On Sunday, September 11, 2016 at 12:02:03 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 10 Sep 2016, at 19:43, [email protected] <javascript:> wrote: > > > > On Saturday, September 10, 2016 at 1:45:56 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 09 Sep 2016, at 19:14, [email protected] wrote: >> >> >> >> On Friday, September 9, 2016 at 10:38:55 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 09 Sep 2016, at 16:08, [email protected] wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Friday, September 9, 2016 at 7:56:27 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Fri, Sep 9, 2016 at 7:46 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 08 Sep 2016, at 21:43, [email protected] wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Thursday, September 8, 2016 at 1:15:15 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal >>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On 08 Sep 2016, at 18:22, [email protected] wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Thursday, September 8, 2016 at 7:53:23 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 07 Sep 2016, at 20:06, [email protected] wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Wednesday, September 7, 2016 at 11:16:38 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 06 Sep 2016, at 17:42, [email protected] wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Tuesday, September 6, 2016 at 4:38:53 AM UTC-6, >>>>>>>> [email protected] wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I understand your pov. It has but one problem. You ignore the >>>>>>>>> elephant in the room; namely, those other worlds or universes >>>>>>>>> necessary for >>>>>>>>> the outcomes not measured in this world to be realized. But you have >>>>>>>>> an >>>>>>>>> out, stated in another post. They form part of your imagination. Not >>>>>>>>> good >>>>>>>>> enough from my pov. AG >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I should also add that the MWI sheds no light, AFAICT, on the >>>>>>>> measurement problem; that is, why we get the outcome we get. As far as >>>>>>>> collapse contradicting SR via the result of Bell experiments, I am not >>>>>>>> sure >>>>>>>> about that conclusion. If FTL occurs, it may be the case that in some >>>>>>>> frames Alice's measurement occurs first, in other frames Bob's >>>>>>>> measurement >>>>>>>> occurs first. I tend to think this muddies the waters on the issue of >>>>>>>> FLT >>>>>>>> transmission and contradictions with relativity. AG >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The "MWI" explains already a part of the mind-body problem when >>>>>>>> formulated in the Digital Mechanist Frame. You don't need to even know >>>>>>>> QM >>>>>>>> to understand the high plausibility of the "many-computations". >>>>>>>> If FTL occurs, and you keep both QM and SR, then an action in the >>>>>>>> future can change the past, and physical causility becomes >>>>>>>> meaningless. >>>>>>>> With mechanism, physical causality is not yet guarantied, to be sure, >>>>>>>> but I >>>>>>>> would throw digital mechanism if it could lead to future -> past >>>>>>>> physical >>>>>>>> action (it does not make sense). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Ah, you wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Possible correction: my remark about relativity might apply to how >>>>>>>> events are seen from a frame moving FTL -- that is, a breakdown in >>>>>>>> causality -- and might not apply to Alice/Bob situation. AG >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Well, OK, then. But it would apply if there were a collapse (in one >>>>>>>> universe), even if Alice needs to send two bits of information to >>>>>>>> transformed the effect (and send or get one qubit). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The "collapse" does not even refer to anything I can make sense of. >>>>>>>> It looks like a continuous invocation of God. As an explanation, it >>>>>>>> looks >>>>>>>> like a continuum of blasphemes (in the theology of the universal >>>>>>>> machine). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Here's what collapse means to me; the wf evolves from a solution of >>>>>>> SWE, namely a superposition, to a delta function centered at the >>>>>>> measurement value. No one knows, or has a model how this transformation >>>>>>> occurs.It's in the category of a TBD, possibly unknowable. It seems >>>>>>> empirically based since repeated measurements of the same system result >>>>>>> in >>>>>>> the same outcomes. I don't necessarily believe in primary matter's >>>>>>> existence. But its statistical persistence seems undeniable, whereas >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> many worlds has yet to manifest any persistence except in the minds of >>>>>>> its >>>>>>> advocates. AG >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The MWI is only the SWE taken literally. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> *Maybe that's the problem; taking a calculational tool too seriously. >>>>>> AG* >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> If an observer O observes a cat in the superposition d + a (dead + >>>>>>> alive), >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> *But that never happens. The state of superposition exists, if it >>>>>> does, when the box is closed, and ceases when the box is opened. * >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Then the SWE is wrong. >>>>>> >>>>>> You beg the question by postulating that QM is wrong outside the box, >>>>>> but there are no evidence for that, given that Everett showed the >>>>>> consistency of QM-without-collapse with the facts, using the simplest >>>>>> known >>>>>> antic theory of mind (mechanism) >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> *The fact is the cat is dead OR alive when the box is opened, and >>>>> presumably alive before the box is closed. So all I am doing is refuting >>>>> your claim that any observer observes a superposition of states. AG * >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> In QM+collapse, which assumes that QM is wrong somewhere (but where? >>>>> No unanimity of collapse-defenders agree on this). >>>>> >>>>> Without collapse, the cat is in the superposition state (dead+alive), >>>>> and when an observer look at the cat, he entangles itself with the cat >>>>> state, and the final state is O-a alive + O-d dead (linearity of tensor >>>>> product). Then by linearity of the SWE, O-a lives a *phenomenological >>>>> collapse" like if the cat was reduced to "alive", and O-b lives a >>>>> phenomenological like if the cat was reduced to "dead", but in the 3p >>>>> picture, no reduction ever occurred. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Bruno >>>>> >>>> >>>> Sorry, but what you write makes no sense. When you look at the cat, >>>> presumably after box is opened, the cat is either alive or dead. You may >>>> be >>>> entangled with it, but at that point in time there is no superposition of >>>> alive and dead. AG >>>> >>> >>> I don't see how you can apply the SWE to this problem. It's a function >>> of space and time and its solutions have nothing to do with alive or dead. >>> And if you can't do so, your analysis makes no sense. AG >>> >>> >>> We usually judged if an animal is dead or alive by a (rough and macro) >>> analysis of the position of the atoms of its body. >>> >>> If the cat lies down: it is dead. If the cat walks: it is alive. No need >>> to go beyond the space and time descriptions. >>> The quality dead and alive are sort of biophysical macro (in the >>> computer science sense). >>> >>> The superposition of the decaying atom contaminates all particles around >>> and that contagion of superposition propagates to the whole box, and beyond >>> if the box leaked or is opened. >>> The propagation speed is subliminal (interaction-time). >>> >>> With Everett theory, which is just Copenhagen theory minus a postulate >>> (collapse), we get back determinacy, locality, realism (although not at the >>> usual mundane level, which I admit can seem shocking). >>> >>> My point, or result, is that IF we postulate Mechanism, an assumption in >>> the cognitive science, or in philosophy of mind, or in psychology, or in >>> theology, THEN we get Everett minus, yet again, a postulate: the SWE >>> itself. It *has to*became explained as providing the unique measure for the >>> first person plural emerging view on all computations in elementary >>> arithmetic, or combinator algebra (etc.). And this works, in the sense that >>> the modal, intensional, variant of self-reference available to any >>> "sufficiently rich" (Löbian, or Gödelian) machine provides a quantum logic >>> and a quantization on the states accessible by a Universal Dovetailer (the >>> sigma_1 arithmetical reality, in logician's terms) relatively to itself. >>> >>> That provides an utterly clear arithmetic interpretation of a theory >>> due to a neopythagorean of the first century of the C. era: Moderatus of >>> Gades, but also of the main Enneads of Plotinus. >>> >>> And this 'machine's theology' contains physics, and so is testable. The >>> conception of matter becomes weird and quite counter-intuitive, and without >>> quantum mechanics, I would have judged it highly unplausible. But both the >>> theology of the universal machine, and the verifiable measurable facts >>> points toward a Platonist like theology. >>> >>> The Enlightenment Period will be transformed when theology, the modest >>> and humble, and highly skeptical, science, will return at the faculty of >>> science where it was born. Until then we are still in the middle-age like >>> we can see by looking around us. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >> >> *It 's easier just to claim the cat shares the wf of the radioactive >> source. But you still have the 800+ pound gorilla in the room you can't >> account for; namely, by your CHOICE to do the cat experiment, you're >> claiming the creation of another world with another cat and another >> observer.* >> >> >> Where did I claim something like that? The terms of the branches does not >> depend on my choice, >> > > *It seems that they do. If you do a cat experiment, you get two branches. > If you don't, you don't. * > > > Well, there are explanation why our type of brain favors the position > base, but when you choose to do an experiment, you don't create branches, > you differentiate on the alternative you are interested in. > > > > *They don't exist apriori, unless you want to deny free will. They come > into existence when an experiment is done, or possibly when there's some > sort of decision tree, such as playing a slot machine at LV. AG* > > > We don't know. We need a coherent quantum theory of gravitation to figure > out. No problem with free-will, as it is not related to quantum of > computationalist indeterminacy at all---but that is quite a different topic > (already discussed here). >
*I think we do know. See comment below. AG * > and the results of the measurement do not depend on the base chosen. >> > > *It seems that they do. Measurements of energy, momentum or spin for > example, result in different bases. AG* > > > They correspond to different base, but the numerical result are not > dependent of the base chosen to describe the wave evolution. This is well > explained in Everett long paper. > *I don't see how you reach this conclusion. If I measure spin, I surely get a different numerical result than if I measure energy, AG * > It is just the supposition terms of the wave (in any base). There are no >> worlds, only relative states. My choice change only the way the multiverse >> is locally and relatively to me partitionned. >> > > *These relative states seem to require observers and a measuring > infrastructure. * > > > No problem. Everett theory is just that it obeys to QM too. > *Please; no appeals to authority. Do you need observers or not on the other worlds, or branches, or whatever, and their measuring infrastructures? AG * > *You create them by virtue of what you DO, say in an experiment. Or do you > back off from the apparent requirement of the MWI that all possible > outcomes are measured somewhere, somehow? * > > > You don't create them at all, no more than you create the moon by looking > at it. You just localize yourslef relatively to the more probable > (numerous, weighted) relative branche(s).th > *What if the probability is 50-50 as in a spin experiment? How is the choice made?. But more important, since I've never done one, will the alternative histories pre-exist if I decide one day to do such an experiment? AG* > > > *Just having a branch evolving is not tantamount to a measurement and > observation. AG* > >> >> * Calling it a branch or whatever doesn't solve your fatal problem. >> There's a simpler solution to your problem; instead of conceiving of the >> collapse as meaning irreducible randomness, * >> >> >> The point is that the randomness becomes only a case of Mechanist first >> person indeterminacy, which exist even without quantum mechanics. >> >> *why not assume it's a continuous process whereby the wf evolves into a >> delta function centered at the value measured? IOW, just assume there's an >> as yet unknown, continuous, non linear evolution of the state prior to >> measurement, which is time reversible. After all, your objection to >> collapse is its standard interpretation as irreducible randomness. AG* >> >> >> That is a Bohm-De Broglie type of move. It assumes QM false, and leads to >> many difficulties often discussed here (see Weinberg argument that non >> linearity leads to the refutation of thermodynamics, GR, >> > > *Do you have a link for this, particularly about his comments on > thermodynamics? TIA, AG* > > > Google on "Weinberg non linear quantum mechanics". > > > > > >> etc.), including irreducibly-hidden variables/initial-conditions, with >> non local effects. Anyway, I work with computationalism, and show we have >> to derive the wave and its equation, so we will see if there is a non >> linearity in that case, but the results so far go in the direction that the >> physics is reversible and linear, etc. >> >> Let us no do "philosophy" and just be clear on what theory we assume. >> Once we assume digital mechanism, there is no more choice left (that *is* >> the point). >> > > *Succinctly, what is digital mechanism? I don't see how arithmetic and > possibly a computer can reproduce any physical theory. It's real stretch > IMO. AG* > > > It has too, see my paper already referred, or ask for more. > > You are right, a computer cannot emulate the physical reality, nor > consciousness. > > Digital mechanism, alias computationalism, is a very weak hypothesis in > cognitive science: it is the hypothesis that we could survive with a > digital artificial brain or body? It is a modern version of > Descartes-Milinda Mechanism. It generalize and weaken many versions like > Putnam's functionalism, which assumes the description level is high. > *Are you referring to Peter Putnam who used to teach at Colombia University in the late 1950's? Do you have a link? AG * > > Some sum up it by "no magic", a bit like Dideort defined rationalism by > Descarte's mechanism. > > Then it is a theorem that elementary arithmetic reality (model) realize > the universal dovetailing, and that both consciusness and matter are > emergent pattern on a self-referential structure which exist in arithmetic > (or Turing equivalent) and the math confirms this by showing that the > (antic) definition of matter when translated in arithmetic gives a quantum > logic. > > Bruno > > > > > > > >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> *Maybe you have a fundamental misunderstanding of Schrodinger's Cat. >>>>>> AG* >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> It is the measurement problem, and you talk like if the collapse >>>>>> solves it, but then tell me precisely the range of QM. >>>>>> I read de Broglie who suggested that entanglement would no more >>>>>> operate at the distance of an atom diameter. People give criteria for >>>>>> the >>>>>> collapse, but the experience refutes them. I share Feynman's idea that >>>>>> the >>>>>> collapse is a collective hallucination, and the math shows that if comp >>>>>> is >>>>>> true then that hallucination is somehow necessary. >>>>>> >>>>>> With computationalism we have to generalize Everett's embedding of >>>>>> the physicist in the physical reality to the embedding of the >>>>>> mathematician >>>>>> in arithmetic (which is actually what Gödel begun). >>>>>> >>>>>> Mechanism explains both the origin of consciousness and the origin of >>>>>> the appearance of matter, and this in a way enough precise so that we >>>>>> can >>>>>> test it, and thanks to QM, mechanism is not (yet) refuted, and is, I >>>>>> think, >>>>>> the only theory explaining consciousness, including why it cannot be >>>>>> completely explained in any first person convincing way (the so called >>>>>> hard >>>>>> problem, which is only the antic mind-body problem after mechanism >>>>>> solved >>>>>> the "easy part" (AI)). >>>>>> >>>>>> I do not defend any theory. You should not been able to guess what I >>>>>> might believe true or not. Computationalism has an advantage in >>>>>> philosophy, >>>>>> which is that it can rely on theoretical computer science which is a >>>>>> branch >>>>>> of both mathematical logic and number theory. It is a good lantern to >>>>>> search the key around, not more. >>>>>> >>>>>> My main point is that we can study the highly non trivial relation >>>>>> between machines' belief and diverse notion of truth they can discover >>>>>> and >>>>>> guess. They got a theology closer to Plotinus (300 after C., >>>>>> neoplatonism) >>>>>> and Moderatus of Gades (neopythagoreanism, 2 centuries before Plotinus) >>>>>> than the materialist Aristotelians. >>>>>> >>>>>> I say this being aware that some scientists still take the >>>>>> Aristotelian metaphysics for granted, but of course science is just >>>>>> beginning to be able to formulate the problem (which of Plato or >>>>>> Aristotle >>>>>> is closer to reality). The discovery of the universal machine/number is >>>>>> still a very recent event and few get really the Church-Turing idea and >>>>>> their relation with Gödel's completeness and incompleteness fundamental >>>>>> results. >>>>>> >>>>>> I can suggest you some good books if you are interested. But if you >>>>>> dislike Everett, it might take some work before liking the consequences >>>>>> of >>>>>> the digital mechanist hypothesis. The bible is Martin Davis >>>>>> "Undecidability", and its own introduction to computability and logic >>>>>> (both >>>>>> published by Dover) is excellent if you are enough mathematically minded. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Bruno >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> we know that, before interaction, the physical state is well >>>>>>> described by the expression O(a + d), with the tensor product noted >>>>>>> multiplicatively, and that it is equivalent with Oa + Od. So even at >>>>>>> this >>>>>>> stage the "O" can be considered being in a superposition state. That is >>>>>>> what I called the linearity of the tensor product. Now, by the >>>>>>> linearity of >>>>>>> the wave evolution we get O-a a + O-b b, that is each branch behaves >>>>>>> classically (P-i = O with i in its memory. And both 0-a and O-b can >>>>>>> repeat >>>>>>> their measurement, and the linearity of the wave evolution implies that >>>>>>> they will always find the same measurement result. So the MWI explains >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> persistence as much well as classical physics, or QM+collapse (if that >>>>>>> means something precise). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> My point is that at this stage, QM (without collapse) is compatible >>>>>>> with Mechanism (used implicitly above) only insofar as the persistence >>>>>>> is >>>>>>> explained from a statistics on *all* computations (which exist once you >>>>>>> agree that 2+2=4 independently of you and me). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> My technical point is that this work in the sense that we can derive >>>>>>> quantum logic (and normally physics) from the logical structure that >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> computations inherit from the logic of (machine) self-reference. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> That is elegant because at this stage the "theory of everything" >>>>>>> needs no less and no more than very elementary axioms (and mechanism in >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> meta-background). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The only axiom that I use are the following: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> 0 ≠ (x + 1) >>>>>>> ((x + 1) = (y + 1)) -> x = y >>>>>>> x = 0 v Ey(x = y + 1) >>>>>>> x + 0 = x >>>>>>> x + (y + 1) = (x + y) + 1 >>>>>>> x * 0 = 0 >>>>>>> x * (y + 1) = (x * y) + x >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Actually I could even just use the two combinators axioms: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Kxy = x >>>>>>> Sxyz = xz(yz) >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Such axioms are Turing complete, and you can prove the existence of >>>>>>> the UD from them (and *in* them if you add some induction axioms, but I >>>>>>> prefer to put them in the epistemology of the observers). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The Turing-Church thesis rehabilit the neopythagorean theology, and >>>>>>> we get physics exactly when we use the antic definition of knowledge >>>>>>> and >>>>>>> matter provided by them (notably by Moderatus of Gades). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On the contrary, if primary matter or if physicalism would be true, >>>>>>> we remain with the task of explaining what is their role for >>>>>>> consciousness >>>>>>> (or just first person experience). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Aristotle idea of naturalism or (weak) materialism (the existence of >>>>>>> a physical primary reality) has only been a tool for letting the >>>>>>> mind-body >>>>>>> problem sleep a bit, and that has been a very fertile simplifying >>>>>>> hypothesis, but now, with mechanism, and plausibly with only quantum >>>>>>> mechanics, we get the (predicted by the Platonist) problem of >>>>>>> justifying >>>>>>> the relation between first person discourse and third person discourse. >>>>>>> We >>>>>>> can't use the simple mind-brain identity theory, because we have an >>>>>>> infinity of quasi identical brains in arithmetic, and we can't use a >>>>>>> selection principle based on a substance without damaging the mechanist >>>>>>> hypothesis. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Keep in mind that my origianl goal is to solve the mind-body >>>>>>> problem, and with mechanism, we have no choice other than justifying >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> appearance of physicalness from a statistic based on the mix of "*all* >>>>>>> computations + machine self-reference when distributed in those >>>>>>> computations. It works (till now). Non-mechanism does not work, and it >>>>>>> is >>>>>>> well known that the mind-body problem has been put under the rug since >>>>>>> Aristotle (except by the Platonists, who were just banned from our >>>>>>> civilisation 1500 years ago). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> In Soccer terms: Plato 1, Aristotle 0. I don't pretend it is the >>>>>>> last match. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Bruno >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Bruno >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Tuesday, September 6, 2016 at 2:23:39 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal >>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On 05 Sep 2016, at 19:31, [email protected] wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Monday, September 5, 2016 at 8:08:12 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal >>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On 04 Sep 2016, at 20:27, [email protected] wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Bruno, thank you for a detailed response. Most of it is above my >>>>>>>>>>> pay grade, but I will check some of your links and see what I can >>>>>>>>>>> make of >>>>>>>>>>> them. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> OK. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> As for the MWI, I have a simple approach. If I went to LV and >>>>>>>>>>> played a slot machine for a single trial or outcome, and someone >>>>>>>>>>> asked me >>>>>>>>>>> what happened to the other thousands of outcomes I didn't get, I'd >>>>>>>>>>> think >>>>>>>>>>> that would be a crazy question. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I mainly agree, because there is no unanimity on which >>>>>>>>>>> counterfactual or conditional non standard logic to use. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> *Isn't it really much simpler? Just because something *could* >>>>>>>>>> exist, like those thousands of other outcomes of the slot machine, >>>>>>>>>> doesn't >>>>>>>>>> mean they *must* exist. The MWI insists all outcomes MUST exist. I >>>>>>>>>> see no >>>>>>>>>> necessity for that. AG * >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> You need it to get the interference between the terms of the >>>>>>>>>> wave. I agree with Deutsch: QM is the science of multiple >>>>>>>>>> interfering >>>>>>>>>> histories. The collapse is an addition to avoid that >>>>>>>>>> multiplication/differentiation consequence. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> But that's the question some physicists ask when they are >>>>>>>>>>> confronted with the non-linearity of collapse in the Copenhagen >>>>>>>>>>> Interpretation. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I tend to disagree here. The quantum situation is different >>>>>>>>>>> because with quantum mechanics, different outcomes can interfere >>>>>>>>>>> and thus >>>>>>>>>>> have some physical underpinning which is hard to avoid, especially >>>>>>>>>>> without >>>>>>>>>>> assuming the collapse of the wave. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> *How can you disagree? Many prominent physicists -- Greene, >>>>>>>>>> Deutsch, Carroll -- when confronted with the non-linearity of >>>>>>>>>> collapse, >>>>>>>>>> believe the MWI avoids or solves this problem. AG* >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> ? >>>>>>>>>> I agree with them. MWI entails no-collapse, and the evolution is >>>>>>>>>> purely linear. Just a "rotation" in the Hilbert space. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Accepting non linearity >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> There are work by Steinberg and Plaga which shows that if the QM >>>>>>>>>>> wave is slightly non linear, then we get the WW with a revenge: >>>>>>>>>>> interactions becomes possible in between terms of the wave. This >>>>>>>>>>> makes >>>>>>>>>>> wrong special relativity, but also thermodynamics, etc. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> *The wf before measurement is linear insofar as it satisfies a >>>>>>>>>> linear DE, and relativity is well tested. So I don't see any issue >>>>>>>>>> here. >>>>>>>>>> AG * >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> OK, but then there is no collapse. We agree, then, only the >>>>>>>>>> collapse leads to non-linearity. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> So I guess you mean that there is a (non linear) collapse, and >>>>>>>>>>> that, strictly speaking the SWR is false. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> SWR = ? >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> *Why does a non-linear collapse falsify SR? AG* >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> By Bell's violation, if there is a collapse, it affects elements >>>>>>>>>> which are space-separated. Einstein explained this already at the >>>>>>>>>> Solvay >>>>>>>>>> congress. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> You introduce a duality between observer and observed, or >>>>>>>>>>> between macro and micro-physics. And, you assume non-mechanism in >>>>>>>>>>> cognitive >>>>>>>>>>> science. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> H*ow can we test our models without the duality of observer and >>>>>>>>>> observed? You demand the impossible. * >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Read the book by Hans Primas on the foundation of chemistery. It >>>>>>>>>> explains well why Everett restores monism in the philosophy of mind >>>>>>>>>> (but he >>>>>>>>>> missed this happens directly with Mechanism). >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> *What "non mechanism" have I assumed? QM just gives us >>>>>>>>>> probabilities. It's not a causal theory. AG* >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> With the collapse. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> That is lot of things for which we don't have evidence. >>>>>>>>>>> Cosmologists applies QM on very big object, like black holes, if >>>>>>>>>>> not the >>>>>>>>>>> entire universe, and people trying to justify a physical collapse >>>>>>>>>>> get a lot >>>>>>>>>>> of problem, like non-locality, to cite the one Einstein disliked >>>>>>>>>>> the most, >>>>>>>>>>> and I share a bit that opinion. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> and actual time irreversibility (not FAPP) is an easier concept >>>>>>>>>>> to accept than the real or fictional other worlds necessary to >>>>>>>>>>> support the >>>>>>>>>>> MWI. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Well, with mechanism, in all case (with or without QM) we get >>>>>>>>>>> the many histories/dreams/computations, and they exist like natural >>>>>>>>>>> numbers. We don't have to take the "worlds" as primitive >>>>>>>>>>> ontological >>>>>>>>>>> reality. I tend to not really believe in *any* world. Those belongs >>>>>>>>>>> to the >>>>>>>>>>> imagination of the relative universal numbers, whose proof of >>>>>>>>>>> existence can >>>>>>>>>>> already be done in elementary arithmetic. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> *Physics is about constructing and testing models of physical >>>>>>>>>> reality, not about dreams. * >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Assuming there is a physical reality per se, but with Mechanism, >>>>>>>>>> the physical reality is "only" a persistent statisticl illusion >>>>>>>>>> emerging >>>>>>>>>> from all computational histories. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> *You can call the MWI a dream, but for me it's a nightmare. LOL. >>>>>>>>>> AG * >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> BTW, the time irreversibility is not FAPP since the collapsed >>>>>>>>>>> wf, when inserted back into the SWE, recovers only itself exactly >>>>>>>>>>> at an >>>>>>>>>>> earlier time, but not the original wf which collapsed. AG >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Yes, OK. If there is such a collapse, but I don't see evidence. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> *If you measure a system repeatedly, you get the same >>>>>>>>>> measurement. That's the evidence for collapse; * >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Not at all. That is what Everett explains in all details. You >>>>>>>>>> don't need the collapse to explain, using only the SWE that in each >>>>>>>>>> branch >>>>>>>>>> the observer feel like there has been a collapse, using only a >>>>>>>>>> notion >>>>>>>>>> similar to the First Person Indeterminacy that we have anyway in >>>>>>>>>> arithmetic. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> *that the system remains in the same eigenstate after >>>>>>>>>> measurement, not in the original superposition. AG* >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Yes, with a collapse which is not explained, nor even well >>>>>>>>>> defined, and which contradicts the SWE. >>>>>>>>>> Computationalism and QM without collapse leads to immaterial >>>>>>>>>> monism, which is nice as we don't have any evidence for primary >>>>>>>>>> matter. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Bruno >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I think it is human coquetry (grin). Nature loves to do things >>>>>>>>>>> in many exemplars, and elementary arithmetic loves that to. >>>>>>>>>>> Personal >>>>>>>>>>> uniqueness is an illusion (provably so in the mechanist theory of >>>>>>>>>>> mind). >>>>>>>>>>> The evide >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
