On 13 Sep 2016, at 00:46, [email protected] wrote:
[SNIP]
On Monday, September 12, 2016 at 2:14:18 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
On 11 Sep 2016, at 20:48, [email protected] wrote:
You create them by virtue of what you DO, say in an experiment. Or
do you back off from the apparent requirement of the MWI that all
possible outcomes are measured somewhere, somehow?
You don't create them at all, no more than you create the moon by
looking at it. You just localize yourslef relatively to the more
probable (numerous, weighted) relative branche(s).th
What if the probability is 50-50 as in a spin experiment? How is
the choice made?. But more important, since I've never done one,
will the alternative histories pre-exist if I decide one day to do
such an experiment? AG
Have you read the sane04 paper?
No. I wouldn't know where to find it,
I gave you the link:
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html
Click on the paper, and on the slide. The slide reminds a
decomposition of the reasoning in eight simple (but not all that
simple) steps.
Don't stay too long in the catalog of people criticizing a work before
studying it. You might end in the category of people who get the point
but lies to save their face.
but more important the theory doesn't appeal to me.
?
Non-computationalism relies on actual infinities, or magical souls, or
naïve fairy tales. Like Diderot understood, with many atheists,
Mechanism is the default assumption of the rationalist.
Mechanism makes eventually all notion of primary matter into
phlogiston-like concept. The point is that if Mechanism is true, the
appearance of matter has a testable explanation, not relying on
assumed substance or materiality, or physical concepts. Mechanism is
not compatible with physicalism, nor even entirely with
mathematicalism, there are some subtleties here, depending on the bet
on digitalism, which belongs to theology, and only to math in "God's
eye" (some relations are true, but only without saying them)..
I could be wrong, but it apparently relies on human memories
?
and seems solipsistic.
Some modalities of self-reference are machine-solispistic, like the
modalities related to the subject (for the others: S4Grz, S4Grz1, X,
X*, X1, X1*). But numbers, computation and the core of matter should
have a first person plural reality (G, G*, G1, G1*, Z, Z1, Z*, Z1*),
and the whole thing is a many mind structure, hardly solipsistic.
The passage from S4Grz (or X) to G (or Z) is when the machine can
discover "not-me" and can bet on the existence of the others, and when
histories can be shared among classes of multiple observers.
I think, without appealing to any theory or paper, you could answer
the question directly about the preexistence of alternative states
or histories.
Yes, everything preexist(s) in some sense, as everything (objective
and subjective) is derived from addition and multiplication of numbers.
The crazy thing here (that addition and multiplication are, taken
together with a bit of logic, already Turing universal) is not mine,
although this is not well known and I am often considered as crazy on
a point which is very basic for mathematical logicians.
If I do a cat experiment, do I create the alternative states or
histories, or are they preexisting? AG
There is only true (and false) relation between numbers, but the
computable one direct a differentiating flux of consciousness, with a
very complex mathematical structure (the modal logics give only the
"simple" propositional level, but we can explore the quantified
version: it is a matter of work).
So when you do the cat experiment, you, relatively to here-and-now,
let the (1p) consciousness flux differentiates in (not two, it is
always aleph_0 at the least) "preexisting" (yet in an epistemological
sense: they are derived notion/experience) computational histories
(defined in term of self-referential number relations).
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
