolve, well, differently > ; > but at the instant of duplication they would still be identical. So if > subjectively it makes no difference and objectively it makes no difference > and even the very universe itself isn't sure if a switch > had actually been made or not then I make the very reasonable assumption > that it just makes no difference, and although there are two bodies and two > brains in that symmetrical room there is only one intelligence and only one > consciousness and only one point of view. > > And if that's not what happens, if one or both notice a difference when the > switch is made then "duplicating the subjective experience" has not been > achieved. I agree and I think Bruno does too. What's your point? >> >> > >> What seems clear to me is that entities capable of subjective >> experience can be duplicated. Then, the content of their experience >> might diverge after duplication. > > > Yes. Until that divergence there is no Moscow man or Washington man, there > is still only the Helsinki man regardless of how many bodies are around. True. > >> > >> He's asking for your bet from your subjective experience after >> stepping into the duplication machine. > > > I would gladly make a bet about John Clark's subjective experience, but o > nly a fool would take the bet as stated above because after > stepping into the duplication machine > different people mean different things by the word "your" so there is no way > to ever know how the "experiment" turned out, which means it wasn't an > experiment at all it was just a mess. Again this stems from ignoring the 1p / 3p discussion. We're just going in circles as usual. >> >> > >> It is not the pronouns muddle >> the waters >> . > > > Then call my bluff and just stop using that goddamn personal pronoun! That > would be the easiest way to prove me wrong, if I was wrong, which I'm not. I did that already, some time ago. Just search the archives. >> >> > >> Having a honest >> discussion using language does not require that both parties agree > > > But an honest discussion does > require that both parties > know the same language, it does require that both > agree > on what the individual words used in that discussion mean, especially > personal pronouns. > >>> >>> > >>> > >>> It helps enormously, although inelegant when dealing with duplicating >>> machines it becomes far more difficult to speak gibberish if personal >>> pronouns are used sparingly. >> >> >> > >> For now duplication machines only exist in the thought experiment. > > > Yes, although unlike such things as faster than light starships building a > people > duplication machine > would require no breakthrough in science, it would only need better > technology. > >> >> > >> There's really no need for you to say things like "John Clark is going >> to eat a ham sandwich". > > > There most certainly is if eating a ham sandwich is involved in a > thought experiment > with people duplicating machines in it! True, but when you are stating your opinion in the mailing list, which exists in a world without duplicating machines, it is not really necessary. > >>> > >>> > >>> I believe John Clark can have 2 bodies so I believe it's possible for >>> John >>> Clark to experience being two people at the same time. >> >> >> > >> And you believe this is what happens after a duplication? > > > I don't see how John Clark can have 2 bodies before they are duplicated. > > Do you? No, but this is not what I'm asking. What I'm asking is: if John Clark follows Bruno's protocol and enters a duplicating machine, and then both copies look out of the window in different places, do you think that John Clark will experience being two in two places at the same time? Notice that "experience" is a first person phenomena. Yes, it is true that two entities with legitimate claims to being John Clark will, among them (third person) experience being in the two places, and it is also true that each one will experience being only in one place. Correct? Then it follows that, from the first person, a 1/2 probability of being in one of the places arises. > >>> > >>> > >>> And I also believe >>> it's possible to later merge both memories into a single body so that >>> single >>> person remembers being both persons. >>> And I also believe that if you remember being that person then you are >>> that person. >> >> >> > >> I don't disagree with you, > > > Good. > >> > >> but this is a bit more tricky. Mental >> illness comes to mind. > > > I don't follow. > Mental > illness > > involves beliefs that are disconnected from reality, Not really. It involves beliefs that are maladaptive from an evolutionary standpoint. It could be that incorrect beliefs (or limited perspectives) increase survival chances. We don't really have a way of knowing. > but in this case John > Clark actually did both things at the same time even though they were > thousands of miles apart , both were real and you vividly remember doing > both. And yes I used the word "you" because although there had been two they > merged back together so there is only one again, so this time the word "you" > could be used without ambiguity. There is no disconnection > from reality > it's just that reality is odd if there are people duplicating machines. But > there is nothing wrong with odd. As per your argument above, which I agree with, there was not duplication in this scenario. In fact, assuming computationalism and an infinite multiverse, this is already happening. My current observer moment is realized infinitely many times, but it still only amounts to a single observer moment and we cannot talk of duplication in this case. Telmo. > John K Clark > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
