On Monday, September 12, 2016 at 4:46:16 PM UTC-6, [email protected] wrote: > > > > On Monday, September 12, 2016 at 2:14:18 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 11 Sep 2016, at 20:48, [email protected] wrote: >> >> >> >> On Sunday, September 11, 2016 at 12:02:03 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 10 Sep 2016, at 19:43, [email protected] wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Saturday, September 10, 2016 at 1:45:56 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On 09 Sep 2016, at 19:14, [email protected] wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Friday, September 9, 2016 at 10:38:55 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 09 Sep 2016, at 16:08, [email protected] wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Friday, September 9, 2016 at 7:56:27 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Fri, Sep 9, 2016 at 7:46 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 08 Sep 2016, at 21:43, [email protected] wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Thursday, September 8, 2016 at 1:15:15 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 08 Sep 2016, at 18:22, [email protected] wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Thursday, September 8, 2016 at 7:53:23 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On 07 Sep 2016, at 20:06, [email protected] wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Wednesday, September 7, 2016 at 11:16:38 AM UTC-6, Bruno >>>>>>>>> Marchal wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On 06 Sep 2016, at 17:42, [email protected] wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Tuesday, September 6, 2016 at 4:38:53 AM UTC-6, >>>>>>>>>> [email protected] wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I understand your pov. It has but one problem. You ignore the >>>>>>>>>>> elephant in the room; namely, those other worlds or universes >>>>>>>>>>> necessary for >>>>>>>>>>> the outcomes not measured in this world to be realized. But you >>>>>>>>>>> have an >>>>>>>>>>> out, stated in another post. They form part of your imagination. >>>>>>>>>>> Not good >>>>>>>>>>> enough from my pov. AG >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I should also add that the MWI sheds no light, AFAICT, on the >>>>>>>>>> measurement problem; that is, why we get the outcome we get. As far >>>>>>>>>> as >>>>>>>>>> collapse contradicting SR via the result of Bell experiments, I am >>>>>>>>>> not sure >>>>>>>>>> about that conclusion. If FTL occurs, it may be the case that in >>>>>>>>>> some >>>>>>>>>> frames Alice's measurement occurs first, in other frames Bob's >>>>>>>>>> measurement >>>>>>>>>> occurs first. I tend to think this muddies the waters on the issue >>>>>>>>>> of FLT >>>>>>>>>> transmission and contradictions with relativity. AG >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> The "MWI" explains already a part of the mind-body problem when >>>>>>>>>> formulated in the Digital Mechanist Frame. You don't need to even >>>>>>>>>> know QM >>>>>>>>>> to understand the high plausibility of the "many-computations". >>>>>>>>>> If FTL occurs, and you keep both QM and SR, then an action in the >>>>>>>>>> future can change the past, and physical causility becomes >>>>>>>>>> meaningless. >>>>>>>>>> With mechanism, physical causality is not yet guarantied, to be >>>>>>>>>> sure, but I >>>>>>>>>> would throw digital mechanism if it could lead to future -> past >>>>>>>>>> physical >>>>>>>>>> action (it does not make sense). >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Ah, you wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Possible correction: my remark about relativity might apply to >>>>>>>>>> how events are seen from a frame moving FTL -- that is, a breakdown >>>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>> causality -- and might not apply to Alice/Bob situation. AG >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Well, OK, then. But it would apply if there were a collapse (in >>>>>>>>>> one universe), even if Alice needs to send two bits of information >>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>> transformed the effect (and send or get one qubit). >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> The "collapse" does not even refer to anything I can make sense >>>>>>>>>> of. It looks like a continuous invocation of God. As an explanation, >>>>>>>>>> it >>>>>>>>>> looks like a continuum of blasphemes (in the theology of the >>>>>>>>>> universal >>>>>>>>>> machine). >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Here's what collapse means to me; the wf evolves from a solution >>>>>>>>> of SWE, namely a superposition, to a delta function centered at the >>>>>>>>> measurement value. No one knows, or has a model how this >>>>>>>>> transformation >>>>>>>>> occurs.It's in the category of a TBD, possibly unknowable. It seems >>>>>>>>> empirically based since repeated measurements of the same system >>>>>>>>> result in >>>>>>>>> the same outcomes. I don't necessarily believe in primary matter's >>>>>>>>> existence. But its statistical persistence seems undeniable, whereas >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> many worlds has yet to manifest any persistence except in the minds >>>>>>>>> of its >>>>>>>>> advocates. AG >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> The MWI is only the SWE taken literally. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> *Maybe that's the problem; taking a calculational tool too >>>>>>>> seriously. AG* >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> If an observer O observes a cat in the superposition d + a (dead + >>>>>>>>> alive), >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> *But that never happens. The state of superposition exists, if it >>>>>>>> does, when the box is closed, and ceases when the box is opened. * >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Then the SWE is wrong. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> You beg the question by postulating that QM is wrong outside the >>>>>>>> box, but there are no evidence for that, given that Everett showed the >>>>>>>> consistency of QM-without-collapse with the facts, using the simplest >>>>>>>> known >>>>>>>> antic theory of mind (mechanism) >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> *The fact is the cat is dead OR alive when the box is opened, and >>>>>>> presumably alive before the box is closed. So all I am doing is >>>>>>> refuting >>>>>>> your claim that any observer observes a superposition of states. AG * >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> In QM+collapse, which assumes that QM is wrong somewhere (but where? >>>>>>> No unanimity of collapse-defenders agree on this). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Without collapse, the cat is in the superposition state >>>>>>> (dead+alive), and when an observer look at the cat, he entangles itself >>>>>>> with the cat state, and the final state is O-a alive + O-d dead >>>>>>> (linearity >>>>>>> of tensor product). Then by linearity of the SWE, O-a lives a >>>>>>> *phenomenological collapse" like if the cat was reduced to "alive", and >>>>>>> O-b >>>>>>> lives a phenomenological like if the cat was reduced to "dead", but in >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> 3p picture, no reduction ever occurred. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Bruno >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Sorry, but what you write makes no sense. When you look at the cat, >>>>>> presumably after box is opened, the cat is either alive or dead. You may >>>>>> be >>>>>> entangled with it, but at that point in time there is no superposition >>>>>> of >>>>>> alive and dead. AG >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I don't see how you can apply the SWE to this problem. It's a function >>>>> of space and time and its solutions have nothing to do with alive or >>>>> dead. >>>>> And if you can't do so, your analysis makes no sense. AG >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> We usually judged if an animal is dead or alive by a (rough and macro) >>>>> analysis of the position of the atoms of its body. >>>>> >>>>> If the cat lies down: it is dead. If the cat walks: it is alive. No >>>>> need to go beyond the space and time descriptions. >>>>> The quality dead and alive are sort of biophysical macro (in the >>>>> computer science sense). >>>>> >>>>> The superposition of the decaying atom contaminates all particles >>>>> around and that contagion of superposition propagates to the whole box, >>>>> and >>>>> beyond if the box leaked or is opened. >>>>> The propagation speed is subliminal (interaction-time). >>>>> >>>>> With Everett theory, which is just Copenhagen theory minus a postulate >>>>> (collapse), we get back determinacy, locality, realism (although not at >>>>> the >>>>> usual mundane level, which I admit can seem shocking). >>>>> >>>>> My point, or result, is that IF we postulate Mechanism, an assumption >>>>> in the cognitive science, or in philosophy of mind, or in psychology, or >>>>> in >>>>> theology, THEN we get Everett minus, yet again, a postulate: the SWE >>>>> itself. It *has to*became explained as providing the unique measure for >>>>> the >>>>> first person plural emerging view on all computations in elementary >>>>> arithmetic, or combinator algebra (etc.). And this works, in the sense >>>>> that >>>>> the modal, intensional, variant of self-reference available to any >>>>> "sufficiently rich" (Löbian, or Gödelian) machine provides a quantum >>>>> logic >>>>> and a quantization on the states accessible by a Universal Dovetailer >>>>> (the >>>>> sigma_1 arithmetical reality, in logician's terms) relatively to itself. >>>>> >>>>> That provides an utterly clear arithmetic interpretation of a theory >>>>> due to a neopythagorean of the first century of the C. era: Moderatus of >>>>> Gades, but also of the main Enneads of Plotinus. >>>>> >>>>> And this 'machine's theology' contains physics, and so is testable. >>>>> The conception of matter becomes weird and quite counter-intuitive, and >>>>> without quantum mechanics, I would have judged it highly unplausible. But >>>>> both the theology of the universal machine, and the verifiable measurable >>>>> facts points toward a Platonist like theology. >>>>> >>>>> The Enlightenment Period will be transformed when theology, the modest >>>>> and humble, and highly skeptical, science, will return at the faculty of >>>>> science where it was born. Until then we are still in the middle-age like >>>>> we can see by looking around us. >>>>> >>>>> Bruno >>>>> >>>> >>>> *It 's easier just to claim the cat shares the wf of the radioactive >>>> source. But you still have the 800+ pound gorilla in the room you can't >>>> account for; namely, by your CHOICE to do the cat experiment, you're >>>> claiming the creation of another world with another cat and another >>>> observer.* >>>> >>>> >>>> Where did I claim something like that? The terms of the branches does >>>> not depend on my choice, >>>> >>> >>> *It seems that they do. If you do a cat experiment, you get two >>> branches. If you don't, you don't. * >>> >>> >>> Well, there are explanation why our type of brain favors the position >>> base, but when you choose to do an experiment, you don't create branches, >>> you differentiate on the alternative you are interested in. >>> >>> >>> >>> *They don't exist apriori, unless you want to deny free will. They come >>> into existence when an experiment is done, or possibly when there's some >>> sort of decision tree, such as playing a slot machine at LV. AG* >>> >>> >>> We don't know. We need a coherent quantum theory of gravitation to >>> figure out. No problem with free-will, as it is not related to quantum of >>> computationalist indeterminacy at all---but that is quite a different topic >>> (already discussed here). >>> >> >> *I think we do know. See comment below. AG * >> >>> and the results of the measurement do not depend on the base chosen. >>>> >>> >>> *It seems that they do. Measurements of energy, momentum or spin for >>> example, result in different bases. AG* >>> >>> >>> They correspond to different base, but the numerical result are not >>> dependent of the base chosen to describe the wave evolution. This is well >>> explained in Everett long paper. >>> >> >> *I don't see how you reach this conclusion. If I measure spin, I surely >> get a different numerical result than if I measure energy, AG * >> >> >> >> Of course. The point is that if we measure whatever we want, the result >> does not depend of the base used. Many are wrong on this when discussing >> Everett's theory. >> >> >> >> >> It is just the supposition terms of the wave (in any base). There are no >>>> worlds, only relative states. My choice change only the way the multiverse >>>> is locally and relatively to me partitionned. >>>> >>> >>> *These relative states seem to require observers and a measuring >>> infrastructure. * >>> >>> >>> No problem. Everett theory is just that it obeys to QM too. >>> >> >> *Please; no appeals to authority. * >> >> >> mentionning a theory is not an argument of authority, it is called >> honesty. Nobody claims that this or that theory is true or false. We avoid >> "philosophy", or make special thread, which I avoid to prevent confusion. >> >> >> >> >> >> *Do you need observers or not on the other worlds, or branches, or >> whatever, and their measuring infrastructures? AG * >> >> >> Everett assume the Universal Wave, but ignores (like most) the >> consequence of digital mechanism. >> >> I assume only elementary arithmetic and computationalism, in the UDA, and >> only elementary arithmetic in the actual beginning of the derivation of >> physics and of the wave from the interview of the universal machine. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> *You create them by virtue of what you DO, say in an experiment. Or do >>> you back off from the apparent requirement of the MWI that all possible >>> outcomes are measured somewhere, somehow? * >>> >>> >>> You don't create them at all, no more than you create the moon by >>> looking at it. You just localize yourslef relatively to the more probable >>> (numerous, weighted) relative branche(s).th >>> >> >> *What if the probability is 50-50 as in a spin experiment? How is the >> choice made?. But more important, since I've never done one, will the >> alternative histories pre-exist if I decide one day to do such an >> experiment? AG* >> >> >> >> Have you read the sane04 paper? >> > > *No. I wouldn't know where to find it, but more important the theory > doesn't appeal to me. I could be wrong, but it apparently relies on human > memories and seems solipsistic. I think, without appealing to any theory or > paper, you could answer the question directly about the preexistence of > alternative states or histories. If I do a cat experiment, do I create the > alternative states or histories, or are they preexisting? AG * >
*FWIW, I think you've solved the mind-body problem by eliminating the body. AG * > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >>> *Just having a branch evolving is not tantamount to a measurement and >>> observation. AG* >>> >>>> >>>> * Calling it a branch or whatever doesn't solve your fatal problem. >>>> There's a simpler solution to your problem; instead of conceiving of the >>>> collapse as meaning irreducible randomness, * >>>> >>>> >>>> The point is that the randomness becomes only a case of Mechanist first >>>> person indeterminacy, which exist even without quantum mechanics. >>>> >>>> *why not assume it's a continuous process whereby the wf evolves into a >>>> delta function centered at the value measured? IOW, just assume there's an >>>> as yet unknown, continuous, non linear evolution of the state prior to >>>> measurement, which is time reversible. After all, your objection to >>>> collapse is its standard interpretation as irreducible randomness. AG* >>>> >>>> >>>> That is a Bohm-De Broglie type of move. It assumes QM false, and leads >>>> to many difficulties often discussed here (see Weinberg argument that non >>>> linearity leads to the refutation of thermodynamics, GR, >>>> >>> >>> *Do you have a link for this, particularly about his comments on >>> thermodynamics? TIA, AG* >>> >>> >>> Google on "Weinberg non linear quantum mechanics". >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> etc.), including irreducibly-hidden variables/initial-conditions, with >>>> non local effects. Anyway, I work with computationalism, and show we have >>>> to derive the wave and its equation, so we will see if there is a non >>>> linearity in that case, but the results so far go in the direction that >>>> the >>>> physics is reversible and linear, etc. >>>> >>>> Let us no do "philosophy" and just be clear on what theory we assume. >>>> Once we assume digital mechanism, there is no more choice left (that *is* >>>> the point). >>>> >>> >>> *Succinctly, what is digital mechanism? I don't see how arithmetic and >>> possibly a computer can reproduce any physical theory. It's real stretch >>> IMO. AG* >>> >>> >>> It has too, see my paper already referred, or ask for more. >>> >>> You are right, a computer cannot emulate the physical reality, nor >>> consciousness. >>> >>> Digital mechanism, alias computationalism, is a very weak hypothesis in >>> cognitive science: it is the hypothesis that we could survive with a >>> digital artificial brain or body? It is a modern version of >>> Descartes-Milinda Mechanism. It generalize and weaken many versions like >>> Putnam's functionalism, which assumes the description level is high. >>> >> >> *Are you referring to Peter Putnam who used to teach at Colombia >> University in the late 1950's? Do you have a link? AG * >> >> >> PUTNAM H., 1960, Minds and Machines, Dimensions of Mind : A Symposium, >> Sidney >> Hook (Ed.), New-York University Press, New-York. also in Anderson A. R. >> (Ed.),1964. >> >> ANDERSON A.R. (ed.), 1964, Minds and Machine, Prentice Hall inc. New >> Jersey. >> (Trad. Française : Pensée et machine, Editions du Champ Vallon, 1983). >> >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> >>> Some sum up it by "no magic", a bit like Dideort defined rationalism by >>> Descarte's mechanism. >>> >>> Then it is a theorem that elementary arithmetic reality (model) realize >>> the universal dovetailing, and that both consciusness and matter are >>> emergent pattern on a self-referential structure which exist in arithmetic >>> (or Turing equivalent) and the math confirms this by showing that the >>> (antic) definition of matter when translated in arithmetic gives a quantum >>> logic. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> *Maybe you have a fundamental misunderstanding of Schrodinger's >>>>>>>> Cat. AG* >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> It is the measurement problem, and you talk like if the collapse >>>>>>>> solves it, but then tell me precisely the range of QM. >>>>>>>> I read de Broglie who suggested that entanglement would no more >>>>>>>> operate at the distance of an atom diameter. People give criteria for >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> collapse, but the experience refutes them. I share Feynman's idea that >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> collapse is a collective hallucination, and the math shows that if >>>>>>>> comp is >>>>>>>> true then that hallucination is somehow necessary. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> With computationalism we have to generalize Everett's embedding of >>>>>>>> the physicist in the physical reality to the embedding of the >>>>>>>> mathematician >>>>>>>> in arithmetic (which is actually what Gödel begun). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Mechanism explains both the origin of consciousness and the origin >>>>>>>> of the appearance of matter, and this in a way enough precise so that >>>>>>>> we >>>>>>>> can test it, and thanks to QM, mechanism is not (yet) refuted, and is, >>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>> think, the only theory explaining consciousness, including why it >>>>>>>> cannot be >>>>>>>> completely explained in any first person convincing way (the so called >>>>>>>> hard >>>>>>>> problem, which is only the antic mind-body problem after mechanism >>>>>>>> solved >>>>>>>> the "easy part" (AI)). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I do not defend any theory. You should not been able to guess what >>>>>>>> I might believe true or not. Computationalism has an advantage in >>>>>>>> philosophy, which is that it can rely on theoretical computer science >>>>>>>> which >>>>>>>> is a branch of both mathematical logic and number theory. It is a good >>>>>>>> lantern to search the key around, not more. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> My main point is that we can study the highly non trivial relation >>>>>>>> between machines' belief and diverse notion of truth they can discover >>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>> guess. They got a theology closer to Plotinus (300 after C., >>>>>>>> neoplatonism) >>>>>>>> and Moderatus of Gades (neopythagoreanism, 2 centuries before >>>>>>>> Plotinus) >>>>>>>> than the materialist Aristotelians. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I say this being aware that some scientists still take the >>>>>>>> Aristotelian metaphysics for granted, but of course science is just >>>>>>>> beginning to be able to formulate the problem (which of Plato or >>>>>>>> Aristotle >>>>>>>> is closer to reality). The discovery of the universal machine/number >>>>>>>> is >>>>>>>> still a very recent event and few get really the Church-Turing idea >>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>> their relation with Gödel's completeness and incompleteness >>>>>>>> fundamental >>>>>>>> results. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I can suggest you some good books if you are interested. But if you >>>>>>>> dislike Everett, it might take some work before liking the >>>>>>>> consequences of >>>>>>>> the digital mechanist hypothesis. The bible is Martin Davis >>>>>>>> "Undecidability", and its own introduction to computability and logic >>>>>>>> (both >>>>>>>> published by Dover) is excellent if you are enough mathematically >>>>>>>> minded. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Bruno >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> we know that, before interaction, the physical state is well >>>>>>>>> described by the expression O(a + d), with the tensor product noted >>>>>>>>> multiplicatively, and that it is equivalent with Oa + Od. So even at >>>>>>>>> this >>>>>>>>> stage the "O" can be considered being in a superposition state. That >>>>>>>>> is >>>>>>>>> what I called the linearity of the tensor product. Now, by the >>>>>>>>> linearity of >>>>>>>>> the wave evolution we get O-a a + O-b b, that is each branch behaves >>>>>>>>> classically (P-i = O with i in its memory. And both 0-a and O-b can >>>>>>>>> repeat >>>>>>>>> their measurement, and the linearity of the wave evolution implies >>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>> they will always find the same measurement result. So the MWI >>>>>>>>> explains the >>>>>>>>> persistence as much well as classical physics, or QM+collapse (if >>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>> means something precise). >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> My point is that at this stage, QM (without collapse) is >>>>>>>>> compatible with Mechanism (used implicitly above) only insofar as the >>>>>>>>> persistence is explained from a statistics on *all* computations >>>>>>>>> (which >>>>>>>>> exist once you agree that 2+2=4 independently of you and me). >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> My technical point is that this work in the sense that we can >>>>>>>>> derive quantum logic (and normally physics) from the logical >>>>>>>>> structure that >>>>>>>>> the computations inherit from the logic of (machine) self-reference. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> That is elegant because at this stage the "theory of everything" >>>>>>>>> needs no less and no more than very elementary axioms (and mechanism >>>>>>>>> in the >>>>>>>>> meta-background). >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> The only axiom that I use are the following: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> 0 ≠ (x + 1) >>>>>>>>> ((x + 1) = (y + 1)) -> x = y >>>>>>>>> x = 0 v Ey(x = y + 1) >>>>>>>>> x + 0 = x >>>>>>>>> x + (y + 1) = (x + y) + 1 >>>>>>>>> x * 0 = 0 >>>>>>>>> x * (y + 1) = (x * y) + x >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Actually I could even just use the two combinators axioms: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Kxy = x >>>>>>>>> Sxyz = xz(yz) >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Such axioms are Turing complete, and you can prove the existence >>>>>>>>> of the UD from them (and *in* them if you add some induction axioms, >>>>>>>>> but I >>>>>>>>> prefer to put them in the epistemology of the observers). >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> The Turing-Church thesis rehabilit the neopythagorean theology, >>>>>>>>> and we get physics exactly when we use the antic definition of >>>>>>>>> knowledge >>>>>>>>> and matter provided by them (notably by Moderatus of Gades). >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On the contrary, if primary matter or if physicalism would be >>>>>>>>> true, we remain with the task of explaining what is their role for >>>>>>>>> consciousness (or just first person experience). >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Aristotle idea of naturalism or (weak) materialism (the existence >>>>>>>>> of a physical primary reality) has only been a tool for letting the >>>>>>>>> mind-body problem sleep a bit, and that has been a very fertile >>>>>>>>> simplifying >>>>>>>>> hypothesis, but now, with mechanism, and plausibly with only quantum >>>>>>>>> mechanics, we get the (predicted by the Platonist) problem of >>>>>>>>> justifying >>>>>>>>> the relation between first person discourse and third person >>>>>>>>> discourse. We >>>>>>>>> can't use the simple mind-brain identity theory, because we have an >>>>>>>>> infinity of quasi identical brains in arithmetic, and we can't use a >>>>>>>>> selection principle based on a substance without damaging the >>>>>>>>> mechanist >>>>>>>>> hypothesis. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Keep in mind that my origianl goal is to solve the mind-body >>>>>>>>> problem, and with mechanism, we have no choice other than justifying >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> appearance of physicalness from a statistic based on the mix of >>>>>>>>> "*all* >>>>>>>>> computations + machine self-reference when distributed in those >>>>>>>>> computations. It works (till now). Non-mechanism does not work, and >>>>>>>>> it is >>>>>>>>> well known that the mind-body problem has been put under the rug >>>>>>>>> since >>>>>>>>> Aristotle (except by the Platonists, who were just banned from our >>>>>>>>> civilisation 1500 years ago). >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> In Soccer terms: Plato 1, Aristotle 0. I don't pretend it is the >>>>>>>>> last match. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Bruno >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Bruno >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Tuesday, September 6, 2016 at 2:23:39 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal >>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On 05 Sep 2016, at 19:31, [email protected] wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On Monday, September 5, 2016 at 8:08:12 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal >>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> On 04 Sep 2016, at 20:27, [email protected] wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Bruno, thank you for a detailed response. Most of it is above >>>>>>>>>>>>> my pay grade, but I will check some of your links and see what I >>>>>>>>>>>>> can make >>>>>>>>>>>>> of them. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> OK. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> As for the MWI, I have a simple approach. If I went to LV and >>>>>>>>>>>>> played a slot machine for a single trial or outcome, and someone >>>>>>>>>>>>> asked me >>>>>>>>>>>>> what happened to the other thousands of outcomes I didn't get, >>>>>>>>>>>>> I'd think >>>>>>>>>>>>> that would be a crazy question. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I mainly agree, because there is no unanimity on which >>>>>>>>>>>>> counterfactual or conditional non standard logic to use. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> *Isn't it really much simpler? Just because something *could* >>>>>>>>>>>> exist, like those thousands of other outcomes of the slot machine, >>>>>>>>>>>> doesn't >>>>>>>>>>>> mean they *must* exist. The MWI insists all outcomes MUST exist. I >>>>>>>>>>>> see no >>>>>>>>>>>> necessity for that. AG * >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> You need it to get the interference between the terms of the >>>>>>>>>>>> wave. I agree with Deutsch: QM is the science of multiple >>>>>>>>>>>> interfering >>>>>>>>>>>> histories. The collapse is an addition to avoid that >>>>>>>>>>>> multiplication/differentiation consequence. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> But that's the question some physicists ask when they are >>>>>>>>>>>>> confronted with the non-linearity of collapse in the Copenhagen >>>>>>>>>>>>> Interpretation. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I tend to disagree here. The quantum situation is different >>>>>>>>>>>>> because with quantum mechanics, different outcomes can interfere >>>>>>>>>>>>> and thus >>>>>>>>>>>>> have some physical underpinning which is hard to avoid, >>>>>>>>>>>>> especially without >>>>>>>>>>>>> assuming the collapse of the wave. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> *How can you disagree? Many prominent physicists -- Greene, >>>>>>>>>>>> Deutsch, Carroll -- when confronted with the non-linearity of >>>>>>>>>>>> collapse, >>>>>>>>>>>> believe the MWI avoids or solves this problem. AG* >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> ? >>>>>>>>>>>> I agree with them. MWI entails no-collapse, and the evolution >>>>>>>>>>>> is purely linear. Just a "rotation" in the Hilbert space. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Accepting non linearity >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> There are work by Steinberg and Plaga which shows that if the >>>>>>>>>>>>> QM wave is slightly non linear, then we get the WW with a >>>>>>>>>>>>> revenge: >>>>>>>>>>>>> interactions becomes possible in between terms of the wave. This >>>>>>>>>>>>> makes >>>>>>>>>>>>> wrong special relativity, but also thermodynamics, etc. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> *The wf before measurement is linear insofar as it satisfies a >>>>>>>>>>>> linear DE, and relativity is well tested. So I don't see any issue >>>>>>>>>>>> here. >>>>>>>>>>>> AG * >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> OK, but then there is no collapse. We agree, then, only the >>>>>>>>>>>> collapse leads to non-linearity. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> So I guess you mean that there is a (non linear) collapse, and >>>>>>>>>>>>> that, strictly speaking the SWR is false. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> SWR = ? >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> *Why does a non-linear collapse falsify SR? AG* >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> By Bell's violation, if there is a collapse, it affects >>>>>>>>>>>> elements which are space-separated. Einstein explained this >>>>>>>>>>>> already at the >>>>>>>>>>>> Solvay congress. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> <blockquote class=" >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. 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