On 11 Sep 2016, at 20:48, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
On Sunday, September 11, 2016 at 12:02:03 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
On 10 Sep 2016, at 19:43, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
On Saturday, September 10, 2016 at 1:45:56 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
On 09 Sep 2016, at 19:14, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
On Friday, September 9, 2016 at 10:38:55 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
On 09 Sep 2016, at 16:08, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
On Friday, September 9, 2016 at 7:56:27 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson
wrote:
On Fri, Sep 9, 2016 at 7:46 AM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
On 08 Sep 2016, at 21:43, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
On Thursday, September 8, 2016 at 1:15:15 PM UTC-6, Bruno
Marchal wrote:
On 08 Sep 2016, at 18:22, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
On Thursday, September 8, 2016 at 7:53:23 AM UTC-6, Bruno
Marchal wrote:
On 07 Sep 2016, at 20:06, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
On Wednesday, September 7, 2016 at 11:16:38 AM UTC-6, Bruno
Marchal wrote:
On 06 Sep 2016, at 17:42, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
On Tuesday, September 6, 2016 at 4:38:53 AM UTC-6,
agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
I understand your pov. It has but one problem. You ignore the
elephant in the room; namely, those other worlds or universes
necessary for the outcomes not measured in this world to be
realized. But you have an out, stated in another post. They
form part of your imagination. Not good enough from my pov. AG
I should also add that the MWI sheds no light, AFAICT, on the
measurement problem; that is, why we get the outcome we get.
As far as collapse contradicting SR via the result of Bell
experiments, I am not sure about that conclusion. If FTL
occurs, it may be the case that in some frames Alice's
measurement occurs first, in other frames Bob's measurement
occurs first. I tend to think this muddies the waters on the
issue of FLT transmission and contradictions with relativity.
AG
The "MWI" explains already a part of the mind-body problem
when formulated in the Digital Mechanist Frame. You don't need
to even know QM to understand the high plausibility of the
"many-computations".
If FTL occurs, and you keep both QM and SR, then an action in
the future can change the past, and physical causility becomes
meaningless. With mechanism, physical causality is not yet
guarantied, to be sure, but I would throw digital mechanism if
it could lead to future -> past physical action (it does not
make sense).
Ah, you wrote:
Possible correction: my remark about relativity might apply
to how events are seen from a frame moving FTL -- that is, a
breakdown in causality -- and might not apply to Alice/Bob
situation. AG
Well, OK, then. But it would apply if there were a collapse
(in one universe), even if Alice needs to send two bits of
information to transformed the effect (and send or get one
qubit).
The "collapse" does not even refer to anything I can make
sense of. It looks like a continuous invocation of God. As an
explanation, it looks like a continuum of blasphemes (in the
theology of the universal machine).
Here's what collapse means to me; the wf evolves from a
solution of SWE, namely a superposition, to a delta function
centered at the measurement value. No one knows, or has a
model how this transformation occurs.It's in the category of a
TBD, possibly unknowable. It seems empirically based since
repeated measurements of the same system result in the same
outcomes. I don't necessarily believe in primary matter's
existence. But its statistical persistence seems undeniable,
whereas the many worlds has yet to manifest any persistence
except in the minds of its advocates. AG
The MWI is only the SWE taken literally.
Maybe that's the problem; taking a calculational tool too
seriously. AG
If an observer O observes a cat in the superposition d + a
(dead + alive),
But that never happens. The state of superposition exists, if
it does, when the box is closed, and ceases when the box is
opened.
Then the SWE is wrong.
You beg the question by postulating that QM is wrong outside the
box, but there are no evidence for that, given that Everett
showed the consistency of QM-without-collapse with the facts,
using the simplest known antic theory of mind (mechanism)
The fact is the cat is dead OR alive when the box is opened, and
presumably alive before the box is closed. So all I am doing is
refuting your claim that any observer observes a superposition
of states. AG
In QM+collapse, which assumes that QM is wrong somewhere (but
where? No unanimity of collapse-defenders agree on this).
Without collapse, the cat is in the superposition state (dead
+alive), and when an observer look at the cat, he entangles
itself with the cat state, and the final state is O-a alive + O-d
dead (linearity of tensor product). Then by linearity of the SWE,
O-a lives a *phenomenological collapse" like if the cat was
reduced to "alive", and O-b lives a phenomenological like if the
cat was reduced to "dead", but in the 3p picture, no reduction
ever occurred.
Bruno
Sorry, but what you write makes no sense. When you look at the
cat, presumably after box is opened, the cat is either alive or
dead. You may be entangled with it, but at that point in time
there is no superposition of alive and dead. AG
I don't see how you can apply the SWE to this problem. It's a
function of space and time and its solutions have nothing to do
with alive or dead. And if you can't do so, your analysis makes
no sense. AG
We usually judged if an animal is dead or alive by a (rough and
macro) analysis of the position of the atoms of its body.
If the cat lies down: it is dead. If the cat walks: it is alive.
No need to go beyond the space and time descriptions.
The quality dead and alive are sort of biophysical macro (in the
computer science sense).
The superposition of the decaying atom contaminates all particles
around and that contagion of superposition propagates to the whole
box, and beyond if the box leaked or is opened.
The propagation speed is subliminal (interaction-time).
With Everett theory, which is just Copenhagen theory minus a
postulate (collapse), we get back determinacy, locality, realism
(although not at the usual mundane level, which I admit can seem
shocking).
My point, or result, is that IF we postulate Mechanism, an
assumption in the cognitive science, or in philosophy of mind, or
in psychology, or in theology, THEN we get Everett minus, yet
again, a postulate: the SWE itself. It *has to*became explained as
providing the unique measure for the first person plural emerging
view on all computations in elementary arithmetic, or combinator
algebra (etc.). And this works, in the sense that the modal,
intensional, variant of self-reference available to any
"sufficiently rich" (Löbian, or Gödelian) machine provides a
quantum logic and a quantization on the states accessible by a
Universal Dovetailer (the sigma_1 arithmetical reality, in
logician's terms) relatively to itself.
That provides an utterly clear arithmetic interpretation of a
theory due to a neopythagorean of the first century of the C. era:
Moderatus of Gades, but also of the main Enneads of Plotinus.
And this 'machine's theology' contains physics, and so is
testable. The conception of matter becomes weird and quite counter-
intuitive, and without quantum mechanics, I would have judged it
highly unplausible. But both the theology of the universal
machine, and the verifiable measurable facts points toward a
Platonist like theology.
The Enlightenment Period will be transformed when theology, the
modest and humble, and highly skeptical, science, will return at
the faculty of science where it was born. Until then we are still
in the middle-age like we can see by looking around us.
Bruno
It 's easier just to claim the cat shares the wf of the
radioactive source. But you still have the 800+ pound gorilla in
the room you can't account for; namely, by your CHOICE to do the
cat experiment, you're claiming the creation of another world with
another cat and another observer.
Where did I claim something like that? The terms of the branches
does not depend on my choice,
It seems that they do. If you do a cat experiment, you get two
branches. If you don't, you don't.
Well, there are explanation why our type of brain favors the
position base, but when you choose to do an experiment, you don't
create branches, you differentiate on the alternative you are
interested in.
They don't exist apriori, unless you want to deny free will. They
come into existence when an experiment is done, or possibly when
there's some sort of decision tree, such as playing a slot machine
at LV. AG
We don't know. We need a coherent quantum theory of gravitation to
figure out. No problem with free-will, as it is not related to
quantum of computationalist indeterminacy at all---but that is quite
a different topic (already discussed here).
I think we do know. See comment below. AG
and the results of the measurement do not depend on the base chosen.
It seems that they do. Measurements of energy, momentum or spin for
example, result in different bases. AG
They correspond to different base, but the numerical result are not
dependent of the base chosen to describe the wave evolution. This is
well explained in Everett long paper.
I don't see how you reach this conclusion. If I measure spin, I
surely get a different numerical result than if I measure energy, AG
Of course. The point is that if we measure whatever we want, the
result does not depend of the base used. Many are wrong on this when
discussing Everett's theory.
It is just the supposition terms of the wave (in any base). There
are no worlds, only relative states. My choice change only the way
the multiverse is locally and relatively to me partitionned.
These relative states seem to require observers and a measuring
infrastructure.
No problem. Everett theory is just that it obeys to QM too.
Please; no appeals to authority.
mentionning a theory is not an argument of authority, it is called
honesty. Nobody claims that this or that theory is true or false. We
avoid "philosophy", or make special thread, which I avoid to prevent
confusion.
Do you need observers or not on the other worlds, or branches, or
whatever, and their measuring infrastructures? AG
Everett assume the Universal Wave, but ignores (like most) the
consequence of digital mechanism.
I assume only elementary arithmetic and computationalism, in the UDA,
and only elementary arithmetic in the actual beginning of the
derivation of physics and of the wave from the interview of the
universal machine.
You create them by virtue of what you DO, say in an experiment. Or
do you back off from the apparent requirement of the MWI that all
possible outcomes are measured somewhere, somehow?
You don't create them at all, no more than you create the moon by
looking at it. You just localize yourslef relatively to the more
probable (numerous, weighted) relative branche(s).th
What if the probability is 50-50 as in a spin experiment? How is the
choice made?. But more important, since I've never done one, will
the alternative histories pre-exist if I decide one day to do such
an experiment? AG
Have you read the sane04 paper?
Just having a branch evolving is not tantamount to a measurement
and observation. AG
Calling it a branch or whatever doesn't solve your fatal problem.
There's a simpler solution to your problem; instead of conceiving
of the collapse as meaning irreducible randomness,
The point is that the randomness becomes only a case of Mechanist
first person indeterminacy, which exist even without quantum
mechanics.
why not assume it's a continuous process whereby the wf evolves
into a delta function centered at the value measured? IOW, just
assume there's an as yet unknown, continuous, non linear evolution
of the state prior to measurement, which is time reversible. After
all, your objection to collapse is its standard interpretation as
irreducible randomness. AG
That is a Bohm-De Broglie type of move. It assumes QM false, and
leads to many difficulties often discussed here (see Weinberg
argument that non linearity leads to the refutation of
thermodynamics, GR,
Do you have a link for this, particularly about his comments on
thermodynamics? TIA, AG
Google on "Weinberg non linear quantum mechanics".
etc.), including irreducibly-hidden variables/initial-conditions,
with non local effects. Anyway, I work with computationalism, and
show we have to derive the wave and its equation, so we will see if
there is a non linearity in that case, but the results so far go in
the direction that the physics is reversible and linear, etc.
Let us no do "philosophy" and just be clear on what theory we
assume. Once we assume digital mechanism, there is no more choice
left (that *is* the point).
Succinctly, what is digital mechanism? I don't see how arithmetic
and possibly a computer can reproduce any physical theory. It's
real stretch IMO. AG
It has too, see my paper already referred, or ask for more.
You are right, a computer cannot emulate the physical reality, nor
consciousness.
Digital mechanism, alias computationalism, is a very weak hypothesis
in cognitive science: it is the hypothesis that we could survive
with a digital artificial brain or body? It is a modern version of
Descartes-Milinda Mechanism. It generalize and weaken many versions
like Putnam's functionalism, which assumes the description level is
high.
Are you referring to Peter Putnam who used to teach at Colombia
University in the late 1950's? Do you have a link? AG
PUTNAM H., 1960, Minds and Machines, Dimensions of Mind : A Symposium,
Sidney
Hook (Ed.), New-York University Press, New-York. also in Anderson A.
R. (Ed.),1964.
ANDERSON A.R. (ed.), 1964, Minds and Machine, Prentice Hall inc. New
Jersey.
(Trad. Française : Pensée et machine, Editions du Champ Vallon, 1983).
Bruno
Some sum up it by "no magic", a bit like Dideort defined rationalism
by Descarte's mechanism.
Then it is a theorem that elementary arithmetic reality (model)
realize the universal dovetailing, and that both consciusness and
matter are emergent pattern on a self-referential structure which
exist in arithmetic (or Turing equivalent) and the math confirms
this by showing that the (antic) definition of matter when
translated in arithmetic gives a quantum logic.
Bruno
Bruno
Maybe you have a fundamental misunderstanding of Schrodinger's
Cat. AG
It is the measurement problem, and you talk like if the collapse
solves it, but then tell me precisely the range of QM.
I read de Broglie who suggested that entanglement would no more
operate at the distance of an atom diameter. People give
criteria for the collapse, but the experience refutes them. I
share Feynman's idea that the collapse is a collective
hallucination, and the math shows that if comp is true then that
hallucination is somehow necessary.
With computationalism we have to generalize Everett's embedding
of the physicist in the physical reality to the embedding of the
mathematician in arithmetic (which is actually what Gödel begun).
Mechanism explains both the origin of consciousness and the
origin of the appearance of matter, and this in a way enough
precise so that we can test it, and thanks to QM, mechanism is
not (yet) refuted, and is, I think, the only theory explaining
consciousness, including why it cannot be completely explained
in any first person convincing way (the so called hard problem,
which is only the antic mind-body problem after mechanism solved
the "easy part" (AI)).
I do not defend any theory. You should not been able to guess
what I might believe true or not. Computationalism has an
advantage in philosophy, which is that it can rely on
theoretical computer science which is a branch of both
mathematical logic and number theory. It is a good lantern to
search the key around, not more.
My main point is that we can study the highly non trivial
relation between machines' belief and diverse notion of truth
they can discover and guess. They got a theology closer to
Plotinus (300 after C., neoplatonism) and Moderatus of Gades
(neopythagoreanism, 2 centuries before Plotinus) than the
materialist Aristotelians.
I say this being aware that some scientists still take the
Aristotelian metaphysics for granted, but of course science is
just beginning to be able to formulate the problem (which of
Plato or Aristotle is closer to reality). The discovery of the
universal machine/number is still a very recent event and few
get really the Church-Turing idea and their relation with
Gödel's completeness and incompleteness fundamental results.
I can suggest you some good books if you are interested. But if
you dislike Everett, it might take some work before liking the
consequences of the digital mechanist hypothesis. The bible is
Martin Davis "Undecidability", and its own introduction to
computability and logic (both published by Dover) is excellent
if you are enough mathematically minded.
Bruno
we know that, before interaction, the physical state is well
described by the expression O(a + d), with the tensor product
noted multiplicatively, and that it is equivalent with Oa + Od.
So even at this stage the "O" can be considered being in a
superposition state. That is what I called the linearity of the
tensor product. Now, by the linearity of the wave evolution we
get O-a a + O-b b, that is each branch behaves classically (P-i
= O with i in its memory. And both 0-a and O-b can repeat their
measurement, and the linearity of the wave evolution implies
that they will always find the same measurement result. So the
MWI explains the persistence as much well as classical physics,
or QM+collapse (if that means something precise).
My point is that at this stage, QM (without collapse) is
compatible with Mechanism (used implicitly above) only insofar
as the persistence is explained from a statistics on *all*
computations (which exist once you agree that 2+2=4
independently of you and me).
My technical point is that this work in the sense that we can
derive quantum logic (and normally physics) from the logical
structure that the computations inherit from the logic of
(machine) self-reference.
That is elegant because at this stage the "theory of
everything" needs no less and no more than very elementary
axioms (and mechanism in the meta-background).
The only axiom that I use are the following:
0 ≠ (x + 1)
((x + 1) = (y + 1)) -> x = y
x = 0 v Ey(x = y + 1)
x + 0 = x
x + (y + 1) = (x + y) + 1
x * 0 = 0
x * (y + 1) = (x * y) + x
Actually I could even just use the two combinators axioms:
Kxy = x
Sxyz = xz(yz)
Such axioms are Turing complete, and you can prove the
existence of the UD from them (and *in* them if you add some
induction axioms, but I prefer to put them in the epistemology
of the observers).
The Turing-Church thesis rehabilit the neopythagorean theology,
and we get physics exactly when we use the antic definition of
knowledge and matter provided by them (notably by Moderatus of
Gades).
On the contrary, if primary matter or if physicalism would be
true, we remain with the task of explaining what is their role
for consciousness (or just first person experience).
Aristotle idea of naturalism or (weak) materialism (the
existence of a physical primary reality) has only been a tool
for letting the mind-body problem sleep a bit, and that has
been a very fertile simplifying hypothesis, but now, with
mechanism, and plausibly with only quantum mechanics, we get
the (predicted by the Platonist) problem of justifying the
relation between first person discourse and third person
discourse. We can't use the simple mind-brain identity theory,
because we have an infinity of quasi identical brains in
arithmetic, and we can't use a selection principle based on a
substance without damaging the mechanist hypothesis.
Keep in mind that my origianl goal is to solve the mind-body
problem, and with mechanism, we have no choice other than
justifying the appearance of physicalness from a statistic
based on the mix of "*all* computations + machine self-
reference when distributed in those computations. It works
(till now). Non-mechanism does not work, and it is well known
that the mind-body problem has been put under the rug since
Aristotle (except by the Platonists, who were just banned from
our civilisation 1500 years ago).
In Soccer terms: Plato 1, Aristotle 0. I don't pretend it is
the last match.
Bruno
Bruno
On Tuesday, September 6, 2016 at 2:23:39 AM UTC-6, Bruno
Marchal wrote:
On 05 Sep 2016, at 19:31, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
On Monday, September 5, 2016 at 8:08:12 AM UTC-6, Bruno
Marchal wrote:
On 04 Sep 2016, at 20:27, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
Bruno, thank you for a detailed response. Most of it is
above my pay grade, but I will check some of your links and
see what I can make of them.
OK.
As for the MWI, I have a simple approach. If I went to LV
and played a slot machine for a single trial or outcome,
and someone asked me what happened to the other thousands
of outcomes I didn't get, I'd think that would be a crazy
question.
I mainly agree, because there is no unanimity on which
counterfactual or conditional non standard logic to use.
Isn't it really much simpler? Just because something *could*
exist, like those thousands of other outcomes of the slot
machine, doesn't mean they *must* exist. The MWI insists all
outcomes MUST exist. I see no necessity for that. AG
You need it to get the interference between the terms of the
wave. I agree with Deutsch: QM is the science of multiple
interfering histories. The collapse is an addition to avoid
that multiplication/differentiation consequence.
But that's the question some physicists ask when they are
confronted with the non-linearity of collapse in the
Copenhagen Interpretation.
I tend to disagree here. The quantum situation is different
because with quantum mechanics, different outcomes can
interfere and thus have some physical underpinning which is
hard to avoid, especially without assuming the collapse of
the wave.
How can you disagree? Many prominent physicists -- Greene,
Deutsch, Carroll -- when confronted with the non-linearity
of collapse, believe the MWI avoids or solves this problem. AG
?
I agree with them. MWI entails no-collapse, and the evolution
is purely linear. Just a "rotation" in the Hilbert space.
Accepting non linearity
There are work by Steinberg and Plaga which shows that if
the QM wave is slightly non linear, then we get the WW with
a revenge: interactions becomes possible in between terms of
the wave. This makes wrong special relativity, but also
thermodynamics, etc.
The wf before measurement is linear insofar as it satisfies
a linear DE, and relativity is well tested. So I don't see
any issue here. AG
OK, but then there is no collapse. We agree, then, only the
collapse leads to non-linearity.
So I guess you mean that there is a (non linear) collapse,
and that, strictly speaking the SWR is false.
SWR = ?
Why does a non-linear collapse falsify SR? AG
By Bell's violation, if there is a collapse, it affects
elements which are space-separated. Einstein explained this
already at the Solvay congress.
You introduce a duality between observer and observed, or
between macro and micro-physics. And, you assume non-
mechanism in cognitive science.
How can we test our models without the duality of observer
and observed? You demand the impossible.
Read the book by Hans Primas on the foundation of chemistery.
It explains well why Everett restores monism in the
philosophy of mind (but he missed this happens directly with
Mechanism).
What "non mechanism" have I assumed? QM just gives us
probabilities. It's not a causal theory. AG
With the collapse.
That is lot of things for which we don't have evidence.
Cosmologists applies QM on very big object, like black
holes, if not the entire universe, and people trying to
justify a physical collapse get a lot of problem, like non-
locality, to cite the one Einstein disliked the most, and I
share a bit that opinion.
and actual time irreversibility (not FAPP) is an easier
concept to accept than the real or fictional other worlds
necessary to support the MWI.
Well, with mechanism, in all case (with or without QM) we
get the many histories/dreams/computations, and they exist
like natural numbers. We don't have to take the "worlds" as
primitive ontological reality. I tend to not really believe
in *any* world. Those belongs to the imagination of the
relative universal numbers, whose proof of existence can
already be done in elementary arithmetic.
Physics is about constructing and testing models of physical
reality, not about dreams.
Assuming there is a physical reality per se, but with
Mechanism, the physical reality is "only" a persistent
statisticl illusion emerging from all computational histories.
You can call the MWI a dream, but for me it's a nightmare.
LOL. AG
BTW, the time irreversibility is not FAPP since the
collapsed wf, when inserted back into the SWE, recovers
only itself exactly at an earlier time, but not the
original wf which collapsed. AG
Yes, OK. If there is such a collapse, but I don't see
evidence.
If you measure a system repeatedly, you get the same
measurement. That's the evidence for collapse;
Not at all. That is what Everett explains in all details. You
don't need the collapse to explain, using only the SWE that
in each branch the observer feel like there has been a
collapse, using only a notion similar to the First Person
Indeterminacy that we have anyway in arithmetic.
that the system remains in the same eigenstate after
measurement, not in the original superposition. AG
Yes, with a collapse which is not explained, nor even well
defined, and which contradicts the SWE.
Computationalism and QM without collapse leads to immaterial
monism, which is nice as we don't have any evidence for
primary matter.
Bruno
I think it is human coquetry (grin). Nature loves to do
things in many exemplars, and elementary arithmetic loves
that to. Personal uniqueness is an illusion (provably so in
the mechanist theory of mind). The evide
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